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
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
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
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
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
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A R V E

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Bar Kannon
HISTORY OF THE WAR *U.S.*

IN

SPAIN AND PORTUGAL,

FROM 1807 TO 1814.

Dean
BY GENERAL SARRAZIN,

ONE OF THE COMMANDERS OF THE LEGION OF HONOUR,
AND FORMERLY CHIEF OF THE STAFF IN THE CORPS OF
THE PRINCE ROYAL OF SWEDEN.

ILLUSTRATED WITH
A MAP OF SPAIN AND PORTUGAL,
EXHIBITING THE ROUTES OF THE VARIOUS ARMIES.

A victorious general has committed no fault in the eyes of the public; while he,
that is defeated, always becomes an object of censure, however wise his con-
duct may have been.

Voltaire's General History, chap. 182.

PHILADELPHIA:
PUBLISHED BY EDWARD EARLE.

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1815.

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1897.

NEW YORK
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VOLUME 1

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
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PREFACE.

No historical account of the war, which Buona-
parte's ambition excited between France and Spain,
having yet appeared, I have collected the most inter-
esting information respecting its principal events.
The peculiar circumstances, in which I have been
placed, enabled me to consult both English and
French general officers, who served in Spain; and to
correct many errors of the official reports. Should
there still be any inaccuracies, my eagerness to rec-
tify them, as soon as they are satisfactorily pointed
out to me, will be the most convincing proof that I
actually believed in the truth of the accounts, on which
I founded my narrative.

I do not pretend to publish a *complete history*.
My work rather consists of *critical observations* upon
the principal military operations, that have taken place
in the peninsula, from the year 1807, up to the duke
of Wellington's entrance into France. The particu-
lar attention, which I have bestowed on that war,
makes me anxiously desire to have the early means
of composing a regular history, which shall contain
the requisite details concerning the force of the dif-
ferent armies, the description of their positions, the
resources of the country, and the political changes
that occurred during the war. As statesmen derive,
from the study of history, the knowledge of nations
and of their government, so ought military men to
consider the study of the campaigns of great com-

manders, as a fruitful source of information, both in theory and practice; because their faults being brought to the test, and rectified by established principles, the attentive reader cannot but increase his stock of knowledge. Such is, in fact, the course, which ought to be pursued in time of peace, for the purpose of bringing to perfection the science of war—a science, the most extensive, the most complicated, the most important, and the most noble; since it protects the liberty, the religion, the property, the commerce, and the glory of nations. An able general has always been regarded as the firmest support of his sovereign's throne; for by his military command he becomes the true depository of the monarch's power, and the safest foundation for the hopes of his country to be built upon.

I shall, perhaps, be asked by what title I constitute myself the censor of the most able generals, such as Soult, Dupont, Wellington, Suckett, Massena, &c. I answer, that from early youth I have studied mathematics, and the art of war. In 1786, when I had scarcely attained my sixteenth year, I was in a regiment of dragoons. I served the king, the republic, the directory, and lastly, Buonaparte, until the month of June, 1810, when I went to England, and offered my services to Louis XVIII. As early as in the year 1794, I wrote, under the direction of the celebrated Kleber, an account of the first siege of Mentz, and arranged his notes on the war of *la Vendée*. If the heirs of the conqueror of Heliopolis possess these manuscripts, they should give them up to government; as they contain details of the greatest interest.

Besides, the confidence, with which I have been honoured by the prince-royal of Sweden, when chief of his staff in the French armies of Germany and Italy, ought to convince the intelligent reader that my opinion on any military operation, is always the result of a serious examination, grounded upon the fundamental principles of the art, and the most brilliant exploits of our best generals.

During my stay in London, I published *Buonaparte's Confession to the abbe Maury*, and two volumes of a periodical work, entitled *The Philosopher, or Historical and Critical Observations*. These works have been favourably received all over Europe, except in France, where their circulation was rigorously prohibited. *Buonaparte's Confession* has been translated into several languages. Military men, in particular, have praised the work; because the campaigns of the French are therein discussed according to the principles and tactics, introduced by the great Frederic, and adopted by the generals, who distinguished themselves in the late wars. I have followed a similar plan with respect to the war in Spain and Portugal. The war in Russia and Germany, from 1812 to 1814, which I am about to publish, is written with the same impartiality, and the same zeal for the progress of the art.

A short analysis of the war between the French and the Spaniards, from 1793 to 1795, may, perhaps, prove acceptable here.

On the sixth of March, 1793, France declared war against Spain. On the twenty-third of the same month, the court of Madrid gave orders to repel force

by force. Troops were sent to the Pyrenees. General Don Antonio Ricardos was invested with the command of the army, which was to invade the French province of Roussillon; and Don Ventura Caro was entrusted with the defence of the passes of Spain on the Bidassoa. General Ricardos made a very brilliant campaign. With means scarcely sufficient to remain on the defensive, he arrived under the very walls of Perpignan, and took possession of Bellegarde. His death was justly lamented by all good Spaniards. The French generals Flers, Dagobert, and Doppet, who fought against Ricardos, possessed his bravery, but not his talents. General Caro at first gained some advantages, which made the French apprehensive for Bayonne. His victory of the first of May, 1793, had he known how to avail himself of it, would have rendered him master of the Adour. But the French having been considerably reinforced, he was driven back to the Bidassoa. It was in this campaign that two heroes, who have since become so illustrious, fought for the first time at Biriattou. Latour d'Auvergne, the first grenadier of France, attacked, at the head of his brave soldiers, the marquis de la Romana, who had been entrusted with the defence of Biriattou; but the French were repulsed.

The campaign of 1794 proved a series of disasters to the Spaniards. The count de la Union, general Ricardos' successor, was a very brave soldier, but an indifferent general. He died on the field of honour like the French general Dugommier, who had rendered victory certain by the ability of his plans, and the boldness of his attacks. Figueras was surren-

dered by treachery. Ricardos had quartered his army on the French territory, during the winter of 1793; and twelve months later, the very same army, commanded by general Las Amarillaz, did not think itself safe on its own ground, at a distance of sixty miles from the French frontiers. This panic of its chiefs extended also to those of the army of Navarra. Court intrigues had caused general Caro to be replaced by the count de Colomera. The latter was defeated, and Spain invaded as far as Toloso, where general Moncey had his head-quarters, in the month of August, 1794. Several engagements with out-posts, in which the Spaniards frequently had the advantage over the French, proved that the soldiers of each army were as brave as their opponents; and that the misfortunes of the Spaniards were merely the consequence of incapacity on the part of their generals.

The campaign of 1795 opened in favour of the French, with the capture of Rosas. Dugommier's death had not been perceived in the French army; because he had been succeeded by general Perignon, who possessed the confidence and attachment of the generals and soldiers under his orders. The Spanish general Las Amarillaz was replaced by Don Joseph Urrutia, and the Spaniards soon observed the beneficial consequences of this change. Their army was rapidly reorganized. It had resumed the offensive with alternate success, when the peace, signed at Basil, on the twenty-second of July, 1795, put an end to all hostilities. Prince de Castel Franco, who had succeeded count de Colomera, in Navarra, could not prevent the possession of Vittoria by the French; but

he reorganized the army, and displayed some talents; for, with forces inferior to those of general Moncey, he succeeded in keeping the two Castiles free from French invasion. It may even be affirmed that, had not peace been concluded, he would, by means of the numerous reinforcements he received at that time, have assumed the offensive, and forced the French to retreat to the Bidassoa.

France had then armies on all her frontiers, and in la Vendee. Every where she was triumphant; and in 1808, Europe would have obeyed Napoleon, had he respected Spanish delicacy. The conqueror of the Austrians at Austerlitz, of the Prussians at Jena, and of the Russians at Friedland, was resisted by a loyal and intrepid people, filled with indignation at seeing themselves robbed of their legitimate sovereign. Who will be able to solve this problem? In 1794 and 1795, France was on the point of giving the law to Spain and all the continent; whilst in 1808, that self same Spain dared to resist France, whose forces, all disposable at the time, must have crushed that country; and in 1814, the Spaniards gave the law on the banks of the Garonne, from Bourdeaux to Toulouse?—The French soldiers of 1808, were far superior to those of 1794 and 1795, as they had the experience of war. The plans of Buonaparte were, or ought to have been, *much better combined* than the ravings of the committee of public safety, and of the directory; and yet in 1795, the French got as far as the Ebro, and in 1814, they were pursued to the banks of the Garonne.

The chief cause of an empire's triumph is to be sought for in the measures, adopted by its government; which employs or neutralizes at will the talents of its generals, and the disposition of its troops. Ricardos and Dugommier are, perhaps, indebted for their great reputation to that very death, which snatched them from the midst of victory. At a later period they might have fallen victims to the intrigues of insidious enemies; for merit is always envied. It was envy that removed Caro from the army of Navarra, the glory of which he had raised by sharing its dangers. Like his companions in arms, he saw with sorrow that his government acted feebly; and his grief was unbounded, when he heard of the peace, concluded by his monarch, with the new French government. This loyal Spaniard had sworn not to sheath his sword, but on the day when the august house of Bourbon should be re-established on the throne of Saint Louis. He would have shared my joy, and that of all good Frenchmen, on having at length witnessed that happy event.



HISTORY OF THE WAR

IN

SPAIN AND PORTUGAL.

BOOK I.

SPAIN is situated, as it were, between Europe and Africa; for on setting aside the received geographical notions, and attending simply to facts, it must be confessed that the peninsula belongs equally to those two parts of the globe; since its soil grows the productions of both, and its population is derived from the Goths, who came from the north, and the Saracens, who came from the south. Spain is bounded on the east by the Mediterranean Sea; on the south by the same sea, and the Straits of Gibraltar; on the west by Portugal, and the Atlantic Ocean; and on the north by the Bay of Biscay, and the Pyrenean Mountains. Its breadth, from north to south, is estimated at one hundred and ninety-five leagues; and its length, from east to west, at two hundred and nineteen: its circumference is calculated at five hundred and eighty leagues.

This rich country was known by the Phœnicians about one thousand years before the Christian æra. They established colonies in Spain. Three centuries before the same æra, Carthage conquered the finest provinces of the peninsula. Commerce served as a pretence for the first attempts;

but the Carthaginian generals soon joined military violence to mercantile cunning, and, in a very short time, they became masters of the provinces that border on the sea shore, from Cadiz up to Barcelona. Rome, the sworn enemy of Carthage, offered her protection to the Spaniards. The destruction of Saguntum, by Hannibal, avenged by the splendid victory of Scipio in the plains of Zama, caused the Romans to be favourably received. But it was not long before the extortions of these new protectors rendered them as odious as their predecessors, the Carthaginians. The Spaniards, by their courage, their sobriety, their vigour, and their indefatigable activity, showed themselves worthy of fighting the Romans. Unwilling to survive the loss of their independence, the inhabitants of Numantium followed the example of the Saguntians, and buried themselves under the ruins of their city. Though headed at first by Viriatus, and afterwards by Sertorius, both celebrated for their exploits and their talents, the unfortunate Spaniards were yet obliged to submit to the good fortune of Pompey the great. The battle of Munda, which was gained by Cæsar over the eldest son of his illustrious rival, completed the conquest of a country, in whose genial climate, fertile soil, and rich gold and silver mines, the Romans found a very precious reward for the prodigious exertions, which they had used to reduce Carthage to submission.

Spain constituted a part of the Roman empire until the beginning of the fifth century. It then became one of the principal theatres of the revolutions, occasioned by the irruption of the barbarians from the north. These were destroyed by the Saracens in 712. Towards the year 1000, Sancho the great had united the whole peninsula into one monarchy; but, by the example of Charlemagne, he divided his kingdom among his children at his death. Spain remained split into different monarchies until the year 1474, when it was again united under one sceptre, by the marriage of Ferdinand V with Isabella, queen of Castile. Its

population, at that time, was calculated at fourteen millions of souls. The reign of Charles V was to Spain what the reign of Louis XIV has since been to France. The Spaniards led the fashion in Europe; and, until about the middle of the seventeenth century, they were considered as patterns of politeness, gallantry, erudition, loyalty, valour, and magnificence. Francis I having been defeated at Pavia, was a prisoner at Madrid.

The appointment of a French prince to the throne of Spain in 1700 roused all Europe against Louis XIV, and caused a general war, known by the name of *the war for the succession of Spain*; of which I shall sketch the principal features, on account of their analogy with the events, that form the subject of this work.

In the year 1706, Philip V was on the brink of ruin. He was forced to raise the siege of Barcelona, and obliged to lead his army back into Spain by the road of Perpignan and Bayonne. Ciudad-Rodrigo, Salamanca, and even Madrid, had opened their gates to the allies: but the slowness and weakness of the archduke rendered all these advantages useless. Philip re-entered his capital. The battle of Almanza, which was gained by Berwick, in 1707, over lord Galloway, seated that monarch firmly on his throne. His severe treatment of Xativa, a town of the kingdom of Valentia, was justly blamed. The inhabitants had ranged themselves on the side of the archduke, his rival: the resistance they opposed to the king's troops was marked by a courage, and devotedness, which placed the besieged on a level with the heroes of Saguntum. The town was taken by assault, plundered, and burnt; and all the inhabitants were put to the sword. In 1708 Tortosa was taken by the duke of Orleans, in sight of Stahremberg, the archduke's general. In 1710 fortune smiled upon the allies. Philip was completely defeated near Saragossa. Stahremberg, his conqueror, conducted the archduke to Madrid, whilst the fugitive monarch collected at Valladolid the wrecks of his

army. He appeared lost, without any resource. Louis XIV himself became a prey to the caprices of fate. Defeated even in the interior of his kingdom, he appealed to the French nation, who made great efforts, in consequence of the frankness, moderation, and nobleness of their monarch's behaviour. The haughty treatment, experienced by his plenipotentiaries, during the conferences of Gertruydenberg, piqued the French, at all times so prone to maintain the honour of the throne, and to avenge the insults offered to their sovereign. The reinforcements, destined for Spain, were placed under the command of the duke of Vendome, one of the most celebrated generals of Louis XIV. On his arrival in Spain, the grandees refused to obey him, and deliberated on the rank they should allow him. "All ranks are equal to me," was the proud answer of the worthy descendant of Henry IV. "I came not to dispute for precedence with you,—I come to prevent your being deprived of your lawful monarch." Surprised at finding so much modesty combined with such transcendent merit, all the Spanish generals zealously vied in the execution of the duke's orders. Vendome kept his word. He maintained Philip on the throne of Spain, and brought him back to Madrid. He took Stanhope prisoner with his army, and defeated Stahremberg in the plains of Villaviciosa. These successes dissipated Philip's alarms, and destroyed the archduke's hopes. Philip, to reward his services, offered Vendome five hundred thousand livres in gold; but the French general refused his offer, saying, "Sire, I am fully sensible of your generosity; but I entreat your majesty to distribute this gold among the brave Spaniards, whose valour, and attachment to your person have, in one day, saved you so many kingdoms." What a lesson for the Cuestas, Egreias, Arizagas, Lapenas, Ballasteros!

Peace was signed at Utrecht on the fifteenth of July, 1713. Barcelona, however, although evacuated by the emperor's troops, and left to its own resources, refused to ac-

knowledge Philip for its sovereign. The French were obliged to besiege the town; and it was on the breach, where other sieges are ended, that this began with an obstinacy bordering on fury. The battle raged in the streets, and even in the houses: the monks rushed with the bayonet upon the French grenadiers, and often successfully; but at length the inhabitants of Barcelona, like those of Saragossa in 1809, were obliged to surrender at discretion, after having sustained the most dreadful assaults: Marshal Berwick, penetrated with admiration of the heroism displayed by those intrepid Catalonians, granted them their property and their lives, in spite of the loud demands of his army, that, in conformity with the laws of war, Barcelona, taken by storm, should be treated like the unfortunate town of Xativa. It had stood a blockade of eleven months, and a well conducted siege of two; and its conquest cost the besiegers above ten thousand men.

The kingdom of Portugal is situated in the western part of the Spanish peninsula. Its length, from north to south, is calculated at one hundred and twenty-five leagues; and its breadth, from east to west, at fifty-four. This kingdom was separated from Spain only after the expulsion of the Moors. The Portuguese monarchy commenced in 1139. The brilliant period of that country was towards the end of the fifteenth century, under the reign of Emanuel the great. It was at this time that Vasco de Gama opened to the Europeans the road to the East-Indies, where the duke of Albuquerque, as celebrated for his genius as for his enterprising spirit, covered the Portuguese arms with everlasting glory. In 1580, Portugal was again united with Spain by the death of Cardinal Henry. Philip II tormented his new subjects with the most unheard of vexations: but the proud Portuguese, indignant at his tyranny, reconquered their liberty, after sixty years of suffering. Don Juan IV was proclaimed their king in 1640. During the war for the succession of Spain, Peter II sided with the allies against

Philip V, and acted an important part in the coalition. Ever since that period, the kingdom of Portugal owes its preservation, and the prosperity of its people, to the wise policy of its monarchs, whose constant efforts have been directed to deserve the protection and friendship of the British empire.

I shall not mention the war between Spain and France, which, fortunately for the two nations, was terminated by the treaty of Basil, signed on the twenty-second of July, 1795. From the instant Buonaparte was appointed consul, he coveted the possession of the peninsula. The better to draw the king of Spain into his snares, he led him to hope for the conquest of Portugal, and its union with the Castilian monarchy.—Charles IV, anxious to preserve peace for the benefit of his subjects, over whom he ruled more as a father than as a king, was weak enough to believe in the loyalty of the new cabinet of the Thuilleries. He blindly adopted the projects of Buonaparte, when the latter, delighted to have obtained an influence so useful to his designs, appeared to display great moderation in accepting the pacific proposals which the court of Portugal sent him by the Chevalier d'Aranjo. It was in consequence of Napoleon's authority that the Spanish commander-in-chief, Manuel de Godoi, signed the treaty of peace between Spain and Portugal, on the sixth of June, 1801. Towards the first of August, general Le Clere, Buonaparte's brother-in-law, who commanded the *auxiliary* army, left Spain to return to France. The Spaniards treated the French officers and soldiers in the most friendly manner. Spain was entirely evacuated after the conclusion of a treaty of peace between France and Portugal, which was signed on the twenty-ninth of September. It is a circumstance worthy of remark, that Buonaparte, who wished to give the Spaniards a favourable opinion of his troops, had taken particular care to compose Le Clere's army of the choicest regiments; the soldiers were, besides, ordered, under the most

severe penalties, to treat the Spaniards with the greatest regard; and these orders were so well obeyed, that the confident and generous Castilians appeared to regret the departure of the very Frenchmen who were soon to return, rob them of their king, and subject them to Buonaparte.

The disasters of Ulm and Austerlitz, in the year 1805, forced Austria and Russia to quit the field of battle for a time. Notwithstanding the good harmony, which seemed to prevail between the courts of Paris and Madrid, rumours were spread, that, as soon as Buonaparte could rely on the sincerity of the amicable protestations of Prussia and Russia, several divisions of the French grand army of Germany were to be detached, under the pretence of being sent to besiege Gibraltar, but in reality to place a brother of Napoleon on the throne of Spain. In the spring of 1806, I had my head quarters in the Castle of Weilburgh, which belongs to the Prince of Nassau. One day, when I was conversing with his Highness on the political and military situation of Europe, the prince spoke of the possibility of making France resume her limits of the year 1789. Austria, Prussia, and Russia, were to attack the line of the Rhine; England was to land one hundred thousand men on the French side of the Channel, and march to Paris; Spain was to penetrate by the Pyrenees as far as the Loire; Italy was to be attacked by two hundred thousand Turks. At this suggestion I exclaimed: *O pulchrum caput, si cerebrum haberet!* I easily recognized in his opinion a secret attack of his brother-in-law, Prince Louis of Wurtemberg, uncle to the emperor Alexander, who, two months before, had come from St. Petersburg to visit the family of his consort. I observed to the Prince of Nassau, that if Prussia did not submit to the will of France, Frederic William would be attacked and defeated; that the Russians would come too late to his assistance, as they had done the year before to co-operate with Mack: that Austria, the inveterate enemy of Prussia, would delight in seeing the latter

power humbled for having so indiscreetly refused to contribute to the deliverance of Germany in 1805: that Spain was under the influence of Napoleon, who regarded king Charles merely as his first prefect, and would soon transfer the throne to one of his brothers; that Turkey possessed neither the will nor the means of conquering Italy; and finally, that England, which is so powerful, so active, and so fortunate upon the seas, as well as in both the Indies, would be so long in calculating the expense of a march to Paris, that it would no longer be possible to perform it successfully, whenever the expedition should be definitively resolved upon.

The prince, although of a very placid disposition, could not conceal an emotion of anger, which escaped him on hearing my opinion concerning the king of Spain, "There is then nothing sacred to your sovereign," said his highness, "and his promises cannot be trusted?"—"Certainly not," I calmly replied, "unless they be favourable to his ulterior designs. Buonaparte's conduct is that of the ancient conquerors, who ravaged the globe—he knows no law but his interest." I was on the point of telling the prince that he too would be swallowed up in his turn; when he interrupted me, saying. "You labour under the grossest mistake. I frequently had the honour of being admitted into the company of your emperor. *I dare flatter myself with possessing a profound knowledge of men.* I am a zealous disciple of Lavater. Buonaparte's noble and prepossessing physiognomy is a sure sign that he is incapable of acting wrongly towards the King of Spain, his most faithful ally. Have you then forgotten the battle of Trafalgar, when the Spaniards certainly fought in a manner, that entitles them to the gratitude of Napoleon? Would you make me believe that Buonaparte is perfidious enough to forget such a devotedness, and to deprive Spain of its lawful monarch?" I answered to the prince, that his observations manifested his ardent love of justice: that if Buonaparte had possessed sen-

timents as virtuous, he would still be a colonel of artillery, and that his insatiable ambition warranted the accuracy of my predictions.

Indeed, the campaign of 1806, against Prussia, actually destroyed the work of the great Frederick. The dreadful battles of Eylau and Friedland, in 1807, left the Russians no hope of success in their struggle against France. Buonaparte thought the moment favourable to accomplish his projects of invasion in the south of Europe. Under the persuasion that the aim of its ally was merely to shut the continent to English commerce, the court of Madrid approved the treaty of Fontainebleau, dated on the twenty-sixth of October, 1807. The second article gave the province of Alentejo and the kingdom of Algarvia to the Prince of Peace, as his exclusive property, and with all the rights of sovereignty. Twenty thousand Spaniards were ordered to join a corps of five-and-twenty thousand Frenchmen, commanded by general Junot. The Prince Regent of Portugal also shared the fatal security of Charles, and he must have fallen into Buonaparte's snares, had it not been for the anxious vigilance of the English over the interests of their faithful ally. It was only by the strongest remonstrances, that Sir Sidney Smith, and the English ambassador at Lisbon, succeeded in determining the prince to leave his capital for the Brazils. The day after the departure of the court, which took place on the twenty-ninth of November, the French entered Lisbon. The severe measures resorted to by Junot, displeased the populace. Numbers of discontented people assembled in the streets: a few soldiers were wounded, and one officer killed. Junot, who had learnt at Milan and Cairo by what means Buonaparte quelled the insurrections of large cities, ordered his troops to fire upon the mob, and tranquillity was restored.

By one of the articles of the above-mentioned treaty, it was stipulated, that, exclusively of Junot's army, another levy of forty-thousand men should be collected at Bayonne,

on the twentieth of November, 1807, that they might be in readiness to enter Spain, and from thence proceed to Portugal, in case the English should threaten that country with an attack. Instead of forty, sixty thousand troops were collected. This army crossed the Pyrenees under the command of general Murat, who assigned cantonments to his soldiers in places, not far distant from the road, which leads from Bayonne to Madrid. In this position he anxiously waited for a favourable opportunity to avail himself of the quarrels, which Buonaparte's agents were soon to excite in the royal family of Spain. As soon as Murat had been apprised of the events of the fifteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth of March, 1808, he rapidly marched to Madrid with the corps of generals Monecy and Dupont. On the twenty-fourth he entered that city at the head of the army, which encamped on the adjacent hills. No troops were left in the town but those that were thought necessary for the maintenance of good order. King Charles, who was still sorrowfully brooding over the dissensions, by which the peace of his family had been disturbed in October, 1807, had on the nineteenth of March yielded to circumstances, and resigned the crown to the Prince of the Asturias, who assumed the name of Ferdinand VII. A proclamation of the new king informed the people that the revolution, which had just taken place, was to strengthen the alliance of Spain with France. His majesty expressed his lively satisfaction at the friendly manner, in which the Spaniards had received the French troops; and assured his subjects that both Buonaparte and himself had no other object than to combat the English government with energy.

When Napoleon was informed of the good reception, given by Ferdinand and his subjects to his lieutenant and the troops under his command, he offered himself as a conciliator to end the quarrels, which had arisen among his allies. It was insinuated to Charles that he would do well to protest against an abdication, which could be attributed

solely to violence; and he was led to believe that the emperor, his faithful ally, would hasten to restore to him a crown which he had unjustly relinquished, provided he consented to solicit his powerful mediation. Charles good-naturedly lent himself to whatever his counsellors seemed to wish. On the twenty-fifth of March, 1808, he wrote to Buonaparte:—"I have been forced to resign the throne, but tranquillity is now restored; and, fully confiding in the generosity and genius of the great man, who has always declared himself my friend, I have taken the resolution to resign myself into his hands, and to await his determination respecting my fate, that of the Queen, and of the Prince of Peace."

The following protest was annexed to this letter:

"I protest and declare that my decree of the nineteenth of March, by which I resign the crown in favour of my son, is an act to which I have been forced in order to prevent greater misfortunes, and to spare the effusion of the blood of my well-beloved subjects. Consequently it ought to be declared null and void.

(Signed)

I, THE KING."

On the other hand, Murat was acknowledging Ferdinand VII, treating him as a king, and giving him the most solemn assurances of Napoleon's friendship. He was told that his disputes with his father would be settled to his complete satisfaction, if he determined on leaving them to the mediation of the Emperor. The royal family of Spain repaired to Bayonne, where Buonaparte had arrived a few days before. The conferences to smooth the difficulties between the father and son lasted until the fifth of May. Among the many disgusts, which Ferdinand experienced, he had the grief of hearing the legitimacy of his birth contested by the very person, to whom he owed his life. The weakness of Charles, the folly of the Queen, and the meanness of the Prince of Peace, drew upon them the public

contempt. Ferdinand and the Infant Don Carlos displayed much firmness. Buonaparte, wishing to frighten the former, told him, that the past ought to have shown his will was not to be resisted with impunity, and that it was as easy for him to punish as to threaten.—“I understand you,” answered Ferdinand with much energy. “You endeavour to intimidate me by reminding me of the fate of the duke d’ Enghien. I request it as a favour from you, to let me perish like my cousin, if you are determined to rob me of the crown of Spain.” His brother, the Infant Don Carlos, who was present, threw himself into the arms of Ferdinand, saying to Buonaparte, “I too beg as a special favour to die with my brother and my king, if you are unjust enough to deprive the Spaniards of their lawful sovereign.”

The two brothers remained for some time encircled in each others arms, weeping bitterly.—Buonaparte, in spite of his iron heart, had not the strength to address any farther discourse to them. Duroc concluded the negotiation, or rather caused the proper signatures to be affixed to the absolute mandates of his master, to whom the crown of Spain was ceded by Charles, and by the two sons of that monarch. This renunciation bears the date of the sixth of May, 1808. Joseph Buonaparte was proclaimed king of the Spains and Indias on the fifth of June following.

Murat wanted to be completely certain that the inhabitants of Madrid submitted to their fate. It is only after a decisive struggle that it is known to whom the palm of victory appertains. Alarming rumours were spread concerning the royal family. It was asserted that they were treated as prisoners of state by their *great friend*, who had assumed this title with the sole view of accomplishing his ambitious designs. The queen of Etruria, and the infant Don Francisco, were also on the point of leaving Madrid for Bayonne, when the people opposed their departure. *It is said* that an aid-de-camp of prince Murat narrowly escaped. The French troops fired upon the inhabitants, who

rushed to arms in all quarters; but an orderless multitude must always finally submit to regular troops. "Grape-shot and the bayonet," says Murat in his report, "*cleared the streets.*" He calculates the number of people, collected in the Alcala and its environs, at twenty thousand. The Spaniards kept up a destructive fire from the interior of their houses. After the garrison had been reinforced by the troops encamped near Madrid, the attack became general. Houses were broken open, and every inhabitant, found with *arms in his hand*, was put to the sword. The carnage was horrible, and the pillage immense. This conflict of the second of May cost the lives of more than ten thousand Spaniards, slaughtered when they were defenceless, and imploring *the clemency of the conquerors!* Buonaparte's tactics to inspire a whole people with terror, by indiscriminately shooting friends and foes in capital cities, is peculiar to him, and stamps his policy with a character of ferocity unknown in the ages of Alexander and Cæsar.

The provinces were soon acquainted with the sad events of Bayonne and Madrid. "One and the same thought pervaded the governors and magistrates:—"Resistance to oppression." Their sentiments were common to all Spaniards. The insurrection may be affirmed to have been general, except in those parts, where the French were very numerous, and in the towns of Navarre and Catalonia which they had occupied under the mask of friendship. The Spanish troops, that were in Portugal under the command of Junot had been recalled, and had returned to Spain. The friendly relations with England were immediately re-established, and the junta of Seville, in conformity with some ancient regulations, was considered as the centre of the general government of the kingdom, in the name of Ferdinand VII. A proclamation of that junta, dated the sixth of June, 1808, declared war against France; and stated the motives of this measure with much precision and energy. This appeal to the courage of the Castilians was

hailed with joy. The most patriotic proclamations were issued by the juntas of each province: but their resentment showed itself more in words than actions. They knew not how to avail themselves of the enthusiasm, which electrified every heart. The desire to be revenged was at its utmost height: but none knew how to organize the true means of revenge; and the momentary successes, obtained in several parts of the peninsula, by increasing the confidence of the Spaniards, made them neglect the measures, that were requisite to enable them to profit by their first victories.

Admiral Rosily was in the harbour of Cadiz, having under his orders a squadron composed of five ships of the line, and one frigate. General Morla summoned him to surrender; and on his refusal, a brisk fire was kept upon him during the ninth and tenth of June. Seeing that all resistance was useless, the French admiral hoisted a flag for a parley, and after many explanations surrendered on the fourteenth. This result, due to the presence of an English squadron, which blockaded Cadiz, as much as to the fire of the batteries belonging to the town, was, nevertheless, entirely ascribed to the Spaniards: their flag was hoisted in all the French ships without the least appeal on the part of the English. A delicacy so uncommon in their new allies, had the best moral effect on the Spanish government and the military leaders. Castanos was appointed general of the army of Andalusia, and General Caro obtained the command of the kingdom of Valentia. Marshal Monecy, after some skirmishing of the advanced guards, halted before Valentia on the twenty-eighth of June, at the head of fifteen thousand men. His idea was to alarm the troops and the inhabitants by a grand discharge of artillery and musketry; but the besieged met him with firmness, and turned a deaf ear to every proposal of accommodation. Monecy had hoped to get possession of Valentia by a *coup de main*. Having recovered from his error, and being uneasy concerning his

communications with Madrid, he retreated with the loss of about one thousand men *hors de combat*.

He was more fortunate than General Dupont who had been sent to Andalusia with eighteen thousand men. The insurgents having defended themselves in Cordova, the town was taken by storm, and given up to pillage.

This conduct, though commanded by existing circumstances, raised the exasperation of the inhabitants to the highest pitch. The whole province rushed to arms: all French soldiers that were seen about, marauding to procure any subsistence, were massacred. General Reding commanded five-and-twenty thousand regular troops, and threatened to cut off the communications of the French with Madrid. General Dupont, a very able officer, felt all the danger of his position; he evacuated Cordova, and established himself at Andujar, on the right bank of the Guadalquivir, while he detached General Wedel to Baylen. Several combats took place, with varied success on both sides, from the first to the eighteenth of July. Reding sagaciously judged that he should easily defeat the French, if he succeeded in dividing their forces. Two Spanish columns took possession of Baylen, and occupied the place. Gobert retreated upon Carolina. Dupont immediately left Andujar, to form his junction with Wedel in the Sierra Morena, and found Reding at the head of five-and-twenty thousand men, posted on the high road from Cordova to Madrid. Having determined to open a passage sword in hand, he attacked them with impetuosity, but was repulsed. The Spanish general had placed his troops in several lines, and ably availed himself of the advantages which the ground afforded. Dupont ordered seven successive charges with the bayonet, under cover of a most destructive fire of artillery. The Spaniards stood unmoved, while Reding rode through the ranks, calling out to the soldiers, "Remember, my friends, that you are fighting for your precious liberty, for our good king Ferdinand VII, and for our holy religion." Dupont

praised his troops for their good conduct up to that day, and incessantly repeated to them that they must *conquer, or die*. But the good position, and the numerical superiority of the Spaniards, rendered victory impossible; and the French soldiers, though very brave, were so exhausted with fatigue, that they had no longer strength to seek death in the ranks of the enemy. General Marescot, more learned as an engineer than profound in tactics, declared that there were no means left to preserve the French troops but by capitulating. He was an older general in point of rank than Dupont. The latter, much hurt by the disheartening predicament in which he was placed, through the dejection of his troops, as well as Buonaparte's commands, which he had but reluctantly obeyed, now determined to enter into a treaty with Reding, and thereby avoid the total destruction of his army. I am far from blaming general Dupont for having capitulated: all his troops witnessed not only his courage, which left victory long doubtful, but his despair, which often made him seek for death in the most perilous places. Had his orders been punctually obeyed by general Wedel, the Spaniards dared not have conceived the design of cutting off the retreat of the French upon Madrid. Fourteen thousand men laid down their arms. About two thousand had been killed or taken prisoners in the battle of Baylen, which commenced on the nineteenth at three o'clock in the morning, and raged with the utmost obstinacy until two o'clock in the afternoon.

The exertions of general Cuesta, in the north of Spain, were not crowned with the success expected from the fine army under his command. He had collected nearly forty thousand men on the heights of Medina del Rio Secco. In this position he was attacked by Marshal Bessieres on the fourteenth of July. The Spaniards made a brilliant defence. Although more than half of the army was composed of new levies, their enthusiasm and courage, operating in lieu of instruction and experience, left victory a long time doubt-

ful. Bessieres had recourse to stratagem. He declined battle on his right and centre; and moving his choicest troops to his left-wing, succeeded in overthrowing Cuesta's fight. Blake performed prodigies of valour, and covered the retreat upon Benevente. The victory of the French was partly due to the 10th and 23d regiments of *chasseurs a cheval*, who made several charges against the Spanish infantry with the greatest intrepidity. Cuesta's movement was premature. He knew that he had to encounter choice troops, of which the imperial guard formed a part. Instead of advancing to Medina, it would have been more prudent to fortify himself in the mountains of Leon; or at least not to advance beyond Benevente, before he could act in concert with the armies of Andalusia and Arragon.

This reverse, however, was amply compensated by the fine defence of Sarragossa. On the second of July, the French attacked the outposts of that place, and forced the troops back into the town. The convent of St. Joseph was taken. The bridge on the Ebro, which had been begun on the second, was finished on the 12th; and the place was completely invested. The heavy artillery, necessary for the siege, was supplied by the arsenals of Bayonne and Pampelona. The town was neither regularly attacked nor regularly defended; but both the attack and the defence were carried on with unparalleled obstinacy.

On the second and third of August, 1808, the besiegers bombarded the town, and cannonaded the wall near the gate of Santa Engracia. The breach having appeared practicable on the fourth at break of day the French gave the assault, and succeeded in penetrating into a part of the town. The French general, being persuaded that the Spaniards had lost all hope of resistance, sent proposals of capitulation to general Palafox. This brave officer sent no answer but these words:—

“*War, blade to blade!*”*

* *Guerre au couteau!*

For several days the French were obliged to besiege every house, in proportion to the extent that they wished to advance into the town. It may be supposed that the governor was acquainted with the successes obtained at Valentia and Baylen; and that he expected to receive prompt assistance: but be this as it may, his energy, the courage of the garrison, and the devotedness of the inhabitants, are above all praise. The governor's brother succeeded in entering the place with some ammunition, when a want of it was beginning to be felt. The troops, that escorted this convoy, being about two thousand in number, likewise proved a great relief. All classes of inhabitants vied in zeal with each other. The countess de Burita formed a corps of ladies, the most respectable for their birth and wealth, to attend the wounded; and these intrepid Amazons frequently exposed themselves to the greatest dangers, under showers of balls, bombs, and bullets, to perform the honorable office which they had undertaken. Conduct so heroic was at length rewarded. The French retreated; and the siege was raised in the night, between the thirteenth and fourteenth of August.

Several less important events had taken place in the other provinces of Spain. On the fifth of July, general Caulaincourt, brother to the French ambassador at St. Petersburg, took possession of Cuenca, and gave the town up to pillage. On the fifth of the same month, general Reille attacked the Catalonians, who were blockading Figueras, dispersed them, and supplied the place with fresh provisions, ammunition, &c. On the sixteenth, general Merlin attacked Bilboa, which was occupied, after a sharp resistance. On the twenty-third, general Merle took possession of Santander. On the twenty-sixth, marshal Bessieres occupied Leon. King Joseph left Madrid on the first of August; and on the twenty-second his head-quarters were at Burgos. To palliate the flight of this prince, the *Moniteur* had the audacity to publish—"that the French army

was going to occupy refreshing quarters, for the purpose of breathing a milder air, and drinking better water." The same journal indulged in long comments on the calamities almost constantly attending great public commotions. The populace, justly exasperated at the bad faith with which Buonaparte had acted towards Spain, and especially towards the royal family, thought they should be revenged by decapitating some of the partizans of France. Saavedra, and about three hundred Frenchmen at Valentia, Solano at Cadiz, Truxillo at Grenada, the count d'Aquila at Seville, the Corregidor of Carolina, the governor of Badajoz, Miquel Ceballos at Valladolid, and some other individuals, more imprudent, perhaps, than culpable, perished victims of a mistaken multitude, whose indignation against the real traitors appeared to be well founded. Heaven forbid that we should be disposed to cast the veil of indulgence over such frightful crimes! But we do not hesitate to cast on the real authors all the odium of those calamities, which for seven years afflicted the nations of the peninsula.

England, whose commercial interests depended on the independence of the continent, eagerly accepted the offers of friendship on the part of the Portuguese and Spaniards. An expedition, under the command of sir Arthur Wellesley, was sent to Portugal to drive the French army from that country. The troops were landed on the first of August, 1808, in the bay of Mondego. General Spencer left Cadiz with five thousand men to join sir Arthur. This junction took place on the fifth. On the eighth, the English army was encamped, and ready to receive the enemy. On the twelfth, the vanguard marched to Leyria. The Portuguese troops, being five thousand five hundred infantry, and five hundred horse, joined the English army, which, by this accession, amounted to nearly twenty thousand fighting men. On the fifteenth, a skirmish took place at Caldas with the French advanced posts. On the seventeenth, the English general attacked a division of six thousand men, un-

General Laborde, encamped on the heights to the south of Rolicá. The ground was well disputed, yet the position was carried, and Laborde effected his retreat in tolerable order. He had troops inured to war, and a more numerous cavalry. This engagement cost the English nearly five hundred men, killed and wounded. On the eighteenth, sir Arthur took the position of Lourinha, to cover the landing of the troops under the orders of brigadier-general Ackland. This operation being terminated, the army encamped on the heights near Vimiera. On the twenty-first, general Junot, having collected all his disposable forces, which might amount to fourteen thousand men, attacked the left wing of the English. He was received at the point of the bayonet, and obliged to fall back upon his reserve. He renewed the charge against general Ferguson's troops, posted on the heights along the road to Lourinha; but he was repulsed with the same intrepidity. From that instant he determined to retreat. General Kellermann, who was ordered to cover this movement, manœuvred with great skill, profited by a wrong position which the English troops had taken while pursuing him, and succeeded in preventing that extent of advantages, which sir Arthur, from the confusion of the vanquished, might at first have been led to expect. This battle, which decided the fate of Portugal, cost the English but eight hundred men. The loss of the French must have been much more considerable, owing to the obstacles which the ground opposed to their reaching the position of the English, whose fire had the advantages afforded by entrenchments against the troops, by whom they were attacked.

During the night, after the battle of Vimiera, Junot assembled the French generals, to hear their opinion on what could be done for the best for his army and France. General Laborde proposed to retreat by Castello Branco, and Guarda, towards Ciudad-Rodrigo and Salamanca, with the view to join the army of marshal Bessieres. To ac-

accomplish this purpose, the French must have abandoned their artillery, their sick, and equipage: they would have been exposed to be continually harrassed on all sides, by the Portuguese and Spaniards, whilst the English vanguard would be upon the heels of the French rear. "In that case," said young Kellermann, who commanded Junot's cavalry, "we shall be very lucky if we reach Burgos with half of the army." Though there was an affectation of holding the Spaniards in contempt, still the catastrophe of general Dupont tended to damp Junot's ardour. He therefore sent Kellermann to the English head-quarters, in order to solicit a suspension of hostilities, by causing it to be understood that the French general wished to enter into an agreement respecting the evacuation of Portugal. The armistice was signed on the twenty-second of August.—The river Sizandra was agreed to form the line of demarcation of the two armies; and it was stipulated that the French should in no case be considered as prisoners of war; and that all their artillery and cavalry horses should be sent to France.

It was on this basis that the definitive convention was signed at Lisbon on the thirtieth of August, 1808,—a convention better known by another denomination—the *convention of Cintra*.

Admiral Cotton did not think it proper to grant terms equally favourable to the Russian squadron, that was in the Tagus. The convention, which he concluded with admiral Siniavin on the third of September, stipulated, that the nine Russian ships of the line, and the Russian frigate, which were then in the Tagus, should be given up to admiral sir Charles Cotton, *with all their ammunition*, and be sent to England, there to be kept as a *deposit* by his Britannic majesty, under the promise of being restored six months after the signature of the peace between his Britannic majesty and his imperial majesty of all the Russias. By the second article, it was agreed, that admiral Siniavin,

the officers, sailors, and marines, should return to Russia. They were five thousand six hundred and eighty-five in number. This arrangement was loyal on the part of the English, and as advantageous to both parties as circumstances would permit. The Russians, it is true, were disarmed without fighting; but of what avail would the most sanguinary battle have been, when they had superior numbers, and English sailors to encounter? The convention of Cintra was highly censured in England, where it was indignantly observed that the French army was merely changing its position. By the fourth article, that army was left in possession of all its artillery, and of the horses, which had been obtained from the Portuguese by French requisitions. The authors of this feeble and dangerous measure endeavoured to justify it, by rating the French forces in Portugal at above twenty-six thousand men; but they neglected to state that the garrisons, the sick, and those employed in administrative offices, ought to be deducted from that number. After the battle of Vimiera, Junot had only twelve thousand fighting men to oppose to about twenty thousand allies. The matter, however, will be seen in a more favourable light, when we consider that the French forces were rendered inactive for several months;—that the allied army became disposable,—that Portugal was evacuated,—and that Lisbon was spared the horrors of a siege.

Thus ended the first campaign of the peninsula, favourably for the Portuguese, and most gloriously for the Spaniards. We may frankly here state, that nothing was wanting on the part of the allies, but a man of consummate experience to organise them, to maintain their enthusiasm, to keep their exertions in a right direction, and, above all, incessantly to repeat—"that they had done nothing as long as there was a single Frenchman in arms upon the Spanish territory." The months of August, September, and October, were lost in unnecessary arrangements. The favoura-

ble opportunity to drive the French beyond the Pyrenees was suffered to escape. They ought to have been closely pursued, without leaving them time to recover. It is averred, that Joseph, after his flight from Madrid, could not collect more than forty thousand fighting men on the Ebro, whilst, at that time, Castanos, Caro, Palafox, Cuesta, and Blake, had under their orders above one hundred thousand, who, intoxicated with their success, would have completely destroyed or dispersed the wreck of the French army. The very same Frenchmen, who, two months before, had ravaged the finest provinces of Spain, were left undisturbed in their cantonments. Does it not appear as if Madrid became a second Capua to the conquerors of Valentia and Baylen? Under the pretence of clothing the regiments of the army under Castanos, they were quartered in the environs of Aranjuez. Surely a fitter time might have been selected for the operation. It was not in the month of August, and in a warm climate, that the want of clothes could appear a sufficient motive to stop the progress of the army, and prevent its profiting by the stupor, into which the enemy had been thrown by his reverses. Besides, nothing hindered the clothes being made: there was time enough to send them before the winter, wherever the army might be posted after the entire evacuation of Spain. It is to the tardiness with which the military leaders pursued the French, at the period now spoken of, that all the misfortunes which befell the Spaniards in the following campaign must be ascribed.

✓ Long experience has proved to Europe, that the English government never neglects to combat the rivals of that nation's commerce, but particularly the French; and this is done always with ardour, often with skill, but seldom with activity. ✓ It must also be confessed, that the cabinet of St. James has very seldom sacrificed the general interest of the nation to the caprice of any favourite. The reverses of England can, therefore, be ascribed to no other

cause than the inexperience of the leaders appointed to conduct her expeditions, or the supineness of her allies in seconding their efforts. The march of sir Arthur Wellesley's army to Santander, for the purpose of acting with Blake and Cuesta, against the right wing of the French, whilst Castanos, Caro, and Palafox, should have attacked them in front and on the left, would have determined Joseph to fly for security under the walls of Bayonne. Buonaparte, who had reasons to fear a rupture with Austria, would not have dared to attempt the passage of the Pyrenees by main force, as long as he was not secure on the side of Germany. Junot's army could not escape; and every thing induces the belief, that, on being informed of the retreat of the French from Spain, this general would have been very glad to have accepted from sir Charles Cotton the conditions of Cintra, in order to withdraw his army from the fury of the Portuguese. If it be said that Junot would not have surrendered to the Portuguese, but would have maintained himself in their kingdom, it may be observed, that Dupont, a far more able officer than Junot, could not keep footing in Andalusia, though he had the hope of being assisted from Madrid. He had only Spaniards to encounter, and he had not to provision, or to occupy and retain, *without provisions*, a city like Lisbon, of nearly three hundred thousand inhabitants. Lord Castle-reagh, whom good fortune had attended in the expeditions he had sent against the Cape of Good Hope, Copenhagen, Martinique, and Portugal, would have been still more lucky in the north of the peninsula, had general Moore been entrusted with the chief command of the allied armies. On the twenty-fifth of September, 1809, his lordship issued orders for sending, to that part of Spain, an army of forty thousand men, including five thousand horse. The Spanish corps of the marquis de la Romana, which consisted of ten thousand men, had succeeded in escaping from the French army in Denmark; and it was determined

that it should be landed at Santander, for the purpose of acting in concert with the English troops. Notwithstanding the check experienced at Medina del Rio Secco, Blake had still about thirty thousand men. The armies of Estremadura, Castile, Andalusia, Valentia, and Arragon, could not be rated at less than one hundred thousand. Allowing twenty thousand to cover Madrid, and to scour the different roads leading to the capital, there still remained two large armies, each of eighty thousand men, which, when well manœuvered, were more than sufficient successfully to repel all the efforts of the French.

Buonaparte was acquainted with these details; he fully knew the means of resistance, possessed by the Spaniards when assisted by the English; and he made his dispositions to render them useless. Alarmed at the hostile attitude which Austria was assuming, he resolved to draw closer his ties of friendship with the emperor of Russia, in order to intimidate the emperor Francis II. Towards the end of September, 1808, he had an interview with Alexander at Erfurt. There he obtained that sovereign's consent to place his brother Joseph on the throne of Spain; as well as the assurance of his co-operation against Austria, should the latter power declare war against France. The march of the columns, destined against Spain, had been suspended for some days; but as soon as Buonaparte was assured of Alexander's sentiments, sixty thousand veteran troops began their route through Bayonne, for the purpose of reinforcing Joseph's army; and ten thousand marched into Catalonia, under general Gouvion Saint-Cyr, who assumed the command in chief of that province. Marshals Soult, Ney, Bessieres Monecy, Lefevre, Mortier, and Victor were placed at the head of the different corps: Buonaparte assumed the command in chief. On the thirty-first of October, Lefevre attacked Blake, who had been joined by the troops under the marquis de la Romana; and success varied from one side to the other, until the tenth of November; when

Lefevre having received numerous reinforcements, under the orders of Victor, obtained a decided superiority. The Spaniards fought with the most uncommon intrepidity; but they were vanquished by numbers, discipline, and ability. Had they been under the command of a prudent leader, who would have withdrawn from position to position, avoiding a general engagement, until the arrival of the English expedition, this campaign would certainly have been rendered worthy of the first. The mountains of Asturia afforded many positions, so much the more favourable, from rendering the French artillery and cavalry useless; whilst the vicinity of the sea facilitated the arrival of provisions and succours of all kind for the allies.

Buonaparte's campaigns in Italy, in Germany, and in Prussia, ought to have convinced his enemies, that it was his main principle of warfare to attack before his adversary had had time to concentrate his troops. Blake attacked and defeated Lefevre, duke of Dantzic, on the thirty-first of October, in the environs of Guenez, near Bilboa. The Spanish general knew not how to profit by this advantage; and Lefevre, having been reinforced, was not long before he beat Blake in his turn. Lefevre's success at Espinosa was entirely owing to Blake's presumption, and to his inexperience of war. The same causes produced the same results with regard to the other Spanish divisions. On the tenth of November, Soult attacked the army of Estremadura, which, after a slight resistance, took to flight in the greatest confusion. The French possessed themselves of Burgos, where they found considerable magazines, which would have been much better placed at Astorga and at Saragossa. On the sixteenth Soult's vanguard took possession of Santander, which contained stores of arms and ammunition that should have been left in places more secure against the invasion of the enemy. On the twenty-third marshal Lannes attacked Castanos in his position at Tudela. The army of Andalusia, which formed the left wing

of the line of battle, opposed a long resistance; and fell back only when, its right being left uncovered by the flight of the army of Castilla, apprehensions were felt of being surrounded by the numerous French cavalry. Buonaparte, at that time, had but eighty thousand fighting men. He had not yet been joined by the corps of Mortier and Junot; nevertheless, he determined to march to Madrid, and avail himself of the advantages which he had just gained. He sent marshal Moncey against Saragossa, directing Soult to oppose Blake and La Romana. On the thirtieth Victor's corps attacked the position of the Sommo Sierra, which was defended by ten thousand Spaniards. Had their trenches been constructed with intelligence, they would have been impregnable, from the advantages of the ground; but of these the engineers had not known how to avail themselves. Buonaparte's report evidently confirms the assertion here made; for it says, that a charge by general Montbrun, at the head of the Polish lancers, decided the affair. This is certainly the first time that a mountain, or natural defence in itself, was, when further fortified, thus carried by a charge of cavalry. It is more probable that Victor's infantry climbed the mountain, and turned the trenches constructed by the Spaniards, who then took to flight; and that the cavalry fell sword in hand upon some stragglers. Buonaparte siezed this opportunity of making a flourish, praising the valour of these new regiments of his guard; and informing the Parisians that the brave men, who carried, at full gallop, one of the steepest mountains of Castile, would know how to defend the Thuilleries and St. Cloud *against all their levies en masse.*

The rout of the corps, which defended the Sommo Sierra, disconcerted the inhabitants of Madrid. They wished to defend themselves, and they might have done so; but there was no one to point out the means. The junta had thought it prudent not to await the last moment, before they placed themselves in safety. The people, indignant at so much

apathy in their chiefs, armed themselves with whatever weapon appeared most proper for defence. The streets were barricaded, and the houses fortified. On the first of December Bessieres arrived on the heights, in the vicinity of Madrid, at the head of the cavalry. He summoned the governor to surrender. General Morla showed as much pusillanimity on this occasion as he had displayed firmness six months before at Cadiz. Instead of encouraging his compatriots to defend themselves, he exerted all his influence for the purpose of inducing them to lay down their arms. Madrid might have resisted a fortnight, and in that case, Buonaparte would have found himself in an embarrassing situation, Sir John Moore, who had left Lisbon on the twenty-seventh of October, had reached Salamanca on the thirtieth of November with his vanguard. Sir David Baird was to be at Astorga on the nineteenth. In spite of the reverses experienced by the Spaniards, they might still have collected twenty thousand men under the command of La Romana. Sir John would have employed them in making false attacks, whilst, with his army of thirty thousand, he would have attacked Soult in the early part of December. A number of contradictory reports, which, to judge by their source, appeared equally authentic, kept him in suspense, and caused some delay in his movements.

Madrid surrendered on the 4th of December, almost without any resistance. Buonaparte had but forty thousand men against sixty thousand, who, being posted behind walls, were as intrepid as old troops. He took good care not to invest the place completely, for fear of provoking a people jealous to preserve their laws and their religion. The night previous to the capitulation, all those, who did not wish to stay with the French, were allowed to leave the city. Buonaparte overwhelmed Morla with bitter reproaches for the part he had taken in the capitulation of Baylen: but the general appeared unmoved at them, and submitted to his new monarch. The information, which he sent to ge-

neral Moore for the purpose of inducing him to march in aid of Madrid, created the suspicion that he had acted in concert with Buonaparte. The English general had a fixed plan of operations, and he soon had reason to congratulate himself for having been deaf to the insinuations of bad faith, and to the counsels, not to say the commands, of ignorance. He was willing to fight for the defence of the Spaniards; but he did not wish to place himself in a situation that would force him into difficulty, and perhaps end in disaster. When he received an accurate account of the position taken by the French, he thought himself sufficiently strong to attack Soult's corps; and marched to the left, for the purpose of approaching nearer to sir David Baird. On the sixteenth of December he stationed his troops at Toro: sir David encamped at Benevente: and on the twentieth the joint army was concentrated at Mayorga: Soult had his vanguard at Sahagan, and his main body at Saldagna. Lord Paget was sent to surprize the troops which occupied Sahagan, consisting of six hundred cavalry. But the French were not surprised. They had already gained time sufficient for flying to arms. They were attacked with impetuosity; and their loss amounted to about two hundred killed or taken. On the twenty-first the English army was concentrated at Sahagan: it consisted of twenty-five thousand five hundred men, including two thousand five hundred cavalry. According to lord Castlereagh's plan, there should have been ten thousand more. La Romana was at Leon with twenty thousand men, ten thousand of whom were good troops: the remainder could be employed only as partizans to alarm the French marauders. Buonaparte was still at Madrid.

At length sir John Moore resolved to attack Soult, whose army of eighteen thousand men occupied Carrion and Saldagna. On the twenty-third sir John wrote to La Romana, informing him that he was then marching to Carrion, and that on the next day (the twenty-fourth) he should at-

tack the post of Saldagna; further requesting that he might be seconded on the part of the Spanish commander, either by marching directly to Saldagna, through Mansilla, or by crossing the river above Saldagna, to outwing Soult's right. But, at the instant when the English army was commencing its movements, general Moore was informed that Soult had been reinforced, and that a great portion of the troops, which had taken Madrid, were hastening by forced marches for the purpose of turning his right, seizing his line of operations, and cutting off his communication with Corunna. Sir John, who knew Buonaparte's tactics, thought that there was not a moment to be lost, in order to escape the snare, which had been very dexterously laid for him. He countermanded the march to Carrion, and on the twenty-fourth commenced his retreat towards Benevente, with the intention of taking a position on the right bank of the river Esla, there to be enabled either to continue his retreat, or to resume the offensive, according to circumstances. It was not long ere sir John's doubts respecting the movements of the French were dissipated: he learnt from a safe quarter that Buonaparte had left Madrid on the twenty-second, preceded by Ney's corps, and the cavalry under the command of Bessieres. On the twenty-eighth the English quitted Benevente, with the exception of the rear guard, commanded by lord Paget. On the same day Buonaparte fixed his head quarters at Valderas, and Soult was at Mansilla. On the twenty-ninth the *chasseurs a cheval* of the imperial guard crossed the Esla, under the idea that they should encounter only a few out-posts, left for the protection of stragglers. But lord Paget attacked them with all his cavalry, overthrew them, and forced them to fall back in the greatest confusion. General Lefevre, who commanded the French, was taken prisoner. This event had a singular effect on the whole French army: every regiment, without exception, was delighted to hear that the English had lowered the pride of those *chasseurs*; for

there was not a man who did not fancy himself a hero, after the success which this corpse had obtained against the Russian-imperial guard at the battle of Austerlitz.

The English army, which till then had observed the strictest discipline, committed some excesses against the inhabitants, whose apathy towards their allies was well calculated to occasion a degree of discontent. Sir John, who had never yet commanded an army so considerable, especially on a retreat, paid too much attention to abuses that are almost unavoidable, and the repression of which ought to be left to subaltern officers, or to the colonels of regiments. His orders for restoring discipline constituted the eulogium of his heart, rather than of his experience. His ill-timed severity had no other effect than to disgust several officers, who, while they were proclaimed to be the authors of the evil, endeavoured to diminish it as far as their power extended. It is painful to acknowledge, but it is incontestibly true, that there are critical moments in war, when the commanders must wink at some improprieties, in order to avoid greater ones. Is there not, indeed, a great degree of inconsistency in punishing marauders, when no provisions are distributed to the soldier? Can it be hoped that troops will sustain the attack of a well fed enemy, when they have had no food for four-and-twenty hours? Such was the situation of the English on their retreat to Corunna; and in spite of the privations which they suffered, they let no opportunity escape of supporting their reputation for subordination, and valour, whenever they could stop the progress of the French army.

Sir John left Astorga on the thirty-first, and Buonaparte had his head-quarters there on the first of January, 1809. He reviewed his army, which was composed of the corps of Soult, Ney, Junot, and Marshal Bessieres's cavalry. Being convinced that he could not surround the English, he sent Marshal Soult to pursue them, for the purpose of forcing them to re-embark. Marshal Ney was

ordered to advance as far as Lugo, to reinforce Soult in case of need. On the fifth, at the moment when sir John was leaving Villa-Franca, his rear-guard was attacked near Cacabelos, by Soult's vanguard. The French, who had ventured upon rather unfavourable ground, were obliged to fall back, after a brisk fire of musketry. General Colbert, having advanced at the head of the sharp-shooters, was mortally wounded. When Buonaparte reviewed the cavalry, which this general commanded, two days before, he said to him in a friendly tone, "You have shown in Italy and Germany, that you are one of my bravest officers; in a short time you shall receive the reward due to your services."—"You have no time to lose, sire," replied Colbert with vivacity, "for although I am but thirty years of age, I feel that I am very old." His presentiments were realized to the great regret of Buonaparte, by whom this officer's talents were highly valued. Colbert had the command of Soult's light cavalry.

On the fifth of January, sir John arrived at Lugo. He examined the ground about the place: it appeared favourable for giving battle. On the sixth, Soult's vanguard came up with the English, but made no attack. On the seventh, the French, surprised that the English had not continued their retreat, advanced their artillery, and commenced a brisk fire, which was duly returned by their enemy. Soult likewise ordered some columns of infantry to advance, which were received by a very brisk fire, and obliged to return to their former position. General Franceschi was then commanded to march to the left of the allies, with his light cavalry. This manœuvre was slowly executed, and at too great a distance from the English. Sir John Moore considered Soult's movements as a strong indication of his purpose; and being persuaded that he should be more seriously attacked the next day, he made his dispositions to ensure victory. On the eighth, the English army was arranged in battle array at the dawn of day. The general

rode through the ranks, and expressed his high satisfaction at the good appearance of his troops, who ardently wished to prove in battle, that the irregularities of a few individuals had not altered their character for bravery and discipline. Sir John must then have felt some regret at having generalised his reproofs against officers, who, from the very beginning of the war, had always shown themselves full of honour, and zealously attached to good order. Soult likewise placed himself in battle array: but he manifested no inclination to begin the attack. If, instead of dispersing in the mountains, La Romana's army had continued to manœuvre on the left of the English, there is no doubt but sir John Moore would have acted on the offensive that day, for the purpose of over-awing Soult, and preventing any impediment to the embarkation of the troops, which was to take place at Corunna.

In the night, from the eighth to the ninth, the English quitted the position of Lugo. On the tenth they halted at Betanzos, and on the eleventh they took a position on the heights before Corunna. There were a few unimportant engagements with the rear-guard. The want of transports caused some baggage to be lost, and some field-pieces were left behind for the same reason. On the twelfth, Soult arrived, with the greatest part of his troops, on the heights opposite to those occupied by the English. The destruction of the bridge at Burgo delayed the arrival of his artillery, which joined him only on the fourteenth. He employed the fifteenth in making his dispositions: and on the sixteenth, at three o'clock in the afternoon, he began the attack. The transports had arrived from Vigo to Corunna, on the fourteenth. Sir John had given the necessary orders for the army to be embarked in the night from the sixteenth to the seventeenth. He was on his way to inspect the troops, when the firing of the advanced posts, and a report from general Hope, informed him that he was attacked. Soult advanced his columns of infantry, under the cover

of several heavy guns, the fire of which was favoured by the rising of the ground. His efforts were directed against the right wing of the English, whose position was very faulty. Sir John went thither in person: he directed the movements of the 4th, 42nd, and 52nd regiments, which covered themselves with glory by their coolness and intrepidity. At their assault upon the village of Elvina, the French were received at the point of the bayonet. The attack on the centre and on the left wing was less impetuous, the ground being in favour of the English. On all sides the French were repulsed; and after having continued their musketry and artillery fire till late at night, they withdrew to their former position. The loss on both sides was nearly equal. Each had about one thousand men *hors de combat*. But the loss of the English proved much more considerable by the death of general Moore, who had his left shoulder broken to pieces by a cannon ball, at the moment he was ordering the 42d regiment to rush on the French with the bayonet. General Baird had been severely wounded, and obliged to quit the field of battle. General Hope, on whom the command devolved of course, acted up to sir John's dispositions, and embarked the army in the night. This operation, one of the most difficult in the presence of an enemy, even when he is inferior in number, was most successfully performed, although the corps of Soult was present, and twenty thousand strong. This oversight of the French can be ascribed only to the signal conduct of the English in their retreat, and particularly on the preceding day.

Thus ended an expedition, which has been too much praised by the friends, and too much criticised by the enemies of the brave general, who terminated it by a victory, and by the sacrifice of his life. An expedition to the north of Spain was a very judicious measure: it was badly performed. The troops ought to have been landed between Gijon and Santander, in the early part of November: they

would have acted as a reserve for the armies of Blake, and of La Romana, which were untouched at that time. The movement against Soult, though incomplete, forced Buonaparte to delay the execution of his designs against Adalusia, and Portugal. There was not a soldier to defend the passages of the Sierra Moréna, and there were but few English left in Portugal. Had Buonaparte been accurately informed of the situation of the English army, and of the distress in La Romana's corps, he would have left Lefevre at Madrid; sent Victor to Andalusia, and Ney to Portugal; and then have marched with Bessiere's cavalry and Junot's corps, solely to threaten the right of general Moore. All reports rated the English at forty thousand, and the Spaniards at twenty thousand. Buonaparte wished to attack them at least with equal numbers: it is to this error on his part, as much as to general Moore's sagacity, that Valentia, Seville, and Lisbon, were indebted, for not having to open their gates to the French at this time. The English general was justly censured for not having availed himself of La Romana's co-operation, in order to attack Soult, as he might have done without danger, from the eighteenth to the twenty-second of December. Had he obtained a complete success against the marshal, as his superiority, owing to his junction with the Spaniards, led to hope, he might, by leaving the pursuit to some fresh Spanish levies, have rapidly advanced by his right on the road of Benevente, and encountered the troops that were coming from Madrid; which troops surprised at seeing themselves vigorously attacked by those very English, whom they expected to catch in a trap, would have undoubtedly been obliged to fall back with great loss. Sir John has also been reproached for not having attacked Soult on the eighth of January, at Lugo; but this is a very unjust reproach of his adversaries. Ney's corps was but one day's march from Lugo. His junction with Soult, which might have been effected in twelve hours, would have rendered the position

of the English army extremely critical. After having well weighed all the probabilities for and against the two parties, the impartial observer is obliged to confess that, whilst he is doing full justice to Buonaparte's boldness in marching to Madrid, and the ability of his manœuvres to crush the English near Benevente; yet in the whole course of this campaign, sir John Moore and the English army vied, in point of science and valour, with the troops and lieutenants of Buonaparte; who owed their successes merely to their numerical superiority, and to the unparelled apathy of the Spanish leaders, soldiers, and peasants, in the countries which were the theatre of war.

Whilst the inhabitants of the southern and northern provinces of Spain were fighting with more courage than harmony for the defence of their liberty, the Catalonians surpassed them in zeal, displaying more intelligent co-operation, and more energy in their attacks. From the very beginning of the campaign, general Duhesme had been closely blockaded at Barcelona. On the sixth of November, general Saint Cyr invested Rosas. The Spaniards made several sorties, which at first proved successful, but, being overwhelmed by numbers, they were obliged to remain in the place, and to renounce this kind of warfare, which impaired the strength of the garrison, without being of any real use. The trenches were opened in the night from the seventeenth to the eighteenth of November. On the twenty-third the breach in Fort Trinity was judged practicable. On the twenty-fourth general Alvarez, at the head of six thousand Catalonians, attacked the posts of Souham's division, and gained at first some advantages: but general Saint Cyr having sent reinforcements to this division, the Catalonians were obliged to recross the river Fluria, after having warmly disputed the victory. On the twenty-eighth the governor of Rosas was summoned to surrender. He did not think it proper to return any answer. Lord Cochrane had thrown himself into the place, with some detach-

ments from the English vessels that were in the roads, to preserve to Spain, as long as possible a place so important by its situation. The town having been taken by main force, the garrison withdrew into the citadel. But all means of resistance having been exhausted, the fort capitulated on the sixth of December, after having defended itself eighteen days. Lord Cochrane and his detachment returned to the English squadron, having previously taken the necessary measures to destroy all the stores of Fort Trinity. As soon as Saint Cyr was in possession of Rosas, he moved his army towards Barcelona. The Catalonians, who blockaded the place, dispersed at the approach of so considerable a force; and the communication of the 7th corps, with general Duhesme, was restored. The junction was effected on the seventeenth of December, after some opposition on the part of general Reding, who commanded the blockade. This general rallied his troops at the intrenched camp of Lobregat, on the south of Barcelona; but was attacked by Saint Cyr, and obliged to evacuate it with the loss of his heavy artillery. During the whole course of this campaign, general Reding manœuvred with great ability. He was opposed to one of the best lieutenants of Buonaparte; and if obliged to fall back, it was owing to the discipline and numerical superiority of Saint Cyr's troops. Those of Reding were almost all new levies, and did not exceed fifteen thousand, whilst Saint Cyr was at the head of twenty-five thousand men, who had almost all made several campaigns.

BOOK II.

THE advantages obtained in Catalonia gave great satisfaction to Buonaparte, who being acquainted with the courage of the Catalonians, and their attachment to liberty, had not reckoned upon so decisive a success. He learnt at the same time, that on the thirteenth of January, Victor had attacked and defeated the remains of the army under Castanos, which Venegas had rallied in the neighbourhood of Cuenca. Soult also informed him, that after the battle of the sixteenth of January, he had taken possession of Corunna; and that on the twenty-fourth, the naval and civil officers of the Port of Ferrol had manifested a desire of submitting to king Joseph. The French occupied that town on the twenty-seventh; but these last despatches did not find Buonaparte any longer in Spain. He had heard that Austria was making great efforts to take advantage of the war in Spain, for the purpose of obliterating, by some victorious blow, the shameful defeats of Ulm and Austerlitz. The occupation of Madrid, the dispersion of the Spanish armies, the sailing of the English expedition, the capture of Rosas, the supply of provisions to Barcelona, and a number of partial successes, gained by his troops in almost all their encounters with the Spaniards, induced Buonaparte to suppose that lenity would, in a short time, accomplish what his legions had so fortunately and so rapidly begun. In his ideas, Valentia, Andalusia, and Portugal, were not to oppose, but rather to assist in the establishment of the new dynasty, for the sake of their own prosperity. He thought he had ensured the submission of the Spaniards, because he had vanquished them: but he had still Saragossa to conquer. This operation he confided to

marshal Lannes, who had Mortier and Junot under his orders.

The heroic defence of Palafox, during the first siege, at once alarmed the officers and troops sent against that town. As soon as Castanos had been defeated at Tudela, Moncey had been ordered to attack the place. The garrison, including the armed peasants, who had thrown themselves into it from all parts of Arragon, amounted to nearly fifty thousand. The French general, who knew what sort of men he was going to encounter, had recourse at first to conciliatory means. The place was not completely invested, that the troops and inhabitants might still receive positive information about events calculated to promote a pacific result. Every thing proved useless. The destruction of all Spain could not have shaken the generous resolution of so many brave men, not to submit before they had exhausted all the resources which honour suggests in such a case, and which a noble despair almost always renders effectual.

On the twentieth of December, 1808, general Suchet attacked the heights of Saint Lambert, on the right shore of the Ebro, whilst general Gazan carried the heights of San Gregorio on the left bank, where the besieged had erected entrenchments, to retard, for some days, the attack upon the town itself. All these posts were defended with the most obstinate courage. The artillerymen were cut to pieces at their guns, and the troops were almost destroyed to a man, after having dearly sold their lives to the besiegers. Moncey was but little acquainted with the warfare of sieges; and was superseded in his command before Saragossa by general Junot—a thunderbolt of war, from his enterprising spirit: in short, the very man requisite to vie with Palafox. Junot was inferior in talents; but Buonaparte had taken care to attach excellent engineer and artillery officers to the besieging army. Junot wished to mark his arrival by a *coup d'éclat*. He attacked the convent of

St. Joseph, and succeeded in obtaining possession of it after a very bloody conflict. The garrison made several sorties, and almost all successful ones. Scarcely had the French constructed a work, when Palafox destroyed it. He drew the attention of the besiegers upon other points by false attacks, ably combined to ensure the success of that which he wished to succeed. His experience, and his *coup d'œil*, frequently disappointed the well-arranged dispositions of generals Dedon and Lacoste, who commanded the artillery and the engineers.

The slowness of the siege, and the desire of seeing it quickly terminated, induced Buonaparte to employ marshal Lannes, who, to the most uncommon intrepidity, joined much good sense and coolness. Junot, anxious to please the emperor, had already lost considerable numbers by repeatedly making, against all common rules of warfare, attacks which often proved fruitless, and always very fatal. He continued to serve under Lannes, who assumed the command in chief on the twentieth of January. Mortier was sent with the fifth corps to support the attacks, and to cover them against any troops that might attempt to succour the place. From the twentieth to the twenty-sixth of January the Spaniards showed themselves, at several points, for the purpose of harassing the army employed in the siege. They were every where repulsed with loss, after having fought with bravery. Their defeats were occasioned by the superiority of the French cavalry, which attacked them in the plains. On the twenty-sixth Lannes made a breach. On the twenty-seventh he ordered the place to be stormed. The convent of Santa Eugrazia was carried, sword in hand, by general Rostollant, who was dangerously wounded, and whose aid-de-camp was killed by his side. The astonishment at the facility, with which a practicable breach was made, ceases when it is recollected that Saragossa is not a fortified town. Its walls have been raised only from motives of administrative police: they have nei-

their battlements nor half moons; not even the turrets of ancient fortification. Brick houses, solidly built, and narrow crooked streets, were the only means of defence on the part of the besieged; whose number, of all ages and sex, were rated, before the war, at sixty thousand souls.

It is impossible to convey a higher idea of the courageous defence made by the besieged, than by quoting the very expressions of Buonaparte's thirty-third bulletin, which says—"on the thirtieth of January the convents of St. Monica, and of the great Augustines, were carried. Sixty houses were taken by having been undermined! The sappers of the 14th regiment of the line have greatly distinguished themselves. On the first of February a ball struck general Lacoste, who died in the field of honour. He was equally brave and learned. His loss has been sensibly felt by the whole army, and still more particularly by the emperor. (General Lacoste was one of his aid-de-camps.) The enemy defended every house. Three attacks were maintained at once by undermining, and every day three or four mines destroyed several houses, thereby enabling the troops to fix themselves in many others. Thus the French arrived at the *Correa*, a large street, almost in the centre of Saragossa, and lodged themselves on the quays, taking possession of the buildings of the schools and university. The enemy attempted to oppose the French in their own way; but, little experienced in this species of warfare, their mines were immediately discovered, and suffocated." Every military man, who gives an attentive perusal to this extract from Buonaparte's own confession respecting the defence made by the inhabitants of Saragossa, will be forced to confess, whatever be his political opinions, that the annals of the globe had not yet afforded a picture so worthy of the respect and admiration of the world. The deeds of heroism, which illustrated Numancia and Saguntum, had already been equalled during the first siege of Saragossa. Palafox, his troops, the people,

the clergy, the monks, the women, and even the children, performed prodigies in this second siege. The French had a numerous army, a formidable artillery, and very able engineers. Vauban has so improved fortification, that the most able defence must yield to a regular and well-directed attack. The French had taken possession of the suburb, situated on the right side of the Ebro. The town was almost wholly in their power. Above twenty thousand Spaniards had perished in the course of the siege; and this enormous loss was as much the result of their own courage, as of a want of order in their attacks. Whatever can exalt the mind, the love of independence, fanaticism, the authority of the clergy, the example of the monks, constantly in the foremost ranks, and the fear inspired by the well-known licentiousness of the besiegers—every thing, in short, concurred to induce the valiant inhabitants of Saragossa to fancy that they attained the pinnacle of glory by shedding their blood, armed for the defence of their king and of their religion. The fort surrendered on the twenty-first of February; and Saragossa was nothing but a heap of ruins, or, to speak more accurately, a vast burial-ground.

Exhausted with fatigue, Palafox had been dangerously ill for several days. It was difficult to supply his place; and this event had spread consternation throughout the town, affecting the inhabitants more than the fire of the besiegers. It is painful to observe, that the French general, who was a truly brave man, refused a capitulation to Palafox, the most valiant officer with whom he had hitherto had to fight and to treat. If this refusal, on the part of the duke de Montebello; had been dictated to him by Buonaparte, he is to be blamed for having accepted the command on conditions so humiliating. A contrary supposition appears out of the question; for it is impossible to be more valiant and more generous than marshal Lannes, who of course was incapable of wanting, towards the worthy governor of Saragossa, the respect justly due to him. By publishing—

“that Palafox was an object of contempt to the Spaniards, and never was seen in dangerous posts,” Buonaparte opened a vast field to his adversaries. Does he suppose that he has avenged the honour of his arms, and consigned the retreat of his troops, after the siege of 1808, to oblivion, by inserting in his bulletins the most ridiculous imputations against a general without fear and without reproach? Had Palafox possessed a vast and organizing genius, he would have been the Washington of Spain. If, with the great soul which Nature had bestowed on him, he had combined those eminent qualities, he would have driven the French from the peninsula, and acted a very brilliant part in restoring the equilibrium of Europe. Palafox was then forty years old. His education had been excellent. He accompanied Ferdinand VII to Bayonne. When he saw that his King was a prisoner, he escaped from France, flew to Saragossa, and used all his means to oppose the invaders. This brave officer remained for a long time a prisoner in France; and Buonaparte must be censured, for not having known how to honour merit, and respect misfortune in a vanquished enemy.

Thus, the winter campaign commenced on the first of November, 1808, and terminated on the first of March, 1809, to the advantage of the French, who, for that reason, denominate it *the Imperial campaign*. The Spaniards were long before they could recover from the terror caused by the defeat of their armies, the capture of Madrid, the surrender of Saragossa, and the departure of the English from Corunna. The same terror extended to Lisbon;—General Craddock had made all the necessary arrangements to embark the troops under his command, in case Victor, who was already arrived at Aleantara, should attack the capital of Portugal. This march, which was attended with but few difficulties, was not undertaken when it might have been performed successfully. Victor was waiting for news from Soult. On the tenth of February, the latter had

collected his army in the neighborhood of Tuy. According to Buonaparte's calculations, he was to cross the Minho on the eleventh, arrive at Oporto from the fifteenth to the twentieth, and enter Lisbon towards the end of the same month. But though he encountered only regiments of Portuguese militia, he was detained on his march longer than Buonaparte expected. The peasants joined the militia, and demanded to be led against the enemy. Upon the observations which the Portuguese general, a brother to Andrade, made to them, they suspected him guilty of treachery, and massacred him, appointing baron Eben his successor. Soult was detained by many severe engagements. On the twenty-sixth day of March, 1809, he arrived before Oporto, and reconnoitered the environs of the place. On the twenty-seventh and twenty-eighth, he made unsuccessful attempts. On the twenty-ninth he renewed his attack on the whole front; and when he thought the favourable moment arrived, he sent to the quarter, which it was most easy to support by a column of choice troops concealed behind some rising ground. The town was plundered in spite of Soult's efforts to prevent the pillage. He wished to preserve the resources which it might afford to the army. This conduct of Soult gained him the esteem of the inhabitants, and made them forget some disorders inseparable from an assault. The resistance which he had experienced in his march to Oporto, gave him an idea of the obstacles to be encountered in a march to Lisbon. He had been obliged to leave garrisons at Chaves and Braga, to keep up his communications with Ney, who occupied Galicia. General Silveira, who incessantly harassed his rear-guard from the moment of its entrance into Portugal, had taken a position at Amaranta, where he maintained himself until the second of May. But the French having attacked him with very superior forces, he was forced to retreat to the mountains on the left shore of the Tamega.

After having wisely calculated all the chances of his position, Soult resolved not to march to Lisbon, before he was informed that Victor was advancing to second his operations: he waited for this intelligence during the whole month of April. At the beginning of that month, marshal Victor had gained, near Medellin, a decisive advantage over Cuesta's army, and killed several thousand men: but he knew not how to profit by this success. He wished to obtain intelligence from marshal Soult before he entered Portugal. Soult and Victor were constantly bearing in mind the terrible reproaches of incapacity and want of energy made by Buonaparte to Dupont, who, I repeat it, is one of the best informed and most courageous generals of the French army. It is to his injustice towards this officer, rather than to the energy of the Portuguese militia and peasants, that Buonaparte ought to ascribe the non-execution of his orders by Soult. Lisbon, besides, was occupied by the English, who in April received sufficient reinforcements to assume the offensive, under the command of sir Arthur Wellesley.

This general reviewed his troops at Coimbra, on the sixth of May. On the tenth his vanguard passed the Vonga, and, having met a French party, forced them to take to flight. On the eleventh, sir Arthur encountered the French advanced-guard, which occupied a strong position on the heights to the north of Grijon. The attack was made slowly; and the French, having discovered that they were assailed by superior forces, retreated in good order. Soult had sent to this column his command to retreat. The officer, who was the bearer of these orders, had been killed by the peasants. Had general Murray, who had turned the left of the French, advanced by columns against those lines, instead of losing precious time in deploying, the French battalion, which formed the rear-guard of those troops, would have been cut off, and forced to lay down their arms. Sir Arthur had not been exactly informed of the strength

of this advanced-guard, otherwise he would certainly have manœuvred in a manner, that not one individual could have escaped.

In the night, from the eleventh to the twelfth, Soult drew back all his posts on the right bank of the Douro, and broke the ship bridge thrown over that river. General Beresford had been detached by sir Arthur to threaten the left of the French, by crossing the Douro near Lamego. He was ordered to march rapidly to Chaves, through Val-Pouca, with the view to close this pass on marshal Soult, in his retrograde movement towards Galicia. To second general Beresford's operation, it was essential to attack the French army, in order to detain the greatest part of its forces at that point. On the twelfth, sir Arthur crossed the Douro, under the cover of artillery, which he had placed on the heights of Villanova, almost facing Oporto. The French general cannot be exculpated for not having made any arrangements to dispute the passage. He never appeared till he possessed troops sufficient to overpower those in opposition to him. As the nature of the ground exposed the French to a heavy fire of artillery, their attacks were but feebly supported. Soult had returned to Oporto, there to give orders for the retreat, which he intended to effect at night. He supposed that sir Arthur, after having crossed the Douro, would take a position, and postpone his general attack to the next day. Under this idea he had sat down at table with his staff, when the firing of the English riflemen, who were in the streets of Oporto, warned him that he had not a moment to lose, if he wished to avoid being taken prisoner. He immediately mounted his horse, and opened himself a passage, sword in hand, with his staff, and an escort of *chasseurs a cheval*. After having rallied his troops, he wanted to re-enter Oporto, but was repulsed. Sir Arthur, at the same time, was joined by general Murray, who had crossed the Douro one league above Oporto. Thus, pressed in the centre by general Hill, on the right by gen-

eral Sherbrook, and on the left by general Murray. Soult retreated to Amarante, where he found general Loison's division.

The French at Oporto were nearly surprised. As it is always necessary to find some reason for palliating a fault, it was asserted that an officer of the eighteenth regiment of dragoons, named Argento, had surrendered a post, and communicated the watchword, which circumstance had facilitated the crossing of the Douro to general Murray's column. Without contesting the accuracy of the fact, it affords no sufficient excuse for the negligence of the French, in having suffered part of general Hill's column to land without firing a single musket. Is it not, besides, surprising, that sir Arthur should, immediately after his arrival at Villanova, have procured boats enough to effect so rapidly the passage of a river of the greatest importance? Soult, who must have been informed of all these preparations, for they were going forward in sight of his centres, and almost under his own eyes (since he had his head quarters at Oporto) did not even cannonade the allies, although he was provided with a very numerous artillery. Those, who know marshal Soult, are of opinion that, considering his position as a very hazardous one, he was glad of an opportunity of leaving it as soon as possible, and in a way not to commit himself with Buonaparte. He had still eighteen thousand men, and sir Arthur had but sixteen thousand. The engagements of Grijon and Villanova prove that he fought only *pro forma*. He left seven hundred sick in the hospital at Oporto. At Pennafiel he abandoned part of his artillery, which embarrassed his march, and proceeded to Braga, through Guimaraens. Sir Arthur had begun his pursuit of Soult on the thirteenth, by the road to Braga, and had repeated his orders to general Beresford, commanding his march to Chaves, in order to harass the French, and to cut off their communication with Galicia, at that point. Soult, who knew that he was actively pursued, saw that nothing but speed could

extricate him from a situation, the embarrassment of which was particularly increased by the general insurrection of the inhabitants. He determined to abandon his heavy baggage, and whatever artillery he had left, after the conflict of his rear-guard on the sixteenth, at Salamonde, against a column commanded by general Sherbrook. The French left Chaves on their right, and marched to Orense, through Montalegre. They had to pass through roads that were almost impracticable, and many perished by the hands of the Portuguese peasants. Soult had entered Portugal in February, 1809, with twenty-three thousand men: three months after that, he quitted the kingdom with sixteen thousand, leaving his equipage and artillery. This fruitless expedition cost France seven thousand soldiers, of whom more than two-thirds were slaughtered by the Portuguese. The rest perished in engagements, or remained in the hospitals at Oporto. With a more experienced, more active, and more enterprising general than sir Arthur Wellesley, Portugal would have witnessed a repetition of the tragedy of Baylen in Andalusia.

If, instead of directing his principal forces towards Oporto, the English general had made only a false attack in that direction, and had marched with the flower of his troops to Pennafiel, after having crossed the Douro, opposite to Poucinno, Soult would have been cut off from Loison. Each of them might then have been successively attacked with superior forces; for to the sixteen thousand English under sir Arthur's command, must be added ten thousand Portuguese, under the orders of generals Beresford and Silveira. It was thus that Castanos had manœuvred when he took possession of Baylen, placing himself between Dupont and Wedel. Soult would probably have abandoned Loison, and by forced marches, have endeavoured to reach Tuy by the way of Barcelos and Ponte de Lima. Admitting even that he should have succeeded in crossing the Minho, and in forcing the defiles of the Serra-da-Estria, his loss would

probably have been very considerable, independently of Loison's column, consisting of six thousand men, who would have been obliged to lay down their arms.

Soult's good fortune, however, prevailed: not only did he escape from Portugal, but he was even so lucky as to arrive in the neighbourhood of Lugo; when this town, blockaded by general Mahi, at the head of twenty thousand Spaniards, was on the point of surrendering, the garrison being without any provisions. The French had before had some thoughts of evacuating the place during the night, and withdrawing to Astorga. General Fournier, the governor of Lugo, would have executed this project, had the road between the two towns offered any facility to effect his movement successfully. But it is a defile of nearly eight leagues in length, where a retreating army may easily be destroyed by the superior advantages afforded to the pursuing enemy from the heights, which command the road on both sides. The besieged were highly rejoiced, when, instead of seeing the Spaniards, they recognised the French. Prudence at first suggested some precautions. The watchword not being the same, they were afraid of a surprise; but marshal Soult having shown himself, he was immediately recognised by general Fournier, and triumphantly received as a liberator. Soult confessed that he had never found himself in a situation so critical as in Portugal, having at his heels an army of choice troops, far superior to his own; and being incessantly harassed on his front and on his flanks by clouds of Portuguese peasants. The officers of the garrison, after having thanked him for the eminent service which he had just rendered them, declared that they had been so much the more agreeably surprised at his arrival, as, for several days past, all reports had agreed in stating that he had been obliged to surrender, and that he was already on board a ship bound to England. The soldiers of Soult's army had been a fortnight without victuals, and had lived only by marauding. Without clothes,

without shoes, and some of them without arms, almost all pale and emaciated, they looked more like a band of revolted peasants than regular troops. They all agreed, that had it not been for the superior talents of marshal Soult, not one individual of the army could have escaped the fury of the Portuguese, and that it was solely to his abilities that the army was indebted for having avoided complete destruction.

Sir Arthur arrived at Montalegre on the eighteenth of May: not judging it proper to continue the pursuit of the French beyond the boundaries of Portugal. This expedition cost the allies but four hundred men *hors de combat*. General Silveira remained in the north, on the frontiers of Galicia: the English army marched to Lisbon through Oporto; and wherever they passed, were received with enthusiasm, inspired by the services they had rendered to the country. Their march was a series of festivities—a real triumph. Sir Arthur, in spite of his numerous mistakes, was proclaimed the saviour of the Portuguese; having delivered them, for a second time, from the domination of the French, at a moment when the advantages gained by Buonaparte and his lieutenants in the interior of Spain, made them justly apprehensive of absolute servitude. The blessings of a whole people, crowding forward to express their gratitude, afforded to the English army the sweetest of rewards.

It was in the midst of the loud acclamations of joy on the part of the Portuguese, that the English army arrived, on the twelfth of June, 1809, in the neighbourhood of Abrantes, where general Mackenzie had been stationed to cover Lisbon, during sir Arthur's campaign against Soult. When marshal Victor learnt the latter's retreat, and the return of the English army to the south, he did not think himself strong enough to resist a combined attack of the English and Spaniards. On the twelfth of May he had detached one division to obtain possession of Alcantara, which

colonel Mayne was forced to quit with the loss of three hundred men. This French division pushed some few troops into Portugal, but Victor, who had Cuesta's army on his left flank, recalled them. As soon as he heard sir Arthur was in person at Abrautes, and that the Anglo-Portuguese army was preparing to march against him, he left Truxillo, crossed the Tagus over the bridges of Almaraz and Arzobispo, and took a position at Talavera de la Reyna.

In the mean-time Austria had declared war against France. This announcement had been closely followed by hostilities. The battle of Eckmuhl had opened the gates of Vienna to Buonaparte. But, having been defeated at Essling on the twenty-second and twenty-third of May, he had been obliged to recross the Danube. He was eagerly demanding to be reinforced with whatever troops were left in the several depots of France, that he might resume the offensive with superior forces. From that moment the French army in the peninsula was abandoned to itself; and it is to the reverses experienced on the Danube, that the concentration of the army of Spain must be ascribed. Estremadura, Galicia, and La Mancha, were evacuated towards the latter part of June. On the eighth general Carrera had been attacked by marshal Ney's troops at the bridge of Saint-Payo, near Vigo. Twelve thousand Spaniards, half of whom were peasants badly armed, repulsed the French, eight thousand in number, and forced them to fall back upon Sant-iago. Carrera's stout resistance was favoured by a well directed fire from four gun-boats, which played upon the right flank of the French. This defeat, combined with the daily losses, arising from the murders committed by the Spaniards upon single soldiers, the difficulty of holding communications, the almost absolute want of provisions, and the exasperation of all the inhabitants against France, induced marshals Ney and Soult to march into the kingdom of Leon. Ferrol was evacuated on the twenty-first, and Corunna on the twenty-second. General

Sebastiani, who had advanced with Joseph as far as El Moral, to reconnoitre the passes of the Sierra Morena, left that position on the thirteenth of June, and established himself in the environs of Consuegra. On the eighteenth of the same month, general Suchet, who commanded the third corps of the French army, attacked general Blake, who had posted himself on the heights before Beclhithe, and forced him to fall back, with loss, upon Aleanitz. Suchet had replaced Junot in the command of the province of Arragon. This general has, in the French army, a great reputation for boldness and good fortune. An uncommonly good education has given him the advantages of a mind well stored with knowledge. He is extremely active, and appears to have been a favourite with Napoleon, because he always was as dexterous in pleasing his superiors, as he is severe towards those under his command.

Towards the tenth of June, the Spaniards were acquainted with Buonaparte's reverses on the Danube. It was to be expected that they would doubly exert themselves to profit by the dejection, which that disastrous intelligence must have caused, as to the spirits of the French army in Spain. The whole month of June, however, passed away without a single effort being made against the French, except in Arragon. La Romana and Carrera in Galicia, Cuesta and sir Arthur Wellesley on the two banks of the Tagus, and Venegas in the Sierra Morena, preserved a state of apathy, which cannot be easily justified. Sir Arthur, after having successively halted at Abrantes and Placentia, until the sixteenth of July, left the latter place on the seventeenth. On the twentieth he formed his junction at Oropesa with general Cuesta, a brave officer, but a weak old man, as incapable of planning as of performing with ability; and yet adhering with inconceivable obstinacy to his own plans. The allied army left Oropesa on the twenty-second. The advanced-guard attacked the French in their position of Talavera, and obliged them to fall back

upon Victor's army, which was stationed on the left bank of the river Alberche. Sir Arthur wished to give battle on the twenty-third. General Cuesta begged to have it postponed to the day following; but when the allies presented themselves, they found the position evacuated. The French, on being informed of the approach of Venegas, who had left Madridejos on the nineteenth, had judged it necessary to concentrate themselves, in order to manœuvre with the majority of their forces, so as to encounter the allies separately; and, above all, to prevent the junction of their armies. In this plan they succeeded beyond their hopes. On the twenty-fourth general Cuesta commenced his pursuit of Victor. Sir Arthur refused to cooperate with the Spaniards *on account of the great insufficiency as to the means of conveyance in Spain*. This is sir Arthur's own expression. It was easy to foresee the consequences of such a disunion. Cuesta was attacked on the twenty-sixth near Torrijos, by Victor's and Sebastiani's corps, and obliged to fall back to Talavera. Joseph had left Madrid on the twenty-third, with a *corps de reserve*, to cover the movements of his army. A body of light troops was left in front of Venegas, to retard his march, and a strong garrison thrown into Toledo to oppose the passage of the Tagus. These dispositions protected both Madrid and the communications of the army, which marched on the twenty-seventh to attack the allies at Talavera.

The advanced guard, under the orders of general Mackenzie, was vigorously assailed, and obliged to fall back on the left of the allies. Soon after, the attack became general. The Spanish infantry, on the right of the line, repulsed the French cavalry. A brisk cannonade against the left, which was occupied by the English, had little effect, and was perfectly well answered by the enemy's artillery. On the twenty-eighth, the attack was renewed at break of day by the French, chiefly against the English army. Prodiges of valour were performed on both sides. Sir Arthur

was assailed the whole day by troops inured to war, and superior in numbers. But he counteracted all Victor's efforts. His troops were as good as those opposed to him; and he had besides selected a very favourable field of battle; while the difficulties of the ground served to impair the regularity and spirit of the enemy's manœuvres. Night separated the combatants. The loss of the allies, on that day, was about eight thousand men, of whom five thousand three hundred and sixty-seven were English. The loss of the French was more severe, from the nature of their attacks, which exposed them almost uncovered to a well sustained fire of artillery and musketry, and to very destructive charges of cavalry. King Joseph learnt, during the battle, that Venegas, who commanded the army of La Mancha, had reached the Tagus with thirty thousand men; that he was bombarding Toledo, and that some of his troops had advanced within four leagues of Madrid, after having crossed the Tagus at Aranjuez. He instantly sent Sebastiani to the succour of Toledo. Victor fell back on Santa Ollala.

Victory had remained with the allies: but they neglected to profit by it. They had sixty thousand men before the battle. The loss on the twenty-sixth, twenty-seventh, and twenty-eighth, did not exceed ten thousand killed, wounded, and prisoners. General Crawford arrived at Talavera on the twenty-eighth, in the evening, and Venegas was untouched. On the first of August the forces of the allies on the Tagus consisted, therefore, of eighty thousand fighting men. Joseph had only forty thousand left. The bloody battle of Talavera had scattered dismay through the French army, and the soldiers agreed that *the English fought as well as the Russians*. Orders were given for the necessary arrangements to evacuate Madrid. The movement of Soult towards Placentia was a mere stratagem of war, which proved completely successful. This general had not above thirty thousand men under arms. Ney's corps had been stationed from Zamora to Placentia, to keep up

the communications. The corps of Soult and Mortier ought not to have given any uneasiness to sir Arthur Wellesley. Admitting even, contrary to all probability, that he had not succeeded in obtaining possession of Madrid, and that Soult had continued his movement towards Talavera, the English general had a safe retreat through Madrid to the Sierra Morena, or towards Estremadura by La Mancha, along the left bank of the Guadiana. Was it likely that Soult, who, two months before, had fled with eighteen thousand men before sixteen thousand English, and ten thousand Portuguese, when he was covered by the Douro against their attacks, should be so imprudent as to place himself with thirty thousand men behind an army of eighty thousand? All the fruits of sir Arthur's successes against Soult in the north of Portugal were lost by his stay in the neighbourhood of Abrantes. Instead of arriving at Talavera on the twenty-second of July, the allied army ought to have reached that place on the twenty-second of June. The plan settled between Cuesta and sir Arthur at Almaraz was defective. To send Venegas to Arganda by Fuente-Duena, was dangerous; it removed him from the centre of operations, and exposed him to be defeated separately. He ought to have been ordered to make a false attack upon Toledo, whilst the main part of his army, marching down the left bank of the Tagus, would have crossed this river opposite to Puebla de Montalban, and joined the grand army, which the day after this decisive manœuvre would have marched to the capital, and taken possession of it without any obstacle. This important operation might have been terminated on the thirtieth of June, whilst Soult and Ney were still in Galicia; occupied by a petty warfare against La Romana and Carrera in the environs of Orense.

Firmness of mind is one of the most essential qualifications of a general. A favourable opportunity, that has been suffered to escape, is not easily met with again. Had

sir Arthur Wellesley destroyed Loison's division of Soult's corps, which was posted at Armarente on the twelfth of May, or had he marched against Victor on the twelfth of June, he would not have had to fight under the apprehension of marshal Soult's threatening to cut his line of operations. Had the English commander been better acquainted with the details of offensive warfare, he would have kept at Talavera the means of conveyance, which had served his army in coming thither from Placentia; he ought to have eagerly yielded to Cuesta, who proposed they should march forward, in order to form a junction with the army of Venegas, and act with a superiority of forces, that would have insured victory and the conquest of Madrid. The want of the means of conveyance cannot be admitted as a sufficient excuse; the fact is, that sir Arthur was afraid of a defeat, and that he wanted firmness of mind. He thought of his retreat before he fought, and he determined to keep his position at Talavera; which, either by the bridge of Arzobispo, or by that of Almaraz, afforded him great facilities to place the Tagus between himself and the French. There is undoubtedly much prudence in this conduct: but it is far from agreeing with the loyal character of the English nation. Sir Arthur never will be applauded for having suffered the Spaniards to be beaten at Torrejos on the twenty-sixth, when the battle of Talavera proves that, with merely the English troops, he could have resisted the whole French army. Another fact, in confirmation of the little harmony that prevailed between the generals of the allied troops, is, that on the tenth of August, Venegas was still in the neighbourhood of Toledo, expecting every moment the advance of the grand allied army to take advantage of the dreadful confusion occasioned among the French troops by the victory of Talavera. In this expectation he had taken a position with his army near Almonacid, where he was attacked on the eleventh of August by Joseph in person, at the head of twenty-five thousand choice troops. Venegas

disputed the victory for nine hours, and retreated, only because his left was overthrown by Sebastiani's superior cavalry. It is to be deeply regretted, that the courageous exertions of those brave men of La Mancha were rendered abortive by the retreat of more than fifty thousand Anglo-Spanish troops, at the moment that every thing concurred to force Joseph from Madrid, and at the same time of the year that he had been obliged to fly in 1808.

On the third of August the English left Talavera for Oropesa. On the fourth they crossed the Tagus over the bridge of Arzobispo; Cuesta's army followed this movement. It had been settled between the two commanders-in-chief, that the Spanish army should keep the position of Talavera, whilst the English army should go to fight marshal Soult, and force him back into Castille. Discord, that fatal bane of almost all alliances, caused these dispositions to be changed. The Spanish general did not think himself strong enough to face Victor, and left Talavera. His retreat exposed sir Arthur Wellesley to be attacked on his flank, in his march against Soult. He therefore determined to remove from the theatre of operations, highly disgusted at having been feebly seconded, and even counteracted; though no one can doubt his anxiety to serve the cause of the peninsula, so long as this could be done without exposing the reputation of the British arms. It is not to his heart, but to his little experience in the command of large armies, that the errors, committed in the course of this campaign, must be ascribed; his zeal in behalf of the noble Spaniards being above all praise. He retreated by show-marches, and, towards the latter part of August, occupied the country situated upon the two banks of the Guadiana, between Merida and Badajoz. Joseph had re-established himself in his palace of Madrid, though amazed at not having been forced to fly to Bayonne, with the remnant of his army. Ney's corps had been concentrated in the environs of Salamanca; that of Soult occupied Placentia; Mortier had his

troops stationed from Oropesa to Talavera de la Reyna; Victor had assigned cantonments to his corps in the neighbourhood of Toledo; and Sebastiani was on his left, occupying Aranjuez and Alcala, to cover Madrid against any Spanish partisans.

Almost immediately after the passage of the Tagus, Cuesta had resigned his command. General Eguia, his successor, made different dispositions. He left the duke of Albuquerque, with a corps of ten thousand men, to repulse the French parties that might come to forage on the left banks of the Tagus; and marched with the remainder of the army, amounting to twenty thousand men, towards the Sierra Morena, for the purpose of joining Venegas. General Beresford, with the Portuguese army, was guarding the frontiers of Portugal, from the Tagus to Almeida. The marquis de la Romana had left his troops for the purpose of going to Seville. This change proved extremely prejudicial to the success of the Spaniards in that part of the kingdom. General Mendizabal, his successor, displayed neither the same activity, nor the same energy. The inhabitants of Arragon were fighting but feebly: they had not yet recovered from the fatigues of the siege of Saragossa. General Suchet was occupied in enabling his troops to recommence the campaign. The guerillas, which have since acted so important a part, were beginning to be formed. Experience had taught the Spaniards, that, in attacks by main force on points which had been previously determined on, their courage almost always failed before the tactics and discipline of the French. The warfare of partisans appeared a safer way to fight successfully. The knowledge of the country enabled them to form snares, into which their adversaries must fall; because they were attacked unawares, and by superior numbers. Places were also selected for these attacks, in which it was impossible for the French to manœuvre, such as narrow passages of mountains, hollow roads, defiles, &c. The marquis de la

Romana is said to have been the author of the organization of those guerillas, which commanded by intelligent and enterprising men, have greatly contributed to drive the French, first to the left bank of the Ebro, and lastly to their own country.

Ever since the first of January, 1809, the French army of Spain had not received a single reinforcement, though it had suffered enormous losses. Its strength, on the first of September, 1809, including the garrisons, did not exceed one hundred thousand men, twenty thousand of whom were in Catalonia, under the command of marshal Augereau, who had succeeded general Gouvion Saint Cyr. Buonaparte had defeated the archduke Charles, on the sixth of July, in the plains of Wagram. Peace was not yet certain; and Buonaparte was still demanding reinforcements for his army, when the Walcheren expedition obliged him to put the national guards, and the *gendarmerie*, into requisition. It is asserted, that, in consequence of a resolution on the part of the council of state, the war minister wrote to Joseph, requesting him to detach twenty thousand men, for the purpose of covering Paris. Joseph answered that he would, with pleasure, come in person with all his army; but only when he should receive the emperor's commands to that purpose: that he had preserved Madrid by a miracle; and that he could not possibly detach a single battalion, without exposing himself to be driven to the Pyrenees. He ended his letter by declaring to the duke de Feltre, that as soon as *the crisis of the Scheldt* had arrived, it would be highly necessary to send him one hundred thousand men, partly to replace the fifty thousand who had perished in the last campaign, and further, to have the power of occupying Valentia, Andalusia, Estremadura, and Galicia. The instant it was fully ascertained that the English were leaving the upper Scheldt, and preparing for their return to England, the battalions which formed provisional regiments, were marched to Bayonne, in order to be sent from that

place to Spain. Several battalions, which had reached Strasburg, to join the grand army at Vienna, were ordered to march back towards the peninsula, in the months of September and October. The total of the reinforcements that entered Spain, during the last four months of the year 1809, may be rated at thirty thousand men.

Although Joseph is unacquainted with the art of war, his good sense made him perceive that Jourdan, however brave and zealous in his service, was little calculated to fill the office of commander-in-chief. He called Soult to his aid, and appointed him to that important station. Marshal Soult, besides, had been on bad terms with Ney, ever since he had refused to stay with the latter in Galicia. The public service was likely to suffer from the disagreement of these two commanders. Soult's new situation gave him a superiority, at which marshal Ney was displeased; and which determined the latter on repairing to Paris. He left the command of his troops to general Marchand, who, wishing to avail himself of a favourable opportunity for exercising his supreme command, marched against La Romana's army, which was posted on the heights of Tamames, near Ciudad-Rodrigo. On the eighteenth of October, he was at first successful against the left of the enemy: but Mendizabal and Carrera placed themselves at the head of the corps de reserve, charged the French with the bayonet, and obliged them to fall back almost in confusion. The duke Delparque, who commanded in chief, moved his whole army forward on the twenty-first, in order to profit by the advantage which he had just gained. On the twenty-fifth he reached the heights of Salamanca, which the French had left the preceding night for Toro. The inhabitants received La Romana's brave companions with enthusiasm: but their joy was of short duration. Soult employed the reinforcements, which were arriving from France, to increase the sixth corps. General Kellermann was ordered to march against the duke Delparque, who had already cut

off the communication between Madrid and Valladolid. As soon as he knew that he was to be attacked by superior forces, he evacuated Carpio, to take the position of Alba de Tormes, near Salamanca. On the twenty-eighth of November, the duke was attacked by Kellermann. His troops did not oppose a resistance worthy of their ancient exploits. They retreated in confusion, with the loss of all their artillery. A French division of the sixth corps took possession of Salamanca on the twenty-ninth. The duke Delparque's defeat was owing to his not having his troops concentrated at the moment when he was unexpectedly attacked. Besides, the Asturians and Galicians thought with regret of the marquis de la Romana, and their mountains. They availed themselves of the confusion, which took place after the engagement of the twenty-eighth, to disperse, and return to their homes.

General Arrizaga had succeeded Venegas and Eguia, in the command of the armies of La Mancha and Estremadura. Surprised on beholding himself at the head of fifty thousand men, delighted with hearing the loud demand of his troops to be led against the French, and possessed of more bravery than experience, this general advanced as far as the plains of Ocana, near Aranjuez. Soult immediately formed dispositions to make him repent this temerity. He assembled Mortier's and Sebastiani's corps, and whatever troops he could dispose of at Madrid. His army did not exceed thirty thousand men, including four thousand horse. He caused the right wing of the Spaniards to be attacked: but the attack was completely repulsed. Proud of this first success, Arrizaga assumed the offensive, and overthrew Leval's division, which formed the left of Soult's army. He committed the imprudence of crossing the hollow road, which was between his line and that of the French. The passage created some confusion in the ranks of the Spaniards. A French division of fresh troops availed themselves of it, to attack the Spaniards with closed ranks and the

bayonet. Arrizaga's infantry, being forced to give way, was briskly pursued. The French cavalry, under the command of Sebastiani, rushed upon the Spanish battalions, which, being already in confusion, could not resist its attacks. The Spanish cavalry, which had been stationed on unfavourable ground, was forced to leave the infantry to its fate, and took to flight. A few Spanish regiments formed squares, and retreated in good order for more than a league; but being hurried away by the torrent, and favoured by the darkness of the night, they dispersed, and the retreat was converted into a complete rout. The loss of the Spaniards amounted to twenty-eight thousand men, twenty-five thousand of whom were taken prisoners.

As this success consolidated Joseph on his throne, he formed the design of subduing the rich provinces of the south. An expedition was prepared against Andalusia, of which Soult was to have the command. But the troops expected from France not being yet arrived, the French could not avail themselves of the confusion prevalent among the Spaniards subsequent to the battle of Ocana; and the attack of the Sierra Morena was postponed to the beginning of 1810. The capitulation of Gerona, on the tenth of December, 1809, ended the third campaign of the French in Spain. Gerona had the advantage over Saragossa of being regularly fortified; and though it was much longer defended, yet no greater praise can be bestowed on the garrison, and on the inhabitants, than to call them worthy brethren of the brave defenders of the capital of Aragon. One of the most glorious exploits during the siege of Gerona, which surrendered only after a courageous defence of six months, was the introduction of fresh provisions and ammunition into the place by general Blake, which service was performed with the most distinguished ability. He knew that the garrison was in want of victuals. He prepared a convoy of fifteen hundred mules, under the escort of four thousand men, commanded by general Garcia de Conde.

This convoy, which had been formed in the neighbourhood of Olot, was to pass the river Ter, at Amer, and move towards Gerona, along the right bank of that river. To protect this movement, Blake resorted to a stratagem. On the thirtieth of August, 1809, he attacked the French with all his disposable forces, in the environs of Brunola. Souham's division having been overthrown, Saint Cyr, who commanded in chief, thought that the Spanish general wanted to give battle, for the purpose of liberating Gerona. He collected his army, and left before the place only the troops necessary to defend his works against the garrison. In the meantime, the convoy made its appearance, overthrew the besieging troops, and entered Gerona amidst acclamations of joy on the part of the besieged. When Saint Cyr heard that the place had been provisioned afresh, he left his position of Brunola, and concentrated his troops, to intercept whatever should attempt to leave the place. But in spite of these dispositions, all that were useless in Gerona, such as the guides and mules, left it without any loss. This circumstance, which must be attributed to the small number of troops under Saint Cyr, was proclaimed by Buonaparte as a capital fault, contrary to all the rules of the art of war; and it was on this occasion that Saint Cyr was succeeded in the command by marshal Augereau.

The nineteenth of September proved a glorious day for the garrison of Gerona. The French marshal thought of overawing the inhabitants by a *coup d' eclat*; and the breach having been found practicable, he intended nothing less than to take the place by storm. He ordered false attacks with ladders at several points, whilst he marched at the head of six thousand men, to establish himself on the breach. The spirit of the first onset caused the troops, by which the breach was defended, to fall back; but the reserve charged with the bayonet, exclaiming—" *Long live Ferdinand VII!*" The French took to flight. Having been rallied by their officers, they thrice renewed their attacks, and every time

in vain.—The breaches were repaired, and the siege was converted into a blockade. Augereau, like all new commanders, had wished to distinguish himself, that he might be able to acquaint Buonaparte at once with his arrival, and with a victory which would induce his master to applaud himself for having chosen one of his most famous lieutenants.

On the twenty-ninth of October, Augereau attacked Blake on the heights of Brunola. The Spanish general, who was not strong enough to give battle, had raised his camp in the night of the twenty-eighth, to take the position of Santa Coloma. The object of this manœuvre was to cover his depot of Hostalrick, where he was preparing a convoy for Gerona. He was attacked by general Souham, with superior numbers, and forced to retreat. On the eighth of November, Augereau despatched Pino's division to attack Hostalrick, and destroy the magazines. The town was taken, and plundered; but the fort, to which general Quadrado's column had retreated, forced general Pino to withdraw, with whatever he had taken from the unfortunate inhabitants. - On the third and seventh of December, the outworks of Gerona were carried by main force, in spite of the courageous resistance of the besieged, who, being entirely separated from Blake's army, and having no hope left of being succoured, surrendered on the tenth. On the eleventh, the French took possession of the town and forts. The garrison and the inhabitants were in absolute want of provisions. The Catalonians, however, were not discouraged by this reverse. Barcelona was more closely blockaded; and the guerillas, destined to intercept the communications of the enemy, increased in numbers and activity. The English, on the seas, seconded, with all their means, the efforts of the Spaniards. Lord Collingwood had dispersed a convoy, that sailed from Toulon for Barcelona. Its escort, consisting of three ships of the line, and two frigates, had been forced on shore on the

twenty-fifth of October, except one frigate, which escaped into the port of Marseilles. The convoy itself, which had retired to the bay of Rosas, was partly destroyed and partly captured, in the night of the thirty-first, by a detachment of the English fleet.

The exploit by which Gerona was provisioned, the victory of Talavera, the evacuation of Galicia, the advantages gained by La Romana's army against Ney's corps, and the activity of the guerillas, warranted the hope that the third campaign would end in favour of the Spaniards. But plans, as ill contrived as badly performed, dangerous pretensions, and ridiculous, not to say highly blameable discontents, paralysed alike the zeal of the brave Spaniards, and the generous exertions of their powerful ally. The pride of a few individuals caused the precious blood, spilled with so much glory for the independence of the peninsula, to have been shed in vain. The English nation, and the English government, as well as the Spanish nation, and the Spanish government, are innocent of the blunders, jealousies, and tardiness of the individuals, who abused the confidence of their employers, by covering their errors and animosities with the specious pretence of the general interest.

Can there be any thing more ridiculous than general Cuesta's stating to the supreme junta, in his report of the seventh of August—"that on the twenty-sixth of July he despatched an officer to sir Arthur, and that in consequence of that general's orders, he resolved to make a retrograde movement from Torrijos to Talavera?" What could be the object of such an assertion? Did Cuesta wish to insinuate that he was under sir Arthur Wellesley's command? His conduct on the twenty-fourth, when he marched only with his own army to Torrijos, proves that he was free to move as he liked. Sir Arthur undoubtedly committed a great fault in not following this movement of Cuesta: but the latter committed a still greater one in separating himself from the English army: and when he saw sir Arthur

determined to continue in the position of Talavera, every consideration ought to have induced his acquiescence in the determination of his ally. The justice of this observation was fully proved by the subsequent events. Sir Arthur Wellesley's letter of the eighth of August from Deletosa, is likewise a curious document. He says therein: "that he is advantageously posted to defend the passage of the Almaraz and the lower Tagus;" whilst on the ninth, the English army began its march to Badajoz, through Truxillo and Merida. Surely, to leave ten leagues of a desert and mountainous country between a river, and the troops entrusted with the defence of its banks, is a new way to defend the passage of that river!

At the time of the sanguinary battle of Ocana, sir Arthur Wellesley (now lord Wellington) was at Badajoz: he had under his command an army of about twenty-five thousand brave men, who anxiously wished for battle. General Beresford, and the duke of Albuquerque, were sufficient to keep the French in check upon the right bank of the Tagus. If by a rapid march, which his position allowed him to conceal long enough to attain his object, lord Wellington had ascended the Guadiana, joined Venegas at Consuegra, and attacked Joseph with eighty thousand fighting men, there is no doubt but he would have gained a complete victory; and by his subsequent movements he would have completely repaired the faults committed at the beginning of this campaign. It was to a similar manœuvre that the Romans were indebted for the victory obtained by the consuls Livius, Salinator and Claudius Nero, over Asdrubal, who was heading a numerous army, with which he intended to reinforce that of Annibal, his brother, in the year of Rome 547. Claudius left his camp, which faced that of Annibal, took with him only the flower of his troops, to the number of ten thousand, and effected his junction with Livius. The want of means of conveyance did not deter him, because, says Livy: *Claudianus exercitus nihil*

ferme, præter arma, secum in expeditionem tulerat. "The troops under Claudius had scarcely any baggage but their arms." Asdrubal was destroyed, with his whole army, consisting of sixty thousand fighting men, and that by thirty thousand Romans. But without recurring to ancient history for examples of that activity, by which strength is increased both numerically, and through the dismay which it occasions, whoever peruses Buonaparte's first campaigns in Italy, will be forced to confess that the generous views of England, and the patriotic intentions of the Spaniards, were not fulfilled. From the month of August to the month of December, the English head-quarters continued at Badajoz. The troops under Venegas and Arrizaga were cut to pieces, whilst there was not a single Frenchman opposed to the English and Portuguese. It was also during this interval that lord Wellington went to Cadiz, on a visit to his brother, the marquis of Wellesley, who was on his return to England. His lordship rejoined the army on the twelfth of November. The army left Spain, to march to the neighbourhood of Almeida, and before the first of January, 1810, all the English troops had re-entered Portugal.

Peace had been concluded between France and Austria on the fourteenth of October, 1809. This great event, which by some observers is perhaps justly attributed less to Buonaparte's victories over the archduke Charles, than to the influence of his insidious policy with the emperor Francis, served to discourage in Spain that class of men, who in all countries wait for some peremptory motive to determine their conduct. The party in favour of king Joseph found itself strengthened by this indifference: but the true Spaniards were only the more confirmed in their determination to obtain their independence by conquest.

The evacuation of the island of Walcheren enabled France to dispose of all her forces against Spain. Several columns of good troops were ordered to Bayonne and Perpign-

nan, to complete the regiments, and reinforce the different armies. In the camp of Boulogne, and in the French garrisons, a fourth battalion had been added to the regiments on service in Spain, for the instruction of the conscripts newly levied. They were formed into provisional half brigades, of three battalions each. When Buonaparte knew that he had nothing more to fear on the Scheldt, he sent those troops to Spain: the men were incorporated with their respective regiments, and the officers, as well as the non-commissioned officers, returned to the different *depots* in France, to superintend the drilling of new recruits. These arrangements were certainly known in England, and in Spain: yet no measures were taken for an effectual resistance to the exertions of the French. In the beginning of August, the marquis of Wellesley had arrived at Cadiz, where he was received as a king. That nobleman, who had made so brilliant a figure in the East Indies, was not equally fortunate in Spain. He approved of all the measures of his brother, when he should have employed both his authority, and his fraternal attachment, to prevent his separation from the Spanish army. He acted with as much circumspection towards the Spaniards, as if he had been treating with the house of lords, whereas he should have held the language of a master in the name of his government, which was unquestionably entitled to dictate, in order to reap some advantage from the immense sacrifices made by Great Britain for the defence of the peninsula. But the noble marquis wanted firmness, or if he evinced any, it was merely to concur in a disastrous measure, that of marching the English army to the neighbourhood of Almeida, where its presence was perfectly useless; as this part of the frontiers of Portugal was defended by two strong places, by general Beresford's division, and by La Romana's army, under the orders of the duke Delparque. The French, besides, had no forces on that point but Ney's corps, which was not above fourteen thousand men strong, as it had not

yet received the reinforcements by which it was to be completed.

To conclude these observations on the military operations of 1809. in Spain. marshal Soult must also be arraigned for an enormous fault. which. had the allies known how to avail themselves of it. would have given them a very decisive advantage in the third campaign. After the duke Delparque had forced the corps of Ney. on the eighteenth of October. to fall back to Toro and Valladolid. the Spaniards were masters of the province of Salamanca. and consequently possessed the passes of Estremadura to the north of that province. Soult's corps. of about twelve thousand men. then under the command of general Laborde. was cantoned in the neighbourhood of Coria and Placentia. General Beresford. at the head of the Portuguese. was guarding the frontiers from the right banks of the Tagus. up towards Almeida. The duke of Albuquerque was posted with ten thousand Spaniards on the left of the Tagus. Mortier. Victor. and Sebastiani. were manœuvring. in the middle of November. against Arrizaga. in the environs of Toledo: and yet the French continued to occupy Estremadura. though. as it were. surrounded by eighty thousand men. Lord Wellington might have collected his army at Merida. passed the Tagus at Almaraz. and taken post at Naval-Moral. to cut off all communication of the French with their main army. Had they been attacked on the right by general Beresford. in the rear by the duke Delparque. and on the left by lord Wellington. whilst they were harassed in their front by the duke of Albuquerque. the loss of these twelve thousand men was indeed inevitable. as they would undoubtedly have been forced to lay down their arms.

This observation is not built upon vague supposition. but upon clear and precise calculations. The English army was only four marches distant from Naval-Moral. and the French could certainly have been kept in ignorance of its moving. as the advanced posts on the Tagus were occupied

by the duke of Albuquerque. General Beresford, and the duke Delparque, required each only two marches to attack the French in their respective directions, and effectually contribute to the success of the principal attack under lord Wellington, who, by this able manœuvre, would have completely destroyed that very same corps of Soult, which had escaped him six months before in the north of Portugal. It is, therefore, merely to the want of union between the allied generals, and the absence of an enterprising leader, capable of combining a great operation, that the French, who were left in so hazardous a situation, at a distance of nearly two hundred miles from Madrid, were indebted for the tranquillity which they were allowed to enjoy in their cantonments. Had they been opposed to an active and enterprising adversary, they would have been so completely surrounded, that not one man could have escaped, to carry the news of this disaster to the *fortunate* Soult. The application of this epithet to the general, who suffered the English army to escape, and embark at Corunna, and who was reduced to abandon all his artillery on his retreat from Oporto, will perhaps be disallowed. But where is the man whose star always shone unclouded? The question was, indeed, agitated by the staff of the English army, on the eve of the battle of Corunna, whether a parley should be demanded, to obtain an armistice, during which the embarkation of the troops should not be molested. The design was not carried into execution, because some irresolution was perceived in the manœuvres of the French. The English would, in fact, have been forced to lay down their arms, had Buonaparte adopted the wise precaution of hastening onwards with marshal Ney, to support marshal Soult's attacks.

In the next book, we shall behold marshal Soult again crowned by fortune, and again neglecting to avail himself of her favours.

BOOK III.

THE joy which Buonaparte felt, on hearing of the misunderstanding between lord Wellington and the Spanish generals, may easily be imagined; and it may be supposed that a circumstance, so prejudicial to the cause of the peninsula, was partly effected by the agents of the cabinet of the Thuilleries, stationed at the seat of the Spanish government. But be this as it may, when Buonaparte was acquainted with lord Wellington's return to Portugal, he hastened to avail himself of a retreat, which would evidently have delivered Granada, Cordova, Seville, and even Cadiz, into his hands, had he been present with the army, or had not king Joseph's indolence prevented marshal Soult's punctuality, as to fulfilling his master's intentions. On the south of the Guadiana are the famous mountains, called *Sierra Morena*; at the foot of which lie the plains of Andalusia, watered by the Guadalquivir. Buonaparte ordered marshal Soult to make arrangements for crossing that *Sierra* at the head of fifty thousand men. The Spanish forces in the *Sierra* did not exceed twenty thousand; and these still dismayed by their rout at Oeana. In order to diminish the resistance, by obliging the enemy to divide his forces, the French commander caused several movements to be made in the middle of January, towards the principal passes of the *Sierra*, especially the two extremities, with a view of inducing the Spaniards to weaken their centre at the pass, which is in the high road from Madrid to Cadiz. On the twentieth of January Soult made a general attack. His right was commanded by Victor, his centre by Mortier, and his left by Sebastiani. Victor set out from Almaden, for the purpose of marching to Andujar, by Torre-Campo,

Villanueva de la Jarra, and Montoro. Mortier marched by the high road; while general Gazan's division was turning, and overthrowing the Spaniards in their intrenchments. The mines, intended to render the road impassable, had been badly contrived, and were scarcely of any use. Mortier halted at Carolina; and on the twenty-first advanced to Andujar.

Sebastiani and Victor were equally successful in their attacks, though they met with greater resistance. The Spanish general had detached the flower of his troops to his two flanks, in order that he might not be turned. He was, besides, persuaded that his centre was secure from danger, being fortified both by nature and art. But finding himself deceived in his calculations, Arrizaga retreated towards Granada, for the purpose of making a diversion in favour of Seville and Cadiz, and of affording to these two important places time for preparations to avoid a surprise. Marshal Soult, indeed, sent the fourth corps in pursuit of the Spaniards towards Granada. Sebastiani attacked Arrizaga in the neighbourhood of Alcala La Real. He was so superior in numbers to the Spaniards, that victory was not long doubtful. Arrizaga took the road to Mercia, and Sebastiani entered Granada on the twenty-eighth. But Joseph, instead of moving his troops onwards, lost his time in issuing proclamations. The one which he published at Cordova, on the twenty-seventh, declared—"that the issue of the war in Spain has never been *doubtful*; that the inhabitants of Cordova ought to make use of their reason, which will show them in the French soldiers so many *friends* ready to defend them, &c." It must be confessed, that Joseph, though rather a sensible man, selected a very improper time and place to inculcate his principles. How could he hold such language in a city, which in 1808 had been sacked by the French, and through which they had seen a body of fourteen thousand prisoners pass, at the very time they heard that the same king Joseph was obliged to

fly full speed from his capital, that he might not fall into the hands of general Castanos? On the twenty-eighth Victor was at Carmona, and Mortier at Exija. On the thirty-first Joseph and Soult were at Carmona: they had marched thirty leagues in ten days.

✓ On the twenty-ninth, Victor had arrived before Seville, and summoned this place; the inhabitants of which were resolved to submit, but on favourable terms. Two deputies were sent to Victor on the thirty-first of January. They demanded that the cortes should be assembled at Seville, to settle the laws of the country. The French general promised them *in his hand writing*, that they should be protected—that the past should be buried in oblivion—and that they should be exempt from *illegal* contributions. This promise induced the magistrates to open the gates of their city to the French army. When Joseph was apprised of this fortunate event, he came in great haste, *on the first of February*, to date a proclamation *from the Alcazar of Seville*. He also lost some time in returning thanks to the soldiers; but at length announced—“as the will of the king of Spain, that a third pillar shall be erected between the pillars of Hercules, which shall make known, to the remotest posterity, and to the navigators of the two worlds, the names of the French chiefs and armies who have conquered Spain.” ✓ Instead of amusing himself with inditing fine phrases, the duke of Albuquerque, who had hastened from Estremadura, judged that there was not a moment to be lost in measures towards the safety of Cadiz. On the fourth of February he threw himself into that place, with all the troops under his command; and on the fifth the French reached Chiclana. From the twenty-ninth of January, till the third of February, the French might have entered Cadiz without any obstacle, had they marched only six leagues a-day. Mortier's corps was more than sufficient to overawe Seville, which was left without troops. The French paid dearly for this neglect of five days, as

the delay made them lose Cadiz; and this city being then the seat of government, it ought to have been considered as a focus of patriotism, which would animate the resistance of the provinces against their conquerors.

Soult came when it was too late. On the tenth of February he wrote from Chiclana to the duke of Albuquerque, for the purpose of inducing him to admit the French troops into the isle of Leon and Cadiz. The answer of this nobleman was firm and energetic. As it throws some light upon anterior events, I shall quote a few extracts.

“ *My lord duke*—the unanimity of the sentiment, which has simultaneously induced all the kingdoms and provinces of Spain to defend themselves against an unjust domination, and to avenge the unparalleled usurpation of the crown, appertaining to their beloved and lawful sovereign, Ferdinand VII, is sufficiently apparent, without pointing out the justice of the cause which I defend. You may therefore be convinced that the Spaniards, in spite of the misfortunes of war, arising from causes no longer in existence, such as their inexperience, and their not having the intimate connexion *with the English nation which exists at this day*, are firmly resolved never to lay down their arms, till they have obtained the just recovery of their legitimate rights. . . .
 The fortress of Cadiz has nothing to fear from an army of one hundred thousand men. There is no comparison between its present state of defence, *and the situation in which it was a few days ago!!!*
 Consequently, and as a return for the interest which your excellency takes in the fate of the inhabitants of this isle, and the fortress of Cadiz, I advise you to renounce the useless sacrifice of your soldiers: knowing the advantages derived by my troops, not only from the nature of the ground, and of the positions which they occupy, but also from the fraternal union which animates them in executing every species of service jointly with the English, our close allies. It is also my duty to inform your excel-

lency, that the illustrious British nation, not less generous than great and brave, have no intention, as your excellency insinuates, to take possession of Cadiz. Their only object is to assist in its defence, with all the means which they abundantly possess; and which the Spaniards solicit, and accept with gratitude. The treatment of the prisoners will be such as it ought to be between civilized nations. We shall not follow the example set by the French troops, of cruelly butchering the Spaniards, as insurgents. Finally, I cannot consent to a conference with your excellency, under existing circumstances, nor till the deliverance of Spain from the presence of all foreign troops, and the restoration of our beloved Ferdinand VII, shall have enabled me to accept, with pleasure, your obliging &c. &c.

(Signed)

The duke of Albuquerque.

Isle of Leon, February 10th, 1810.

To his excellency the duke of Dalmatia."

This language, very different from that held by Morla to Buonaparte, at the capitulation of Madrid, left Soult no hope of reducing Cadiz otherwise than by famine, or by the fear of a bombardment. His troops occupied San Lucar de Barrameda, at the mouth of the Guadalquivir, Rota, Puerto de Santa Maria, Puerto Real, and Chielana. He placed a strong garrison in Medina Sidonia. He had sent marshal Mortier into Estremadura, for the purpose of subduing that province, gaining possession of Badajoz, and opening a communication with the second corps, of which general Reynier had taken the command. The French had occupied Zafra on the 9th of February; and on the twelfth they summoned Badajoz to surrender. The governor refused to open the despatches; and dismissed the bearer of the flag of truce, with a declaration that in future he should order such couriers to be fired upon. Mortier, who was not prepared to besiege the town, cantoned his troops be-

tween Lerena and Almendralejo, establishing his head-quarters at Lossantos. as the most central point of his cantonments. The intelligence that Badajoz too had not been taken, caused some vexation to Soult. ✓ He perceived that he had been too sanguine, when, on the third of February, he thus addressed prince Berthier from Seville—"To judge by the conduct of the inhabitants, we may consider the war as almost ended." The first idea of hostilities being terminated, had been suggested to marshal Soult by general Sebastiani, who in the despatch dated Granada, the twenty-ninth of January, assured the marshal—"that the French troops conducted themselves admirably—that the inhabitants were *delighted* with them—and that every one at Granada considered the war as at an end." Sebastiani informed Soult in the same letter, that he had found at Granada a battalion of one thousand men, almost all Swiss. of general Dupont's army—that he had promised them free pardon, if they would faithfully serve the emperor—that the officers had sworn to do so *in writing*, on their honour—and that the non-commissioned officers and privates had taken their oath with the greatest enthusiasm. ✓ But although Sebastiani had announced that the Spaniards had sworn fidelity to king Joseph with the greatest alacrity, he yet judged it prudent, before he marched towards Malaga, to place the castle of Alhambra in a state of defence, and to have in it a garrison of twelve hundred men. for the purpose of keeping the inhabitants of Granada in a state of tranquillity.

On the fourth of February, general Milhaud marched to Antequera, with a strong advanced guard. On the fifth, he proceeded to Malaga. The Spaniards were attacked, forced in their positions, and obliged to fall back. They rallied near Malaga, assumed the offensive, and, in their turn, forced the French to retreat. Sebastiani, having arrived with a reinforcement of infantry, to the assistance of his advanced guard, summoned the Spaniards to lay down

their arms. Instead of returning any answer, they rushed forward with loud shouts, assailing the French with a very brisk fire of artillery and musketry. The ground was favourable for the manœuvres of cavalry. Sebastiani availed himself of it; he obliged the Spaniards to seek refuge in Malaga, which he entered in close pursuit of the fugitives. The firing continued for some time, in the town, from roofs and windows; but the arrival of the French infantry put an end to the conflict, and the inhabitants submitted. These details show, however, that the Spaniards merely wanted a leader, capable of availing himself of their courage, and of their determination to resist the French. Malaga was provided with one hundred and forty-eight pieces of ordnance, of all sizes, independent of twenty-three field pieces, destined for the army of Catalonia. The store-houses were filled with ammunition. How could the Spanish government neglect the proper measures for the defence, or the evacuation, of a place so important on account of its stores, which, owing to the vicinity of the sea, might easily have been removed? But anarchy was carried to such an extreme, that the delirious populace entrusted the command in chief to a Capuchin monk, who was appointed lieutenant-general. To have placed him at the head of a company of grenadiers might have been proper enough; but it was easy to foresee the result of military operations, conducted by such a man. Satisfied with his successes in Andalusia, and indulging the hope that Cadiz, after the first agitation had subsided, would accept his paternal offers, king Joseph set out for Madrid; and left to marshal Soult the supreme command of the civil and military authorities in Andalusia.

Buonaparte took care to circulate the most favourable reports concerning the occupation of the southern provinces of Spain, for the purpose of encouraging his troops to march with less reluctance, and reinforce the army of the peninsula. According to his statements, the south of Spain

combined all the advantages of colonies, without any of their inconveniences. This artifice proved successful. There was but little desertion from the regiments sent to Spain. The sixth French corps, of which marshal Ney had resumed the command, moved onward to Ciudad Rodrigo. On the eleventh of February, some mortars played upon the town, and the governor was summoned to surrender. Andrew de Herasti answered, like a man of honour—"that he should not surrender till he had been regularly attacked; and till he was reduced to the last extremity." Being thus deceived in his expectation, marshal Ney fell back, cantoned his troops between Ciudad-Rodrigo and Salamanca, and collected the means of acting with more effect. The eighth corps, under the orders of Junot, was preparing to assume the offensive against Astorga and the Asturias. The seventh corps was still resting from the fatigues of the siege of Gerona, when, on the twenty-ninth of February, general O'Donel, who had replaced Blake, attacked it almost unawares in the plain of Vique. The Spaniards were conquerors; but not knowing how to moderate their ardour, and pursuing the French too eagerly, the cavalry, which protected the retreat of the latter, availed themselves of a favourable ground and moment, when rushing with impetuosity upon the patriots, they made the latter lose the fruit of this glorious victory.

O'Donel's plan had been judiciously laid to raise the blockade of Hostalrick, and destroy general Souham's division, which was the flower of Augereau's troops. Whilst the Spanish general was directing the attack against this column, he caused Besala, on the north of Gerona, to be also assailed, in order to oblige the French to divide their forces; and a corps of six thousand *miquelets* rushed upon the Italian division, which blockaded Hostalrick. At the same time, all the intermediate posts were overthrown by clouds of peasants, that flocked from all sides, to concur in the execution of their brave general's plan. But the re-

treat of O'Donel's corps, occasioned in the evening of the battle by the superiority of the French cavalry, rendered the advantages nugatory, which had been gained on the whole line. Augereau was so alarmed at the risk he had run, that he sent Buonaparte the most pressing letters for prompt reinforcements, in order that he might not be obliged to evacuate the whole province of Catalonia. His master discovered the true cause of the marshal's fears. He supposed him attacked with a bodily illness, which depressed his spirits; and appointed marshal Macdonald to succeed him in the command. Augereau was still with the army, when the garrison of Hostalrick, labouring under an absolute want of provisions, evacuated the place on the eleventh of May, and opened themselves a passage through the blockading troops, sword in hand. About the same time, the small islands of Las-Medas, situated on the coast of Catalonia, opposite the mouth of the Ter, were taken on the part of the Spaniards, by a *coup de main*. Their occupation was advantageous to the Spaniards, as it put a stop to the coasting trade, which, till then, had been so serviceable to the French, for the purpose of throwing provisions into Barcelona.

The province of Arragon appeared tranquil. Suchet judged the opportunity favourable to obtain possession of Valentia, and to communicate, by his right wing, with the left of marshal Soult, who had sent advanced parties as far as the kingdom of Mureia. He reached the environs of Valentia almost without striking a blow: but he did not prove more fortunate than marshal Moncey. His promises, his menaces, and his attacks, were all rendered equally fruitless by the ardour of the Valentians, and the sagacity of general Caro. Suchet perceived that he should be kept a long time far from Arragon, if he obstinately persisted in his attacks upon Valentia; he also heard that guerrillas were forming in the province under his command, which might do much mischief, unless they were checked

during their infancy. Besides, general O'Donel, who had been informed of his enterprise upon Valentia, had already put himself in motion for the purpose of marching to the assistance of that place. These motives determined the French general to adjourn the execution of his designs, and draw nearer to the province of Arragon. But to keep his troops in activity, he laid siege to Lerida. General O'Donel now thought he could engage him with the prospect of success. On the twenty-third of April, he attacked the French, at the head of fifteen thousand Spaniards. The garrison of Lerida, to second the attack of the succouring army, made a sortie, which was repulsed. The two armies, having met, fought with intrepidity: but victory again declared against O'Donel, in the end, owing to the superiority of Suchet's cavalry. Lerida protracted its defence to the fourteenth of May, when it was obliged to capitulate. It contained large stores of warlike ammunition. Astorga had surrendered to the eighth corps, a short time before. Junot had taken possession of that town on the twelfth of April, after a vigorous resistance. But the attack of that place had been badly managed. The French, without any necessity, lost a number of brave men, who would have been preserved, had the siege been conducted according to the rules of fortification.

Ney and Reynier had their head-quarters, the former at Salamanca, the latter at Merida. Soult continued at Seville. A kind of revolution had taken place at Cadiz. The duke of Albuquerque had been dismissed, and succeeded by general Blake. The civil authorities forgot the signal service which this nobleman's great activity had rendered, when his corps entered the Isle of Leon, twelve hours before it was attacked by Victor. They forgot that it was to the able dispositions, and energetic measures of this nobleman, that they were indebted for being able to remain faithful to Ferdinand VII, as well as from being exempt from the contributions and vexations of every kind, to which

cities are exposed under the yoke of any enemy. What an execrable vice is ingratitude! This nobleman, whose zeal and talents might have been so useful during the war of the peninsula, was sacrificed to the caprices of some office clerks, and honourably exiled, being sent as ambassador to the court of London.

A dreadful storm destroyed, in the bay of Cadiz, four ships of the line, and about fifty merchant vessels. The hurricane lasted from the seventh to the tenth of March. From the mouth of the Guadalquivir, to the inmost recess of the bay, the coast exhibited the lamentable spectacle of several thousand unfortunate individuals, struggling against the waves, on the wrecks of ships; but the sea was so heavy, that not more than six hundred could be saved. The English set two ships on fire. The French batteries near the sea suffered also considerable injury. During the months of March and April, Soult adopted the system of moveable columns, to restore tranquillity in the plains of Estremadura, and on the mountains of Andalusia. La Romana and Blake displayed great talents and activity in that kind of warfare, which is so well adapted to troops newly raised. Reynier, Mortier, Latour Maubourg, and Sebastiani, were more frequently conquered, than conquerors in the different engagements, which took place between their detachments and the Spaniards. In his letter to Berthier, dated Granada, the seventeenth of March, 1810, Soult forgets the respect, which generous enemies owe to each other, and unconsciously passes a high eulogium on general Blake, when he says, "general Blake, who ought rather to be styled a marauder, has succeeded, by dint of menaces, punishments, and conflagrations, in exciting the people of those mountains (the Alpujarras) to take up arms." How can a general of really superior merit be so inconsistent as to publish invectives like this? Marshal Soult ought to have said that the inhabitants of the Alpujarras, exasperated at the shameful treatment received from his moveable co-

lums, eagerly flocked to the standard of general Blake, in order that they might, under his guidance, be freed from their oppressors, and avenged.

According to Sebastiani's and Soult's brilliant reports, in the months of January and February, Andalusia must have been considered to have enjoyed as perfect tranquillity as any province of France. It must have been painful to marshal Soult, when he recovered from such a delightful dream, and published, two months after, the most alarming details. In his letter to Berthier, dated Granada, the seventeenth of March, he observes, that "It will be difficult in future to guard against the intrigues of the English agents, so long as the camp of Saint Roch is not occupied, and the lines are not re-established. His catholic majesty would for the moment have ordered general Depolas's division thither, were not that division *necessarily* employed in keeping the communication open from the Sierra Morena to Granada and Seville, and holding in check the numerous inhabitants of the kingdoms of Jaen and Cordova, now infested by *thousands* of disbanded soldiers and smugglers, whom it has not yet been possible to seize, and who daily commit robberies to a great extent. *The number of these dispersed soldiers and smugglers is rated at above thirty thousand!*" After this avowal, which is not obscure, Soult states that Blake, who had at first gained some advantages over the French troops, was attacked and defeated by general Sebastiani; and that in Estremadura, Mortier had dispersed some troops of insurgents, collected by the marquis de la Romana, at Xeres de los Cavalleros, and at Llerena. All these details evidently show that the French, being obliged to guard so great an extent of country, would have been easily forced to evacuate Andalusia a second time, had the English army, instead of being buried in the mountains of Portugal, manœuvred in the north of Andalusia, on the right shore of the Guadalquivir, between Cordova and Belalazar.

Fort Matagorda was attacked on the eleventh of April, and the English, by whom it was defended, were obliged to evacuate it on the twenty-third. The superiority of the French artillery had made it a heap of ruins, when the resolution to abandon it was taken. By the possession of this post, the French were enabled to bombard Cadiz, the distance from the fort to the central parts of the town being nearly equal to the reach of mortars of twelve inches, and thirty-six pounders, pointed at an angle of from thirty to forty-three degrees. The capture of this fort occasioned the liberation of about fifteen hundred French prisoners, six hundred of whom were officers. During the night of the fifteenth to the sixteenth of May, the sloop *Castile* cut her cables, and ran ashore to the northwest of Matagorda. The prisoners had overpowered the Spanish crew, and the French mariners, detained in the sloop, had directed the manœuvre. In spite of the brisk fire kept up by the Spaniards from the land batteries, and from the gun-boats, the French were almost all landed, owing to the eagerness with which they were assisted by their countrymen. When the sloop was burnt, there remained only a few sick, whose lives were despaired of. This event may be considered as the conclusion of the fourth campaign in the south of Spain; that in the north terminated by the capture of Mequinenza.

This fortress is situated on a very steep rock, at the confluence of the Ebro and the Segre. General Suchet began to invest it on the twentieth of May. The trenches were opened in the night of the second to the third of June. The garrison at first made a courageous defence; but, overpowered by the French artillery, and no doubt astonished at the rapidity of the progress made by the besiegers towards the body of the place, a capitulation was on the eighth agreed upon. Its strength amounted to one thousand four hundred men. The defence, by no means adequate to the difficulty of the ground, was generally judged unworthy of the firmness which distinguishes the Spanish

character. Mequinenza is justly styled the key of the Ebro. Although the artillery had fired ten thousand balls, a vast quantity of ammunition, and three months provision for two thousand men, were, nevertheless, found in the place. It was on this account that the French general spoke with the utmost contempt of the garrison, in his official report, and went so far as to add, "that he granted them the honour of desfilng before the French troops, merely out of the regard which he felt for the valour of the Spanish artillery."

The French opened the fifth campaign with the siege of Ciudad-Rodrigo. In order to bear the imperial eagles triumphantly to Lisbon, Buonaparte collected a formidable army, under the command of marshal Massena, known by the denomination of prince of *Essling*, no very flattering title, since it recalls a disaster. This general had under his orders, Ney, duke of Elchingen, Junot, duke of Abrantes, and general Reynier. The army amounted to seventy thousand fighting men. Lord Wellington had but fifty thousand, half of whom were Portuguese. General Hill's division, which formed a corps of observation on the movements of general Reynier, was a part of this army. Had the allied troops been inured to war, like the French, the balance would have been nearly equal, on account of the two strong places in front of the Anglo-Portuguese army. But the very reverse was the case. The Portuguese were new levies, and the conquest of Andalusia, combined with Massena's great reputation, had spread through the army that kind of stupor, which enfeebles courage, and frequently paralyses the dispositions of the ablest chief. These difficulties did not escape lord Wellington's consideration; and in order to overcome them, he determined to act on the defensive, unless the advantages of the ground, and the faults of the French general, should afford him some opportunity of making an attack with a prospect of success.

Massena, who, hitherto had been so fortunate, and who was proud of a command far superior to any with which he had been previously entrusted, thought that, after having taken Ciudad-Rodrigo, and Almeida, his march to Lisbon would be a mere series of victories. He hastened to have Ciudad-Rodrigo invested. The trenches were opened in the night of the fifteenth to the sixteenth of June, 1808. Ney, who commanded the sixth corps, was ordered to conduct the operations of the siege; and Junot, at the head of an army of observation of twenty thousand men, posted himself on the left bank of the Agueda, to hold lord Wellington in check, whose advanced guard was at Carpio, his main army being in the neighbourhood of Almeida. On the twenty-fifth of June, the French began to cannonade the place. The besieged returned the fire with success, and disabled many pieces of ordnance belonging to the besiegers. On the twenty-eighth, Massena summoned the governor to surrender. The latter refused to capitulate, as the place was still capable of being defended. The works were continued under the fire of a superior artillery. On the ninth in the morning, the French made use of their battering guns with very great effect. On the tenth the breach was found practicable. Every thing was ready for the assault, when the governor, convinced that a longer resistance was impossible, hoisted the white flag. This fine defence, during twenty-five days, with open trenches, redounds much to the honour of Don Andrew de Herasti, and the inhabitants of Ciudad-Rodrigo, who, though exposed to a sanguinary bombardment, encouraged the garrison, joyfully sharing their fatigues and perils. A numerous artillery, a great quantity of ammunition, and rich stores of all kinds, were found in the place. The garrison consisted of six thousand men.

Although superior in number to lord Wellington, yet, anxious not to endanger his ancient glory, Massena halted in the neighbourhood of Ciudad Rodrigo, until Reynier,

who commanded the second corps, had recrossed the Tagus, for the purpose of marching to Castello Branco, and threatening the right flank of the allied army. The English commander had foreseen this movement, and general Hill was ordered to cover that point, the preservation of which was essential to the complete execution of lord Wellington's plan. On the twenty-fourth of July, marshal Ney, supported by Junot, attacked the English advanced-guard, commanded by general Crawford. But the numbers were far from equal; the French being four times as many. Crawford caused fort Conception to be blown up, and retreated in excellent order to the river Coa, by the road of Alverca. He defended the bridge till night. The French, surprised at such a resistance, ceased their attacks. They had been foiled in the design of carrying off this advanced-guard. General Crawford, not wishing, on his part, to be again exposed to such a disproportionate attack, availed himself of the night, drew nearer to the English army, and took a position at Carwalhal. His loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners, amounted only to four hundred men, though he had been fighting with great obstinacy. After this trifling advantage, Massena ordered Almeida to be invested.

The trenches were opened on the fifteenth of August. Two thousand labourers were employed in digging the first parallel: it was not finished before the nineteenth, owing to the difficulties of the ground. They were obliged to hollow the rocks by means of mines. On the twenty-fifth the batteries were completed. On the twenty-sixth the besiegers opened their fire, with above sixty pieces of ordnance or mortars. Towards evening, a bomb fell in the front upon an ammunition-wagon, which was loading at the door of the principal magazine. The explosion of this wagon set fire to above a hundred thousand quintals of powder, which caused a shock equal to the eruption of a volcano. Many houses were thrown down, and the cathedral was destroyed. On the twenty-seventh, Massena

ceased the firing from his batteries, and despatched one of his aid-de-camps to summon colonel Cox. That the garrison, consisting entirely of Portuguese troops, might influence, or accelerate, by their clamours, the determination of the governor, who thought he should still be able to defend himself in spite of the fatal accident by which the magazine had been blown up, the French caused the marquis d'Alorna, an ancient Portuguese general, who was then with Massena, to approach the ramparts, in order to conciliate the troops and inhabitants. But this stratagem had not immediately the expected effect. The governor refused the proffered terms. Massena then ordered all his batteries to renew their fire; and colonel Cox, supposing that circumstances would not allow lord Wellington to come to his succour, and seeing himself badly seconded by the garrison, whose fidelity had been shaken by the promises of the marquis d'Alorna, consented at length to surrender the town. The five thousand men, who still composed the garrison, were dismissed to their homes. Massena enlisted about twelve hundred of them as pioneers, in order to fill the trenches of Almeida, and to repair the high roads.

Lord Wellington has been much censured for having suffered Ciudad-Rodrigo and Almeida to be taken, without availing himself of the diminution caused in the French army by the besieging troops. But Massena employed only ten thousand men on each of these sieges; consequently he had forty thousand left to place in battle array; six thousand of whom were cavalry. As lord Wellington could not be joined by general Hill's division of fifteen thousand English and Portuguese, detached to observe general Reynier's army of twenty thousand French, his lordship had only thirty-five thousand fighting men, with whom he could attack Massena, who, having the choice of the field of battle, would not have neglected to increase his superiority by entrenchments. Had the English general given battle in that situation, the allied army would have been destroyed,

and Portugal would have become a French province. His lordship has also been blamed for not having prevented the junction of the army of Portugal, by marching against Ney, who occupied Salamanca. This observation was advanced with great confidence by many of those, who never studied the art of war but in their closets. The plan of the French had been very ably formed, in order to draw the English army to the Tormes; and there, by completing its destruction, add one more to the list of the disgraceful and lamentable scenes of Marengo, Jena, and Friedland. Lord Wellington easily discovered the snare laid for him. The instant he left his position to attack marshal Ney, the latter would have fallen back to Valladolid, whilst general Reynier, who was at Aleantara, and general Junot, who was at Zamora, would have hastened, by forced marches, to seize his line of operations between Ciudad-Rodrigo and Almeida. The allied army occasioned, by its presence, a delay of fifteen days in the surrender of Ciudad Rodrigo; and the same would have been gained for Almeida, had it not been for the fatal event of the powder magazine. These delays, the result of the English commander's combinations, gave the Portuguese the necessary time for destroying, or burying in the ground, whatever might be serviceable to the French; and enabled the allied army to receive reinforcements; with which lord Wellington most completely exculpated himself from the absurd accusations of his envious censurers.

After the surrender of Almeida, the allied army had posted itself in the valley of the Mondego, on the road to Lisbon. Reynier and Hill had drawn nearer to their respective corps. Lord Wellington had, as it were, placed himself on the watch, to observe his adversary's movements, and avail himself of the errors which the fiery temper of Massena led him to expect. The latter put his troops in motion on the sixteenth of September, as if he had intended to follow the allied army on the left of the

Mondego; but being arrived at Tormes, he marched on the right to Vizeu. On the twenty-first, he pushed his advanced guard as far as Saint Cambadao. On the twenty-fifth, Ney and Reynier crossed the river Criz, on the road to Coimbra, which passes through the Sierra de Busaco, a chain of lofty mountains on the right bank of the Mondego. Lord Wellington, who had a perfect knowledge of the country, determined to avail himself of the advantages offered by the strong position of Busaco, where the French artillery and cavalry could be of no service whatever. He therefore rapidly marched to the left, with his whole army, which he posted on the heights, its right resting on the Mondego, and its left on the northern extremity of the Sierra, near Mealhada. This movement was as quickly performed as it had been ably conceived. It was begun on the twenty-sixth, at two o'clock in the morning, and at noon the whole allied army was in battle array. No troops remained on the left bank of the Mondego, but a body of Portuguese, for the purpose of guarding the road to Lisbon, and covering the right of the army.

Lord Wellington had scarcely taken his position, when Massena appeared with his whole army. A brisk firing commenced on the whole line between the riflemen. The French general employed the remainder of the day in reconnoitering the position of the allies. He no doubt supposed the sight of his three corps would intimidate lord Wellington, and that Busaco would be evacuated, without coming to a general engagement, but he was deceived in his supposition. On the twenty-seventh, he ordered Reynier to attack the right of the allies, and sent Ney against their left. General Junot, with his corps, and the whole French cavalry, which the nature of the ground, so ably chosen by lord Wellington, rendered perfectly unavailable, were left as a reserve. The French were repulsed in all their attempts. General Picton charged, with the bayonet, a column that had succeeded in reaching the top, and

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forced it to retreat in the utmost confusion. While the allied army was gaining a complete victory on its right, the left, under the orders of general Crawford, was equally successful against marshal Ney's corps. It was in this attack that general Simon was taken a prisoner, with about three hundred men of the column, which he had boldly led up to the top of the Sierra. The loss of the French, in killed and wounded, amounted to between four and five thousand, whilst that of the allies did not exceed one thousand men *hors de combat*.

The French must have been so much the more amazed at this vigorous resistance, as half of the allied army consisted of raw Portuguese troops, little accustomed to fire. But, animated by the example of the English, they performed prodigies of valour against the famous conquerors of Austerlitz and Wagram. Their behaviour destroyed Massena's hopes of carrying the position of the English by main force. He therefore resolved to turn them by their left. In the night, from the twenty-seventh to the twenty-eighth, he began his march, to reach the road from Oporto to Coimbra, by Sardao. This post, of which the English general knew the importance, was to have been occupied by colonel Trant, and in that case the French would have been in a very critical situation. But the colonel could not reach it before the twenty-eighth, at night, when he found the French in possession of the defiles. Lord Wellington, informed of this circumstance, did not judge his position any longer capable of being maintained. He therefore recrossed the Mondego, that he might be enabled either to fight or to retreat, at his choice, without endangering his line of operations. His lordship stated the motives of his conduct to the earl of Liverpool, by observing, that although the unfortunate delay, in the arrival of colonel Trant at Sardao, made him apprehensive of not accomplishing the object, which he had in view on crossing the Mondego, and occupying the Sierra

de Busaco, he still did not regret that he had done so, as this movement had afforded him a favourable opportunity of showing the enemy what kind of troops his army was composed of. It had, for the first time, brought the Portuguese levies in contact with the enemy in a favourable situation; and proved that the pains, taken with them, had not been thrown away; and that they were worthy to fight in the same ranks with the English, for the interesting cause, of the success of which these very troops gave the most confident hope.

Massena, on being master of the high road of Oporto ardently wished to obtain revenge for the check of the twenty-seventh. In this expectation, he was advancing with his whole army, which was still sixty thousand strong, including ten thousand excellent cavalry. But lord Wellington did not judge the environs of Coimbra proper to stop Massena's progress, and give him battle. He determined on drawing nearer to his reinforcements, and fighting only under advantages, which a good general ought not to neglect when the destiny of empires is at stake. By moving to Torres-Vedras he obtained a strong position, an increase of troops, and the certainty of an honourable retreat, if the fate of arms should prove adverse. Fortune indeed seldom refuses to crown so much sagacity.

Massena's advanced-guard entered Coimbra on the first of October. An engagement with the English rear-guard took place on the banks of the Mondego. The allies disputed the ground inch by inch, and at night they rejoined the main army on the road to Pombal. On the tenth, all the troops were stationed in the lines of Torres-Vedras; their right wing close to Alhandra, near the Tagus, and the left on the sea, near the mouth of the Sizandra. During the whole retreat, the French did not attempt any movement, that could cause the least uneasiness. On the fifth their light cavalry, wishing to come up with the rear-guard of the allies, was attacked by sir Stapleton Cotton. This

skirmish, which took place near Leyria, terminated in favour of the English. On the twelfth the French re-appeared in great numbers on the heights near Alenquer. They had suffered much from the rains, which fell abundantly for several days. Massena was astonished to find the position of Torres-Vedras still stronger than that of Busaco. It was provided at all points with redoubts, constructed with much care, and ably contrived to batter in front and in flank the columns, which might attempt to force the lines. Renouncing, therefore, every project of attack, Massena determined to blockade the allies, hoping that hunger would oblige them to leave their lines, and give him battle. He stationed the left of his army at Villa-Franca, his centre at Alenquer, and his right towards Otta.

The French general evidently showed it was to Buona-parte that he was indebted for his military glory. Indeed, ever since he left Almeida, he displayed neither boldness nor foresight. Without adverting to the faults, which he committed in the attack of Busaco, he must be blamed for advancing towards Lisbon, without having first gained a decisive advantage over the allies, in a position where he might have availed himself of his fine cavalry, and of the ability in manœuvring for which his troops were distinguished. When he saw that lord Wellington refused to fight at Pombal, he should have pushed only his advanced-guard to Leyria. He might have quartered half of his army between that town and Mondego, and stationed the remainder between Coimbra and Oporto. He might have selected a field of battle, where lord Wellington would have been obliged to fight him, for the purpose of freeing Portugal from the vexations of his foraging men, whom he might then have sent to great distances, in all directions. In that case he would not have had to upbraid himself with the most unparalleled neglect, that of having exposed to the vengeance of the Portuguese, about three thousand

Frenchmen, wounded in the battle of Busaco, who had been left unprotected in the hospitals of Coimbra, which colonel Trant occupied on the seventh of October. And what renders his march to Lisbon still more inexcusable, is, that there were in the French army a number of well-informed officers, who warned him that the heights, which cover the capital of Portugal, are exceedingly steep and lofty. Junot alone, who was rather a brave grenadier than a clever general, told Massena that he would be answerable for his success; and in order to determine the marshal on advancing, he no doubt made use of a most persuasive argument—the pleasures and wealth of Lisbon.

The lines of Torres-Vedras may certainly be taken by an able general: but they actually proved impregnable to the commander who had suffered himself to be so completely beaten at Busaco. The dignities of a prince and a marshal do not constitute a general of the first rank. No individual is fit to head an army, but he whom nature has endowed with comprehensive genius, and immoveable coolness, both matured by experience. Without these two eminent qualities, the most enterprising officer becomes at once the weakest man of his army, because he wants that intrepidity of mind, which braves dangers, whenever genius discover the means of overcoming them. Marshal Soult, at the head of Massena's army, would have carried the position of Busaco, and forced the lines of Torres-Vedras; because he unquestionably was the ablest general of the army sent to Spain. The allies, besides, would not have been strong enough to resist the French, if the latter had been commanded by a commander possessed of talents as eminent for the offensive, as those of lord Wellington for the defensive. His lordship, therefore, must be considered as having conquered Massena by himself, and not by means of his army; which was at that time inferior to the French, both in point of numbers and experience. Every obstacle, that could be thrown in the way of the French, had been

adopted. Orders were given to destroy the means of subsistence, or to withdraw them from the grasp of the French marauders, by burying them under ground, or carrying them to the mountains: and had these orders of the English general been punctually obeyed. Massena would have been obliged to leave the kingdom of Portugal eight days after his arrival at Alenquer. But these dispositions, dreadful in appearance, yet of imperious necessity for the success of the general's plan, were neglected by the inhabitants of the valleys of the Tagus, and the Zozero. The French, on hearing that there were provisions at Thomar, detached a body of six thousand men in that direction, to procure fresh supplies for their troops, which in a few days had exhausted the country they occupied.

Every day the allied army assumed a more imposing attitude, both from the reinforcements which it received, and from the improved state of the lines, the left of which having appeared rather weak, lord Wellington established a second line, with its right on the Tagus, and the left at Erinira, through Bucellas and Mafra. An intrenched camp had been prepared, to serve as a retreat to the allied army, and cover its embarkation, if it were forced to quit its lines: it had been chosen opposite fort Saint Julian, near the mouth of the Tagus, at the distance of two leagues from Lisbon. But these precautions proved unnecessary. On the fourteenth of November, Massena left his position during the night, and took the road to Santarem, with the view of approaching nearer to the country whence he drew his supplies. He might then have been successfully attacked by the allied army, which, independent of the troops that had arrived from England, had been reinforced on the nineteenth of October, by the corps of La Romana, consisting of about ten thousand men, whilst the French army had been weakened by the detachments charged with providing for its subsistence, as well as sickness, occasioned by bad food, and the rainy season. Lord Wellington immediately

determined on pursuing Massena. On the eighteenth he arrived at Cartaxo. On the nineteenth he made arrangements to attack Santarem, where, according to the reports he had received, there was but a rear-guard left. After having well reconnoitred that position, his lordship judged it safe against a *coup de main*. The same motive, besides, which had forced the French to leave Alenquer, soon obliged them to continue their retreat, in order to be more in the vicinity of magazines. Massena had remained in person at Santarem with the flower of his infantry: and the same general who for the space of one month had appeared to challenge the allies, hastened to strengthen himself by felling trees and forming intrenchments. Was he then no longer the same Massena, who, a fortnight before, wanted to plant Buonaparte's eagles on the ramparts of Lisbon? Time will make the cause of this singular metamorphosis known; for at Santarem he might easily have collected his whole army, to crush, once for all, those very same English, who, in his opinion, "would not fight but when they were posted on inaccessible rocks, or concealed behind intrenchments, covered with artillery, and impregnable." The ninth corps was at the same time leaving Sabugal, for Castello-Branco and Punhese. His advanced-guard, under the command of general Gardonne, reached Mogon, near Abrantes, almost without fighting. The garrison of the latter place would have been sufficient to destroy this column of four thousand men, as general Drouet did not support it in time; and Massena, who must have been acquainted with its approach, neglected to send a strong body for the purpose of meeting it. General Gardonne's prudence partly repaired these blunders: he fell back in tolerable order to Penamacor, which he reached on the twenty-ninth of November, after having overthrown whatever opposed his passage. General Drouet then determined to join the army of Portugal by Celorio, and Ponte di Marcella. Gardonne again commanded Massena's advanced-guard, which formed its junc-

tion with the main French army in the neighbourhood of Leyria, on the twenty-sixth of December. But in spite of this reinforcement, which raised the numbers of his army to seventy thousand men under arms, Massena dared not give battle to lord Wellington, who had been bidding him defiance for above a month—a just return for the insolent language which Massena had used in front of the lines at Torres-Vedras.

The inconvenience of keeping an army collected in so rude a season, had induced the English general to assign cantonments to his troops, on both banks of the Tagus. Those under the orders of generals Hill, Fane, and Erskine, were stationed on the left bank; the remainder of the army was distributed on the right, in the following manner: generals sir Brent Spencer and Cameron at Cartaxo, where lord Wellington had his head-quarters: general Crawford between Cartaxo and Santarem, observing the advanced posts of the French; general Picton at Torres-Vedras; general Campbell at Alenquer; general Cole at Azambujo; general Leith at Alcrentre; and the rest of the army within the lines. The French army occupied the rich country between Santarem and the Zizere; the ninth corps was cantoned in the neighbourhood of Leyria, where general Drouet had his head-quarters. The fortifications of Santarem were considerably increased: a bridge was thrown over the Zezere, with intrenchments on both its banks, no doubt to open a communication with Spain by Castello-Branco. Such was the position of the French and English armies towards the latter part of 1810. Although the allies had lost two fortified towns, and evacuated an immense extent of country, they yet cannot be denied to have had the advantage over the French in this campaign. They twice forced the latter to retrograde, first at Busaco, and afterwards at Torres-Vedras. In short, the French could not force them “to seek a refuge on the ocean,” as had been Buonaparte’s solemn promise to the people of France.

This circumstance unquestionably evinces the superiority of the English commander over the French general, hitherto so well known by the brilliant appellation of *the favourite child of victory*. Though considered as his pupil, marshal Soult yet continued to display more ability than his ancient master.

This general was informed that an expedition was preparing to alarm the coast near Malaga. He acquainted general Sebastiani with this information, ordering him, at the same time, to be in readiness, for the purpose of repulsing the meditated attack by the allies. On the fourteenth of October, a body of three thousand troops, under the command of lord Blaney, was landed near Freangirola, at the distance of four leagues from Malaga. The object of this expedition was to seize the fort, which was defended by only one hundred and sixty men. As soon as he had gained this post, lord Blaney would have provided it with a garrison, that the French might be induced to attack it with troops drawn for that purpose from Malaga. The expedition was to re-embark under the cover of the fort, and, in concert with other troops sent from Gibraltar, they were to have taken Malaga by a *coup de main*, destroyed its fortifications, and captured the privateers and richly laden vessels which were in the port. The plan had been badly combined, and experienced a complete failure. The distance from Malaga to Freangirola was not sufficiently great to accomplish the main object, had lord Blaney even succeeded in obtaining possession of the fort. The governor, who perceived that the assailants were unprovided with the means of taking it by storm, refused to receive the officer who was sent to him for a parley by lord Blaney. During the night a battery was mounted with some guns, landed from the vessels. But the fire of this battery, and of the squadron, did not intimidate the governor, who expected to be speedily assisted. On the fifteenth, general Sebastiani approached, at the head of a body of troops superior to the

allies, who were obliged to re-embark with great loss. Lord Blaney was among the prisoners. It is astonishing that his lordship did not avail himself of the night after the landing, to give up the capture of the fort, return on board, and thus avoid all conflict with an enemy greatly superior in numbers.

General Godinot had several encounters with detachments from the army of Murcia, under the orders of general Blake. The success was various, so long as the Spaniards confined themselves to the warfare of partisans; but they were defeated whenever an attempt was made by them to take any fixed position; so that the French continued in possession of the boundaries of Andalusia. At Cadiz many courageous sorties were attempted during the siege: they were rendered abortive by superior numbers, and by means of the French redoubts. Even in the beginning of October, the French batteries were already mounted with above three hundred heavy guns. Trocadero, Puertoreal, and Chiclana, were fortified with care. Marshal Soult presided over all these works: he wished to make amends, by great zeal, for the fault he had committed of not marching rapidly enough to Cadiz. He hoped to overawe the garrison by bombs, which mortars of a new invention (*des mortiers sur semille*) launch to a distance of one thousand nine hundred fathoms. He had missed the opportunity of gaining without a blow the richest, and, next to Gibraltar, the strongest town of Spain. The patriotism of the Spaniards, and the ability of the English, were destined, however, to paralyse all the marshal's efforts. Cadiz was never to become otherwise than subject to Ferdinand VII. Though very busy before this place, marshal Soult was, at the same time, endeavouring to subdue the insurgents of the county of Niebla, and the Sierra Morena. He presided over the administration of Andalusia, to secure the pay and subsistence of fifty thousand men, the amount of his

army, exclusive of the corps of Mortier, which he had detached to Estremadura.

The campaign ended with the conquest of Tortosa. Before he laid siege to this place, general Suchet was repeatedly obliged to engage general Villacampa. He had also the difficulties of the ground to overcome; that he might bring up his artillery. Some advantages having previously been gained on the twelfth and thirteenth of November, by Suchet, over Villacampa; on the twenty-sixth by Munier, over the Valentians, who lost two thousand five hundred prisoners; and on the twenty-ninth of the same month, by Habert, over O'Donel; the army, destined to lay siege to Tortosa, left Xerta on the fifteenth of December. On the evening of the same day, the place was completely invested. In the night, from the twentieth to the twenty-first, the trenches were opened without much loss. The labourers were favoured by a hurricane, which prevented the besieged from discovering the point of attack: and (what had never before been seen in any siege) the covered way was finished previous to the batteries, which were destined to silence the fire of the besieged.

This circumstance leaves no doubt respecting the feebleness of the defence opposed by the garrison. On the twenty-ninth, at break of day, the French opened their batteries. On the thirtieth, they carried the *tete de pont*, on the right bank of the Ebro; and on the thirty-first, they ceased the attack, being no longer fired upon by the besieged. On the first of January, 1811, the governor hoisted the white flag. He sent the plan of a capitulation, which was not accepted; and refused that proposed by general Suchet. The besiegers then renewed their fire. Two breaches were judged practicable. The troops solicited to be led to the assault; and the general was about to consent, when the governor sent another deputation, through which he submitted to the conditions proposed. The troops of the garrison were sent prisoners of war to Saragossa. They

amounted to seven or eight thousand men. One hundred and seventy-seven pieces of ordnance, besides provisions of all kinds, were found in the place.

In vain does the French general lavish great praises on the defence of Tortosa, in order that he may impart more importance to his conquest.—Had he not published his journal of the siege, he might have been credited. A garrison of eight thousand men, who suffer the covered way to be finished without firing a shot, bring upon themselves everlasting disgrace; and the governor, who ought to be regarded as the principal author of a conduct so pusillanimous, deserves to be branded with infamy for his cowardice, his ignorance, and treachery to his king and country. The fall of this town must also be imputed to the neglect of the Spanish government, which should have entrusted its defence to an officer of distinguished merit. Suchet states in his report—"that the governor was a weak man, surrounded by two or three officers, who shared his authority." The expedition, destined against Malaga, would have been far more useful, had it been sent to Catalonia, for the purpose of reinforcing O'Donel. Lord Wellington, having been able to resume the offensive as early as the fifteenth of November, and Massena having refused battle, his lordship might easily have despatched a body of choice troops to reinforce the army of Valentia, and to raise the siege of Tortosa. The numerous transports in the Tagus, would have facilitated the movements of those troops, which were not required for the defence of the lines at Torres-Vedras. The position of Cartaxo, in which lord Wellington continued about four months, might have been abandoned without any inconvenience; as the French had destroyed every thing, even the very thatch which covered the peasants' dwellings. Had his lordship been generalissimo of the Spanish armies at that time, it is probable that, by bold and scientific manœuvres, Tortosa would have been preserved, the blockade of Cadiz raised, and Massena

equally obliged to evacuate Portugal. The campaign of 1811, which we are about to describe, affords, above all, a convincing proof that the peninsula would have been evacuated by the French at this time, had the allied forces been under the command of a single leader. But before we conclude the year 1810, two officers must be mentioned, whose deaths were highly regretted by the respective commanders of the two armies. On the twelfth of October, general Saint Croix, an ancient aid-de-camp of Massena, was cut in two, near Villa-Franca, by a cannon ball, from a gun-boat stationed in the Tagus, to cover the right of the allied army. This officer commanded Massena's advanced guard, at the passage of the Danube, on the fifth of July, 1809; and, on the twenty-eighth of September, after the battle of Busaco, he was sent to take possession of Sardo, and to lead the advanced guard of the French army to Coimbra. Captain Fenwick, the commander of Obidos, was mortally wounded on the eighth of December, in an engagement with some French grenadiers. Lord Wellington, in his letter of the fifteenth of December, to lord Liverpool, wherein he mentions the death of this officer, adds that it is a very great loss to the army, and he is regretted by all who knew his valour and his activity. The campaign of 1811 commenced by a much more severe loss to the cause of the brave Spaniards—the death of the illustrious marquis de la Romana; which was soon followed by the destruction of his army, and the surrender of Badajoz. But the allies were not disheartened by these disasters. They resolved to adopt the French manœuvres, with regard to the movement *en masse*, and the charge with the bayonet. The only way to conquer, was to beat the enemy with their own weapons, by adopting, above all, that famous *concentrated* system, which forms the basis of all their triumphs. From this instant the successes of the allies became certain, as they had the superiority of numbers. The beneficial consequences of so wise a determination were soon

manifested by the evacuation of Portugal; and the victory of Barrosa, gained by the English general, Graham, over marshal Victor, afforded the most sanguine hopes as to the speedy deliverance of the peninsula. We shall now enter upon a more minute account of these great events.

BOOK IV.

ON the twenty-third of January, 1811, the marquis de la Romana died, somewhat suddenly. He was leaving his house, for the purpose of paying his respects to lord Wellington, when he was seized with a dizziness, like that of an apoplectic stroke, which terminated his life in less than half an hour. The marquis had been educated in France, the language of which he spoke with much elegance. But though he had several friends in that country, he never sacrificed the general cause to any private connexions. He always proved a loyal Spaniard; and as long as he had access to the court of Madrid, neglected no means of frustrating the intrigues practised by the cabinet of the Thuilleries. Neither flattery nor money having any empire over him, Buonaparte had recourse to his love of glory; and the marquis was caught by this bait. He was sent to the north of Europe, with a division of Spanish troops: but the moment he heard that Spain claimed his services, he nobly resolved upon instantly repairing to the defence of his beloved country. Assisted by the English government, he succeeded in leaving Denmark, with his troops, and landed at Santander, in 1808. He had served with the most marked distinction, and was snatched away at the very time when lord Wellington was congratulating himself on having a colleague, by whose wise counsels he was so much enlightened. His lordship, in his letter of the twenty-sixth of January, to the earl of Liverpool, expressed his regret at this event, stating, that the virtues, talents, and patriotism of the marquis, were well known to his majesty's government; that in him the Spanish army had lost its noblest ornament; his country the purest patriot; and the world the

most valiant, as well as the most zealous defender of the cause for which they were fighting, and that his lordship should ever gratefully acknowledge the assistance he had received from the marquis, since the latter joined the army, both by his operations, and his counsels.

This eulogium is complete. It does as much honor to its author as to the hero, whom it praises. The marquis having learnt, some days before his death, that the French, under the orders of marshal Mortier, were in great force on the Guadiana, he had determined to send general Mendizabal to stop the progress of the enemy. Marshal Soult, having felt the necessity of holding some strong places, in order to secure his communications with the troops of Estremadura and Andalusia, before he advanced to the Tagus, had ordered Mortier to take Olivenza, which town, though provided with a garrison of three thousand men, opposed but a feeble resistance. Mendizabal could not arrive in time enough for its relief. He had about twelve thousand men under his command; and pitched his camp on the right bank of the Guadiana, near Badajoz. Marshal Soult had left Seville, to direct, in person, the military operations of Estremadura; and immediately after his arrival attacked Badajoz. To invest this place completely, it was necessary to drive the Spaniards from their position, which had a free communication with fort San-Christoval. On the nineteenth of February, Soult's cavalry crossed the Guadiana, to join the infantry, which had passed the river the night before, accompanied by the artillery, without meeting the slightest opposition from Mendizabal. This general placed perfect reliance on a few redoubts, with which he had surrounded his camp.

At the break of day, the French cavalry rushed upon the left wing of the Spaniards, and overthrew them. General Girard attacked the right, with a force so superior, that he soon carried the position, in spite of the vigorous resistance opposed on this point by the flower of the Spanish

troops. During these two main attacks, a body of riflemen had prevented the possibility of assistance being despatched from the centre of the Spaniards to their wings, and kept them constantly in fear of a real attack. When Soult heard of the advantage gained on his right and left, he collected all his troops against Mendizabal's centre; and by this able manœuvre, forced a whole corps of six thousand men to lay down their arms. The remainder of this army were either killed or dispersed. At ten o'clock in the morning the conflict was over. The fugitives fled partly to Badajoz, and partly to Elvas. General Mendizabal retreated with his cavalry under the cannon of that fortress. This victory, which was complete, cost the French only four hundred men *hors de combat*. It opened, as it were, the gates of Badajoz, by the facility which it afforded of completely investing the place on the right of the Guadiana, and by the depression of spirits which the destruction of the only troops sent to protect them, must have occasioned among the besieged. In detaching Mendizabal to the Guadiana, a great error was committed. This general, like all Spaniards, was uncommonly brave: but where had he displayed military talents, which warranted the hope that he would be able successfully to cope with marshal Soult? His troops, besides, were not so sufficiently inured to war, as to beat the French in an open country. Lord Wellington should have detached general Beresford, with the very same Spanish troops, and an additional reserve of ten thousand English; in which case he would have prevented the fall of Badajoz.

On the eleventh of February, Soult had caused fort Pardalleyras to be attacked; and it had been carried at the point of the bayonet. The besieged defended themselves with as much courage as ability. They made several sorties, which retarded the progress of the besiegers, and cost a considerable number of their troops. Menacho, the governor of the place, was killed in the last sortie of the gar-

rison, which he wished to command in person, on account of the importance of its object. He wanted to prevent the completion of the covered way, on the part of the French. General Imas, his successor, manifested similar zeal and valour. The breach being deemed practicable on the tenth of March, marshal Soult made the requisite arrangements for the assault. However, before he proceeded to an extremity, always fatal to both parties, he summoned the governor, who, seeing that a longer resistance was impossible, surrendered the place on the eleventh. The garrison, consisting of nine thousand men, were made prisoners of war. One of the articles of the capitulation stated, "that the garrison should march out by the breach;" which circumstance peremptorily refutes the unfounded imputations cast upon the defenders of Badajoz. The French found in the batteries, or in the arsenal, one hundred and seventy pieces of ordnance, mortars, or howitzers, eighty thousand quintals of gunpowder, a large quantity of cartridges for the infantry; and what was still more precious to the conquerors, two complete bridge equipages, in excellent condition.

The satisfaction which these advantages must have caused to marshal Soult, was diminished by a reverse experienced, almost at the same time, on the part of his troops before Cadiz. The plan for driving the French from their lines had been perfectly well combined, and the success would have been complete, if, as might have been done, sufficient means had been collected for its execution. On the twentieth of February, an expedition sailed from Cadiz roads, consisting of four thousand English troops, under the orders of general Graham, and eight thousand Spaniards. General Lapena had the command in chief of the allied army. Having left Cadiz on the twenty-first, the English landed at Algeiras, and at Tariffa joined the Spaniards, who, owing to contrary winds, reached that place only on the twenty-seventh. The army began its march

on the twenty-eighth, in the direction of Chielana, through Barbate and Vayes de la Frontera. The bad state of the roads delayed this movement; and it was only on the fourth of March that the allied troops came in sight of the French, posted near Chielana. General Graham formed the advanced guard with his column, strengthened by two thousand Spaniards. He had taken a position at Barrosa, whilst he was waiting for the rest of the army. The commander-in-chief ordered him to march to Bermesa, with a view to oppose the attempts of marshal Victor against general Lardizabal, who, by a well-directed attack behind the lines, near Santipetri, had succeeded in opening the communication of the continent with the Isle of Leon. The first step towards this success had been taken by general Zazas, who, on the first of March, had moved a body of troops in that direction. On the third and fourth, there were some sanguinary conflicts in that quarter: and it is to the heroic courage displayed by the Spaniards, that we must ascribe the facility with which the French yielded this important post to general Lardizabal. Admiral Keith had also detached some vessels, to threaten several points of the coast, in order to keep the French troops there, and to diminish the number of the forces that might be employed against the army which formed the expedition.

Every thing had so far succeeded to the wish of the allies. General Graham was on his march to Bermesa, when his scouts reported that the French appeared in great force upon the plain, and that they were hastily advancing to the heights of Barrosa. The English general, being well aware that this position would afford marshal Victor the means of harassing, perhaps even of surrounding the rear-guard of the allies, instantly ordered a counter-march, to support the troops which guarded Barrosa. But, in spite of the celerity with which he executed this movement, general Ruffin had already overthrown the Spaniards, and established himself on the heights. Though inferior

in numbers, general Graham ordered the attack. The English infantry performed prodigies of valour. After a dreadful fire of artillery and musketry, which killed many troops, without deciding the victory, the English rushed upon the French with their bayonets, and remained masters of the field. Marshal Victor had the whole three divisions of his army in a line. The French general Vilate was opposed to the Spaniards, and Graham had to encounter Leval and Ruffin. The distinguished ability of the English general on this occasion, and the uncommon intrepidity of his troops, entitled both to the favours of fortune; but the English were not seconded by the Spanish general, Lapena. He remained almost a tranquil spectator of this dreadful conflict. Had he, at the very beginning of the action, advanced between the centre and the right wing of the French, the field of battle would scarcely have been disputed. Vilate, who formed Victor's right, being cut off from the other divisions, would have evacuated the lines which he was to guard; and would have hastily fallen back, that he might not be surrounded. Lapena, leading his column to the right, would then have threatened the centre of the French, who, astonished at the boldness of this manœuvre, and at the intrepidity of the English, would have immediately retreated, to avoid a destruction which must have been the inevitable consequence of a protracted defence in that position.—“The great art of war is to conquer by manœuvring much, and shedding little blood.”

This battle was uncommonly destructive, though it lasted but two hours, Victor having taken the wise resolution of retiring behind his intrenchments at Chiclana. The loss of the French was very considerable; it was rated at three thousand men *hors de combat*, among whom were several officers of rank. General Rousseau and colonel Autie, both highly esteemed officers, were among the slain. General Ruffin was taken prisoner, after being dangerously wounded. He died on his passage to England, in

sight of the English coast, and in consequence of his wound, which had perhaps been neglected; for, on the eve of his death, he enjoyed his meals as if he had been in perfect health. This officer was a very handsome man, a brave soldier, but an indifferent general. It was entirely to his courage and to his handsome figure that he was indebted for his rank. He was the son of an innkeeper of Bolbee, a small town near Havre de Grace, in Normandy. He died at the age of forty. But the French more sensibly felt the loss of the eagle belonging to the eighth regiment, one of the most distinguished in the French army.— This trophy was the just reward of the valour displayed by three companies of the foot guards, and by the eighty-seventh regiment, under the command of major-general Gough. The French also lost six pieces of ordnance. The victory, however, was dearly bought by the allies. The English had twelve hundred and forty-two men *hors de combat*, and the Spaniards about fifteen hundred; but they lost no officer of distinction. There is one circumstance, which gives a peculiar character to the victory of Barrosa—it was the first offensive battle successfully fought by the allies.

After having had the mortification of being unable to gather the fruits of his labour, in consequence of the Spaniards having left him alone with his column to oppose the French, general Graham judged it useless to occupy Barrosa any longer, and returned to the Isle of Leon on the succeeding day. The people of Cadiz manifested their indignation against Lapena's conduct, and he was deprived of a command with which he ought never to have been entrusted. The only fault of which this general can be accused is that of having undertaken a task beyond his means. To deny him the merit of bravery, zeal, and patriotism, is ridiculous; but as for his talents—

“ Tel brille au second rang, qui s'éclipse au premier.”

The siege of Cadiz would have been raised, and marshal Victor, with his army half destroyed, would have been obliged to retire on Seville, if Graham, instead of being under Lapena, had been the commanding general. By what title, indeed, could the Spanish generals pretend to command the English? If it be on account of the superiority of rank, such a claim, perfectly harmless in the Spanish army list, becomes dangerous, when a warlike enemy is to be successfully opposed: this demands well-informed and experienced commanders. The virtues, and the brilliant qualities, of the general officers on the staff of the Spanish army, entitle them to the utmost respect; but they must frankly be told that their *well-directed* efforts would soon have accomplished the deliverance of Spain, had they imitated the Portuguese, who owed their independence to that conciliatory spirit, which made them eagerly adopt the measures prescribed by the English, both for the organization of the army, and for the general administration of the kingdom.

On the very day that Victor was defeated, Massena was leaving Santarém, under the cover of night, on his return to Spain. Ever since the first of January, nothing of importance had occurred between the two armies, which had remained unmolested in their quarters; except, that the French had reconnoitered the English on the nineteenth of January, when the English posts were obliged to quit Riomajor. General Junot attacked that village with a large body of cavalry and infantry; but he withdrew almost instantly, having been wounded in the face by a rifleman. The communications with Spain had been rendered extremely difficult by the newly-formed corps of Portuguese militia, which, under the orders of English officers, were not afraid of disputing the passage of escorts bearing despatches, though these often consisted of from two to three thousand men. Colonel Grant particularly distinguished himself. He had several engagements with general Cla-

paredo near Guarda and Cavilhao, in which he displayed much coolness and sagacity. General Silveira and colonel Trant also deserved lord Wellington's praise, for their services in the neighbourhood of Coimbra. Finding himself thus surrounded, Massena distributed to his troops the provisions he had left; and, being well aware that he should loose his army, if he marched against the allies, commenced his retrograde movement in the night of fifth to the sixth of March.

For several days past he had sent off his heavy baggage and commissariat, under the protection of a numerous escort, on the road to Mondego. He himself followed in the same direction, with the main part of his army. Lord Wellington immediately began the pursuit: his advanced guard came up with the French rear-guard on the ninth, near Pombal. The English cavalry made many fine charges; the infantry could not arrive in time to attack the enemy before night, and the French availed themselves of this circumstance to continue their march. On the eleventh Massena took a position on the heights of Redinha, where he was attacked the next day by the English army. Being hard pushed on his front, and turned on his left, the French general ordered his advanced-guard, which suffered much on the passage of the Redinha, to fall back, and at night he marched by Condexa to Ponte de Murcella. As he wished to give his train the necessary time to leave the road unobstructed, Massena took a strong position on the right bank of the river Ceira, leaving but an advanced-guard on the left, near Toz d'Aronce. This village, which was occupied by the French, was assaulted by the English, and several times taken and retaken. In the night, Massena continued his retreat, after having destroyed the bridge on the Ceira. The engagement which took place on the fifteenth was very sharp, and lord Wellington would have most probably succeeded in forcing the enemy to a general battle, had not his march been retarded by a thick fog,

which lasted all the morning. The loss of the English in this affair was about four hundred men killed or wounded. The French acknowledge only two hundred men *hors de combat*; whilst the dead bodies, left on the field of battle, exceeded that number. Their loss must have amounted to about eight hundred.

From the fifteenth of March to the second of April, no engagement took place, excepting a few skirmishes of small importance. The nature of the ground was in favour of the French. Columns, sufficiently strong to attack them with advantage, could rarely be sent on their flanks; and whenever the ground would allow this manœuvre on the part of the English general, Massena hastily retired to establish himself, in his turn, on almost impregnable rocky ground, where a general attack by main force would have exposed the allied army to a great loss, without attaining any sooner the object intended, viz. the evacuation of Portugal, which the want of provisions would infallibly effect a few days later. It is true that a retreating army, and especially a French retreating army, is not far from its destruction, when it has at its heels a good general with numerous troops, and is harassed on its flank and line of operations by a brave people, desirous of being avenged, and freed from their oppressors: but there are circumstances which will not allow the pursuers to profit by the confusion generally prevalent in a retreating army; and the same ground, which at Busaco had afforded lord Wellington the means of victory over the impetuous Massena, now gave the latter similar advantages on his evacuating Portugal. ✓ Marshal Saxe, in his *Memoirs on War*, chapter the twelfth, observes—"that a proverb, which recommends *the building of a golden bridge to a retiring enemy*, is generally religiously followed, though it is one formed upon false principles. A retreating enemy ought to be closely pushed, and vigorously pursued, and his apparently fine retreat will soon be converted into a rout. . . . Many generals, however,

do not like to end the war so soon." But, in spite of this great authority, it is certain that the strong positions, which the mountainous country from Santarem to Almeida affords, at very short distances from each other, would not allow the allies to perform more than they did. The last conflict between the two armies took place on the third of April, near Sabugal. Colonel Beckwith commenced the engagement. The French posts having fallen back, the English, who pursued them, found themselves attacked by a force so superior, that they were obliged to retreat to the army, whose march was impeded by the badness of the roads, and especially by a hurricane, attended with great rains, which prevented any view of what was passing. Lord Wellington placed himself at the head of his columns, attacked the enemy in flank and front, and drove them from their position. Two hundred French were left dead in the field of battle. Massena recrossed the Agueda with his whole army, leaving only a garrison of three thousand men in Almeida, under the orders of general Brennier.

The allies could not undertake the siege of that fortress, because they wanted the supplies, and particularly the heavy ordnance requisite for such an operation. Lord Wellington, therefore, determined to blockade the place, his informers having reported that Massena had not been able to introduce more than one month's provisions into the town. As soon as his lordship had finished the arrangements, by which all communications between the garrison of Almeida and the French were cut off, he left the neighbourhood of Almeida on the thirteenth of April, under the idea that the operations on the Guadiana demanded his presence. General sir Brent Spencer was appointed to supply the place of the commander-in-chief during his absence. General Beresford, who had been detached to Alentejo, after the engagement at Pombal, had reached Portalegre on the twentieth of March. On the twenty-fourth he advanced to Campomayor: the French had evacuated

this place, and established themselves on the heights in its rear, with some infantry, supported by four regiments of cavalry. The English marched boldly up to them. The fifteenth regiment of light dragoons, consulting only their courage, pursued the fugitives under the cannon of Badajoz. But they were in their turn pursued by fresh troops, which came to the assistance of the infantry at the time that general Beresford, from the superiority of his numbers, was attacking them with advantage. This seasonable succour facilitated the retreat of the French. Their loss was rated at six hundred men; that of the English at about three hundred. The allies quartered their troops in the environs of Elvas, that their reinforcements might have time to arrive, as they intended to act on the offensive upon the left bank of the Guadiana.

On the fourth of April, general Beresford effected the passage of this river, experiencing scarcely any opposition. Marshal Soult, after having supplied Badajoz, had withdrawn the greatest part of his troops towards Andalusia. He committed the fault of leaving only five hundred men in Olivenza, when the extent of the place required, at least, three thousand. If he did not intend to keep this post, he ought to have blown up the fortifications, and sent the ordnance, stores, and troops to Badajoz. The English quickly availed themselves of this defect. General Cole invested the place on the twelfth of April. On the fifteenth he opened his batteries, and the governor surrendered on the very same day. To facilitate this operation, general Beresford had marched to Lerena. On the sixteenth the cavalry of the allies defeated a French detachment, and took a great number of prisoners. The retreat of the French to Guadalcanal, and lord Wellington's arrival at Elvas, determined general Beresford to retrograde, in order to concert measures with his lordship relative to the siege of Badajoz. The first conference took place at Elvas on the twenty-first. On the twenty-second the two generals reconnoi-

tred Badajoz with great care. The garrison made a strong sortie against their escort, and was repulsed. The siege was resolved upon; but the overflowing of the Guadiana having prevented the construction of bridges, the allies confined themselves to a close blockade on the two banks of the river. On the third of May, the weather proving very fine, and the waters of the Guadiana being much reduced, the communications were secured, and the trenches opened. General Philippen, governor of Badajoz, defended the approaches of the place by well-timed sorties, and by intrenchments, or counter-approaches, which retarded the progress of the besiegers. On the tenth he made a sortie with twelve hundred men, took possession of the trench, which he damaged, and retreated only before a superior force.

On the twelfth, general Beresford was informed that marshal Soult had left Seville on the tenth, in order to throw provisions into Badajoz. He therefore determined to raise the siege, and to concentrate all his forces, for the purpose of giving battle to the French. He sent all the implements of the siege to Elvas, and took a position near Albuera. General Blake reinforced the allied army with his troops, in the nights of the fifteenth and sixteenth. At eight o'clock in the morning, marshal Soult manœuvred on the right of the allies, to cross the small river Albuera; and, by a change of direction on the right, he marched two columns of infantry and one of cavalry, as if he had intended to take the village of Albuera. The object of these movements was to mask the march of his main body of infantry, which wanted to cut off the communication of the allies with Olivenza, by Valverde. General Beresford guessed the intentions of marshal Soult. He entrusted Blake with the defence of that wing; and had it supported by general Cole. The attack having become general, the Spaniards were driven from their positions; but the defence of the English was obstinate. The momentary confusion, occasioned by the

successful charge of a body of Polish lancers, was soon repaired by the intrepidity of the soldiers; who, in the broken regiments, fought man to man with them. The principal merit of the Poles consisted in their novel equipment. The generals, who commanded the English divisions, did not wait for orders, to act with their columns. Wherever the danger was greatest, thither they marched with the utmost rapidity; and manœuvred with so much ability and boldness, that they snatched the victory from the French, and forced them back to the positions which they occupied before the battle. Generals Cole, Stewart, Hamilton, Alten, and Houghton, covered themselves with glory. The latter fell breathless, being struck by a chain-shot at the moment that he was charging the French at the head of his troops, and forcing them to retreat. The conflict ceased towards three o'clock in the afternoon; and the combatants were struck with horror at the dreadful havoc they had made in each other's ranks. The loss of the two armies was rated at nearly twenty thousand men *hors de combat*, whilst the total of their forces did not much exceed forty thousand.

Marshal Soult had, however, accomplished his object, for he had forced the English to raise the siege of Badajoz, and he judged it useless, perhaps even dangerous, to renew the engagement. On the seventeenth, he manœuvred on his right, under cover of his numerous cavalry; and after having saved appearances, by continuing two days in the neighbourhood of the allies, as if he had wished to challenge them once more, he withdrew towards Andalusia.

The slaughter of Albuera ought to draw down the severest censure upon the two generals, who were the wanton authors of it. Had general Beresford been sensible of the advantage, which general Blake's arrival gave him, he would not have raised the siege of Badajoz. Assisted by the zeal of the inhabitants of Estremadura, he might, in two days, have drawn lines of contravallation and circumvallation. These would have paralyzed the Polish cavalry,

which merely gained a momentary success, from a kind of stupor, suddenly occasioned by the length of their lances; and, above all, by the floating of a little red flag, that inspired terror, though it is but a silly ornament, more fit for the stage than for a regimental dress. Marshal Soult would have been defeated, as his cavalry would have been of no service; and he would, moreover, have been obliged to attack in intrenchments the same allies, who, even on the extensive plains of Albuera, forced him to fall back. Marshal Soult also had been informed, in the night of the fifteenth to the sixteenth, that the allies had raised the siege, and that general Philippon was destroying their works. What then could be his object in giving battle? His well-known humanity is a sufficient guarantee that he was not urged by the horrible desire of spilling blood. But he might have manœuvred on the sixteenth, as he did on the seventeenth; and by this alike sagacious and humane proceeding, he would have shown himself, not only equal in point of talents, but even far superior to his master, by the prudence and skill of his combinations. If, in attacking the allied army, marshal Soult, consulted only that ridiculous self love, which makes the general interest secondary to the gratification of vanity, he well deserved the terrible chastisement he received, by the loss of a multitude of brave soldiers, whose training had cost him so many fatigues, and by the death of his intimate friend, general Verle, who, for twenty years, had been to him what Berthier was to Buonaparte—his faithful companion in war, and his confidential associate. Verle fell, like general Houghton, charging at the head of his troops. He was an honest man, a brave soldier, and a good staff-officer: but he wanted both the moral qualities and physical means requisite in a general.

Marshal Soult ought to have congratulated himself on not having had lord Wellington to encounter in the battle of the sixteenth, or he probably would have paid still dearer for his temerity. But reports, that Massena was col-

lecting his army to succour Almeida, had called his lordship back to the north. On the second of May, Massena actually crossed the Agueda, at Ciudad-Rodrigo. On the same day, he moved his army to the Azava, near Carpio and Galegos. On the third, he marched in the direction of Almeida. The allied army assembled near Fuentes-de-Onora, with the exception of general Pack's column, which was ordered to continue the blockade of Almeida. Lord Wellington rested his left on the ruins of fort Concepcion, and his right on Nava-de-Avel. This position was uncommonly strong, except the right extremity between Nava-de-Avel and Posobello, where it was possible for the French cavalry to act. Massena, who had not yet reconnoitred the ground, ordered the sixth corps to attack the advanced guard of the allies, and take possession of Fuentes-de-Onora, which was occupied by lord Wellington's centre. The village was several times taken and retaken. Nothing could equal the obstinacy of the combatants, but their bravery.—This sanguinary conflict ended in a tacit agreement to share the possession of the post. Massena states in his report—"that lord Wellington filled the avenues of this village, as well as the walls and rocks on its flanks, with troops: and that, by all possible means, his lordship rendered the occupation of the greater part of the village *extremely difficult*." He adds—"that when he saw the possession of the village would cost the army too high a price, he made the requisite arrangements for another species of attack—that he reconnoitred with care the flanks of the enemy—that he found accessible ground near Nava-de-Avel—and that thither he resolved to march his army."

Massena then, by his own confession, was defeated on the third, and obliged to adopt a new plan. On the fifth, at the break of day, he attacked the right of the allies, with the flower of his troops. Possobello was carried with the bayonet, after a vigorous resistance. The French cavalry, which had favoured this attack by manœuvring in the rear

of the position, was kept in check by the fire of general Houston's column. Lord Wellington, nevertheless, thought his line was too far extended. By concentrating his troops, he lost, it is true, his communication with Sabugal; but he prevented the approach of the French to Almeida, which was the great object of Massena's attacks. The allied army changed its front on its centre, the right wing falling in the rear. Generals Houston, Crawford, and Stapleton Cotton, performed this movement with the greatest precision, though harassed by a very superior force. General Montbrun gained some advantage over those detached troops, that were slow in joining their divisions. The prompt assistance, afforded wherever it was requisite, rendered the attack of scarcely any importance, though Massena had built upon it the hope of a complete victory. He was not more fortunate in his attempts against Fuentes-de-Onora, though he sacrificed the choicest troops of the ninth corps, which formed his centre. Whenever the French appeared, the English retreated, in excellent order, and under a continued fire, to the upper part of the village, where well-placed batteries destroyed whole ranks of the French columns, and forced them to take flight. Arrangements, so well combined on the part of the allies, convinced the French general that he had no resource left but to retreat. He was ashamed of being forced to leave Almeida to its fate: and in order to repair, as much as possible, the reverse which he had just experienced, he had recourse to artifice. On the sixth, he kept his position. On the seventh, he sent orders to general Brennier to blow up the fortifications of Almeida, and retire, with his garrison, to Barbadel-Puereo, whence he was to march to Sanfelices, crossing the Agueda, near that village.

In conformity with these orders, general Brennier loaded with powder the mines, which had been prepared for the destruction of the most important works. He spiked the artillery, and rendered the ammunition and provisions of

every kind, unserviceable. On the tenth, he imparted his orders to the principal officers of the garrison, acquainting them with the danger they were about to encounter, and the measures he had taken. He then conducted them to a spot, whence he pointed out the direction which he intended to follow in his march. When he left the place, at eleven o'clock at night, he gave the watchword; "*Buonaparte and Bayard.*" His advanced guard came up with the English posts at the moment the mines exploded, and blew up the ramparts. The spirit of the attack, and the superiority of numbers, easily opened a passage for the head of the column: but it was much harassed on its flanks, and the rear-guard was cut to pieces. Such indeed must have been the fate of the whole garrison, had lord Wellington employed the wise precaution of drawing lines of contravallation. The delay, which the attack upon such lines would have occasioned, would have given time to collect the blockading troops; and Brennier would have received the chastisement due to his novel plan of action. There was no disgrace in surrendering to an army of forty thousand men, which had just gained a signal victory over the troops destined to succour Almeida. General Brennier has been highly extolled for having succeeded in reaching the bridge of Sanfelices on the morning of the eleventh: but, had he perished with his whole column, as he must inevitably have done, if the English had been more vigilant, his conduct would justly have been stigmatized as that of a fool-hardy man, who consults nothing but his own glory, and wantonly sports with the lives of the individuals under his command. Besides, by destroying the forts and warlike stores of Almeida, he had placed himself without the pale of the accustomed laws of war; and it would have been but an act of justice, on the part of the allied army, if they had fallen upon the fugitives, and refused any quarter, or, at least, if they had severely punished the officer who had dared to violate usages, consecrated by ages among civilized nations. General

Brennier would have incurred less blame, if he had left the place and the magazines untouched. His movement, in that case, would have appeared a vigorous sortie, the unexpected success of which might have suggested to him the idea of using it to avoid captivity. His unwarrantable destruction of the works and stores of Almeida, deprived lord Wellington's army of the supplies, which they had lawfully earned with the precious blood shed in the battle of Fuentes-de-Onora.

The loss of the allies, from the third of May to the tenth, amounted to about three thousand men *hors de combat*: that of the French to about four thousand. Their principal loss was occasioned by the ridiculous obstinacy, with which they persisted in the attempt to drive the English from Fuentes-de-Onora. Had it not been for this fault, they would not have lost more than the allies. Lord Wellington, aware of Massena's ardent disposition, ably availed himself of the advantages afforded by the ground, as he had done at Busaco. This second reverse wounded the vanity of the French general to the quick; and he determined to resign. After having recrossed the Aguada with his army, he left Spain, under pretence of being in a bad state of health. Massena was succeeded in his command by marshal Marmont. Though greatly mortified at the escape of the French garrison from Almeida, lord Wellington could not impute to his brave army a measure, the attempt and success of which were alike improbable. His lordship justly lavished the highest praises on his troops; and both houses of parliament unanimously voted their thanks to the conquerors of Busaco and Fuentes-de-Onora. Instead of becoming the boasted prey of Massena, so celebrated for the vivacity of his attacks at the head of the advanced guards in Italy, Portugal was freed from the presence of French armies; and their expulsion being the glorious result of victory, every thing announced that the kingdom would long be safe against a new invasion. But, not

withstanding this happy prospect, lord Wellington caused the works of Almeida to be immediately repaired, in order to secure that place against a *coup de main*. He could not have chosen a more favourable point for the general store-house of the army, whether he intended to continue on the defensive, or whether circumstances would permit him to penetrate into Spain. His lordship was presiding over the execution of these measures, when general Beresford informed him of marshal Soult's march to the relief of Badajoz, and expressed the satisfaction which he and his army should feel in fighting under his directions, provided his lordship's presence was not necessary to observe Mas-sena.

Lord Wellington accordingly set out from Almeida, on the sixteenth of May, and arrived on the nineteenth at Elvas, where he received the report of the battle of Albuera. He learnt, with pleasure, that Badajoz had been invested anew on the same day—that Soult was in full retreat towards Seville—and that general Beresford greatly harassed his rear-guard, with the flower of the allied army. His lordship immediately undertook the direction of the operations on the Guadiana. The trenches were opened before Badajoz in the night of the twenty-ninth to the thirtieth of May. On the sixth of June, the breach, made in fort San-christoval, was judged practicable. The assault was made on the same day, towards ten o'clock in the evening; but in spite of the valour of the assailants, they were repulsed; because, contrary to the rules of the art, they had not taken the precaution of being masters of the ditch, in order to prevent the entrance of the besieged into it. This blunder, on the part of the English engineers, had not escaped the observation of the French governor, Philippon. As soon as it was night, he had sent miners into the ditch, to clean the foot of the breach, and thus render it impracticable. When the English came, they not only could not reach the steep breach by climbing, but their ladders also

proved too short, on account of the height to which the miners had raised the new parapet. After three very sanguinary attempts, they were obliged to retire. The firing against Sanchristoval was continued on the following days: and on the ninth the breach was again judged practicable. Lord Wellington ordered a fresh assault of the fort in the evening: but the same obstacles were encountered as in the evening of the sixth; because the same fault had been committed. The troops displayed an ardour and bravery worthy of a better result; and their loss was increased by their obstinacy in continuing at the foot of the breach; sometimes on the defensive, and sometimes renewing the attempt to scale the wall, in the constant expectation that fortune would reward their intrepidity. It required peremptory orders from lord Wellington to withdraw them from so perilous a post, and to make them return to the camp, so great was their amazement at being unable to execute the commands of chiefs, who had their entire confidence and attachment.

The sad result of these two assaults, and the news of the preparations of the French for the relief of Badajoz, determined lord Wellington to postpone the conquest of that place, to a more favourable opportunity. On the tenth, orders were given to raise the siege. The unexpected opposition, which marshal Soult had met with at Albuera, induced him not to renew the attack, but with numbers superior to those of the allies. A few days after the sanguinary battle of Albuera, he had been furnished with fresh evidence that the English cavalry, though inferior in number, was not afraid of meeting the French. On the twenty-fifth of May, general Montbrun attacked general Lumley, near Usagre. He fancied that the bare sight of his numerous columns would induce the allies to make a precipitate retreat. How great then must have been his surprise, when he saw his advanced-guard, consisting of three regiments, boldly attacked, and completely overthrown, by

the third regiment of dragoon guards, supported by the fourth! The result of this skirmish strengthened marshal Soult's apprehensions of not being strong enough to encounter lord Wellington. He ordered marshal Marmont to join him on the Guadiana, with the choicest troops of the army of Portugal. Marmont was not able to leave the environs of Ciudad-Rodrigo before the fifth of June; on the thirteenth he reached Almaraz, on the Tagus, and on the eighteenth, he formed his junction with Soult in the neighbourhood of Merida. On the seventeenth, lord Wellington had set out from before Badajoz, which, ever since the raising of the siege, had been closely blockaded. His lordship did not think proper either to march to the French, or to wait for them. The whole allied army crossed over to the right banks of the Guadiana, and took a position on the Caya, in the neighbourhood of Arronches. Soult and Marmont arrived at Badajoz on the twentieth. On the twenty-second they marched a strong body of troops to Elvas, and Campo-Mayor; in order to cover them, while they reconnoitred the environs of these two places, and procured accurate accounts of the allied army. They returned to Badajoz on the same day, satisfied with having relieved that place, and undoubtedly convinced, in their own minds, that lord Wellington was in a situation to frustrate all their ulterior efforts.

The combined army of the French was rated at seventy thousand men under arms, ten thousand of whom were cavalry: that of the allies at sixty thousand, including six thousand horse. But, in spite of this inferiority, the English commander had made very judicious dispositions to prevent the junction of the two French armies. He collected the flower of his infantry and cavalry at Albuera, in order to fight marshal Soult separately, if the latter should march directly to Badajoz. After having forced this army of the south to retreat, the allies would have rapidly marched to Merida, and stopped the progress of the army of Por-

tugal; which, on hearing of marshal Soult's retreat, would have fallen back to Almaraz without fighting. This important operation was to be executed by fifty thousand of the allies attacking successively two French armies, each of thirty-five thousand men; whilst a corps of ten thousand would have been left to continue the blockade of Badajoz. Such was the plan of the English commander, which would have completely succeeded, had he been opposed by a less experienced general than Soult, whom the battle of Albuera had taught additional prudence. Lord Wellington's worthy competitor felt how critical his situation would be, if he did not take the greatest precautions to avoid a battle on the part of his army alone. He left Lerena only on the twelfth, and on the sixteenth, he was still in a position at Fuente-del-Maestro, where the roads of Badajoz and Merida meet. Though he had heard, on the seventeenth, that lord Wellington was recrossing the Guadiana, and though he might easily have harassed his lordship's rear-guard, by marching to Badajoz through Albuera, yet afraid of this retreat being a feint on the part of the English general to bring about a battle with him separately, he marched to Almendralejo, on the Merida road. This great circumspection is, unquestionably, the highest eulogium of lord Wellington's excellent measures. Had the engineers followed the rules of fortification, with as much ability as his lordship displayed in the application of the principles of the higher branches of tactics, Badajoz would no doubt have surrendered about the fourteenth or fifteenth of June.

Whenever a place is properly attacked, it never resists above two or three days after a breach has been rendered practicable; and for such a protracted defence there must be in the bastions additional works, which did not exist at Badajoz. It scarcely would be believed, were it not expressly mentioned in the official reports, that, in the beginning of the nineteenth century, troops should have been sent to the assault with ladders, after the breach had been

judged practicable. If they wished to scale the town, they only needed to make a false attack at the breach, where the enemy was in great force, and climb up the ramparts, on divers other points, where success was so much the more infallible, as the besieged, not expecting such an attack, would have been taken unawares, and would, of course, have opposed little or no resistance. But in spite of these gross blunders, the loss of the allies, according to lord Wellington, both during the siege, and in the two assaults, did not exceed twelve hundred men *hors de combat*. The garrison lost nearly the same number in their sorties against the works of the besiegers.

The rules of fortification were better followed by the French before Tarragona, which general Suchet had besieged since the fourth of May. He had reached the environs of the place on the twenty-sixth of April; after having several times fought against the garrison, which made many successful excursions against the French moveable columns, sent to oppose the introduction of provisions into the fortress. On the fifth, the garrison of fort Oliva made four sorties, successful at first, but afterwards repulsed by superior forces. On the eighth the French established a great redoubt on the sea-shore. The guns of the English squadron in the roads warmly opposed the construction of a work, intended to intercept, or at least to obstruct, the communication of the town with the fleet. But the obscurity of the night, added to the great number of labourers, defeated the attempts of the English.

On the tenth, general Campoverde entered Tarragona, with troops from Catalonia. On the fourteenth, a sortie of six thousand men attacked the troops which invested the place, overthrew whatever opposed their passage; destroyed several works, and returned only after the French had collected the greater part of their troops. This attack took place on the side of the Francol, a river to the south of Tarragona. On the twenty-first, general Sarsfield, at the

head of several thousand *miquelets*, drove the French from Aleover, on the high road to Lerida. Suchet sent against him a corps of choice men, who easily dispersed such irregular troops. The latter were, indeed, less calculated to fight in the plain, than to act as riflemen on the rocks of the Pyrenees. On the twenty-seventh, four heavy batteries were completely mounted against fort Oliva. The garrison made a sortie to oppose this operation. They had overthrown the first posts, and were about to destroy the work, when general Salm arrived, at the head of three battalions, to protect the labourers; and the garrison was obliged to return to the fort. General Salm was killed on the spot by a musket ball. He was a very active officer, but of little ability, and more brave than prudent. He was not beloved by the troops, on account of his frequently groundless, and always excessive severity. On the twenty-eighth, the batteries began to play; and notwithstanding the brisk fire of the Spaniards, the superiority of the French became sensible on the evening of the very same day, when the fort returned their fire but feebly. On the twenty-ninth, at the approach of night, Suchet ordered the assault. The garrison defended the breach with the greatest intrepidity. The assailants were repulsed, and the attack would have thoroughly failed, had not the darkness of the night favoured the march of a column, which, possessing themselves of the gate, broke it open with hatchets. The Spaniards, who were not sufficiently numerous to defend that point, retired in confusion, and were soon followed by the remainder of the garrison, to a small barrack, protected by a ditch. Of the two thousand five hundred men, who defended fort Oliva, more than two-thirds were put to the sword. The rest, consisting of about nine hundred, surrendered at discretion; and their lives were spared.

On the thirtieth, at nine o'clock in the morning, three thousand men left Tarragona to retake fort Oliva. They were repulsed, as might easily have been foreseen. The

governor had committed the fault of not sending this reinforcement the night before, to repel the assault. He would then have caused a great loss to the French. But instead of repairing his first error, he committed a second, in diminishing the forces of the place, by the loss of the brave men, who perished in the attack of the thirtieth. The least sagacious officer must have perceived, that an enemy, who is enterprising, and numerous enough to carry a work by main force, would not neglect the measures requisite to prevent its being retaken, especially when he has an army of five and twenty thousand men at his disposal. A sound judgment, and coolness not to be disturbed, are two essential qualities, without which the governor of a strong place exposes himself, not only to personal disgrace, but even endangers the safety of the state, by sacrificing his garrison in attacks, better calculated to make a vain parade of unprofitable courage, than to protract the defence of the important post, with which he is entrusted by his sovereign.

The conquest of fort Oliva left Tarragona to its own strength; and in the night of the first to the second of June, the besiegers opened their trenches. The first parallel was constructed at the distance of one hundred fathoms from the body of the place. To prevent the entrance of any succour by sea, it was of essential importance to obtain possession of the lower town, which comprises the harbour and the pier. But the progress of the works was slow, and attended with great losses. A half moon, which covered the curtain between the bastions, called *des Chanoines* and *Saint Charles*, was carried only at the third assault. In this work a battery was erected, the support of which required ten thousand sand-bags. Its fire was opened on the twenty-first, together with that of two other batteries. Towards noon, three breaches were judged practicable. The declivity of the ditch had been made at the projecting angle of the bastion *des Chanoines*; this was wrong. It ought to have been against the fore part of the bastions, on the

front of attack. But is probably a mere mistake in the report of Suchet's aide-de-camp, who very likely is rather a brave grenadier than a clever engineer. At seven o'clock in the evening, five columns were marched to the intended points of attack. One was for each of the three breaches; the two others, provided with ladders, were to scale the ramparts, make a diversion in favour of those who were ordered to the breaches, and, by a serious attack, penetrate, if possible, into the town, thereby forcing the besieged to retire into the upper part of it. General Suchet succeeded beyond his expectation. Four columns penetrated into the town, notwithstanding the dreadful fire of the besieged. The fifth, which was advancing by the seashore, was overthrown by general Sarsfield. But this advantage was soon rendered of no use by the arrival of other French troops, who, setting aside all feelings of humanity, made a dreadful slaughter of the inhabitants and soldiers that fell into their hands. The garrison had two thousand men killed. No prisoners were taken. The remainder, amounting to three thousand, took refuge in the upper town. When the French soldiers thought they had plundered the place sufficiently, they set fire to most of the houses. Considerable warehouses of cotton and sugar became the prey of the flames. The commander of the English squadron could not remain a tranquil spectator of the horrible situation, in which the inhabitants of Tarragona were placed: he approached the lower town, and opened the fire of all his vessels on the French posts. The garrison of the upper town, encouraged by this assistance of the English squadron, attempted a sortie, but unsuccessfully. They quickly retreated within the ramparts, when they saw the French ready to attack them.

In the night of the twenty-first to the twenty-second, the trenches were open before the upper town. The breach having been judged practicable on the twenty-eighth, the assault was made with impetuosity, and feebly opposed.

To have a just idea of the disastrous scene that ensued, it will be sufficient to recollect the expressions of its author, who is interested in diminishing its horror. "The rage of the soldiery," says general Suchet, in his report to prince Berthier, dated Tarragona, the twenty-ninth of June, 1811, "was increased by the resistance of the garrison, which every day expected deliverance, and wished to insure its success by a general sortie. The fifth assault, still more vigorous than the preceding ones, attempted yesterday at noon, against the inner rampart, has been attended with dreadful slaughter, but with inconsiderable loss on our side. The terrible example which I foresaw, *to my sorrow*, and foretold in my last report to your highness, has been made; and will long be remembered in Spain. Four thousand men were slain in the town: from ten to twelve thousand tried to escape into the country by leaping from the walls; but one thousand of these were cut to pieces, or drowned. About ten thousand (five hundred of whom are officers) have been taken prisoners, and marched to France. Nearly fifteen hundred lie wounded in the hospitals of the town, where their lives have been spared in the midst of the slaughter. Three major-generals, and the governor, are among the prisoners. Several other superior officers are among the dead. Twenty stands of colours, three hundred and eighty-four battering pieces, forty thousand cannon balls, or bombs, and five hundred thousand quintals of gunpowder and lead, are in our power, &c." No mention is made in this report, of the inhabitants that fell victims to the rage of the French soldiers, who, on entering the town, indistinctly slew all they found in their passage. An eye-witness asserts that the slaughter was as dreadful as Suchet describes it. The capture of Tarragona is undoubtedly a very brilliant conquest; but it would far more redound to the honour of the French troops, if they had not stained the renown of their arms with so much blood.

The blame, however, falls lighter on general Suchet than on the governor of Tarragona, whose improvidence and obstinacy cannot be palliated by his courage. He had witnessed the equivocal conduct of his troops in former assaults, and he might easily have foreseen that he would not prove more fortunate in a fresh attack, when the French, to achieve their object, would act with increased ardour against enemies, whom they were wont to conquer. He should, therefore, have come to an honourable arrangement; especially as the marquis of Campoverde, who had left Tarragona, to collect an army for its relief, did not make his appearance. Moreover, the Valentians and Aragonese did not attempt the expected diversion. And, what should have removed all scruples in the governor's mind, as to the propriety of a surrender, the English refused to join the garrison. The governor himself, in his report to the council of regency, says: "The garrison has displayed the greatest heroism in the defence of the place, until the assault, which was feebly opposed. The soldiers yielded, and were intimidated. Every thing conspired against this unfortunate garrison. General Campoverde, on leaving the place, promised to return soon to its relief and deliverance; a promise which he never performed, though he renewed it every day. General Miranda, sent to the succour of the place by the kingdom of Valencia, landed at Tarragona on the twelfth of June, and re-embarked the next day, to join the army under Campoverde. An English division arrived on the twenty-sixth. Colonel Skerret, its commander, came on shore to confer with me. On the twenty-seventh, English artillery officers and engineers, came to reconnoitre the front of attack, and, being convinced that the place was incapable of opposing any resistance, returned to their vessels; so that all hastened from the town, and yet they were all sent to its succour! To be forsaken by those, who came to assist us, was the worst, &c." This short extract from general Contreras's long report, evidently shows

that the task, with which he had been entrusted, was beyond his means. When he saw the English engineers convinced that it was impossible to protract the defence of Tarragona, when he saw them return to their vessels, thus confirming their opinion in the most authentic manner, he ought to have sent offers of capitulating to the French general, who, being himself a man of honour, would have proposed none but honourable terms. It is, therefore, from mistaken vanity, and inconsiderate bravery, that general Contreras, instead of capitulating, committed the melancholy fault of awaiting the assault on the twenty-eighth. But these errors of the governor are far from justifying Suchet's arbitrary conduct. Valour and severity have both invariable bounds, prescribed by reason and honour. Whoever oversteps them, be it even from excessive zeal, ought to be considered as dangerous to the state, and incapable of holding a superior command.

No sooner was general Suchet master of Tarragona, than he ordered the fortifications to be repaired. He left a strong garrison in the place, and marched to Montserrat, where the marquis d'Ayroles had established his *depot general*. On the twenty-fourth of July he formed his junction with a detachment from the garrison of Barcelona, commanded by general Maurice Mathieu. Montserrat, which entirely differs from other mountains, is an assemblage of immense pyramids, seated on a great number of insulated rocks, whence it derives the name of *Monte Serrado*, or *the sawed mountain*. This post was so strong by nature, that the Spaniards supposed the French would confine themselves to a blockade of it. They had increased the difficulties of an attack by main force, having cut the road which leads to the convent, and constructed redoubts on very steep rocks, to the top of which they had carried some pieces of ordnance. Suchet had been informed that the marquis d'Ayroles, had too small a number of troops to defend himself against many attacks, the success of any

out of which would put him in possession of what he termed "*the den of the insurgents of Catalonia*." His troops carried three redoubts, which were at the foot of the mountain, whilst several columns of *voltigeurs* climbed the rocks, wherever they were accessible. The peasants, stationed on the summits of the mountains, kept up a very brisk fire, whilst others, placed on the brinks of the intermediate projecting places, rolled down stones and pieces of rocks upon the assailants. The whole mountain, however, was carried with the bayonet; and the marquis d'Ayroles himself owed his safety only to the darkness of the night, and the perfect knowledge he possessed of the passes. This conquest was extremely beneficial to Barcelona; the supplies of which had often been intercepted by the Spaniards of the mountain. General Maurice Mathieu returned to Barcelona, and Suchet went to Arragon; there to make the necessary arrangements for his expedition against the kingdom of Valentia.

It was no doubt a matter of surprise that the French army, called the army of Arrogan, should have been manœuvring for near twelve months in Catalonia. The circumstance was owing to the energy of the Catalonians, who had gained signal advantages against marshal Macdonald's army, as long as it had been spread wide to maintain the communications. In the night of the nineteenth to the twentieth of March, the marquis de Campoverde, at the head of eight thousand men, attempted to obtain possession of fort Montjoui, which is the key to Barcelona, and where he had some partisans. The French received information of it in time to frustrate the plan, which had been agreed upon. The Spaniards attacked with impetuosity; but they were repulsed: and, seeing that they were not seconded, as they expected, by their friends within the place, they retreated in excellent order. They took, however, better precautions to surprise Figueras. There was a secret postern, which opened into the ditch. Two Catalonians, on

the commissariat of the garrison, opened this gate in the night of the ninth to the tenth of April, and introduced five hundred miquelets. The garrison, which consisted of four hundred men, could not fire a single musket, so badly was the service performed. Both officers and soldiers were quietly in their beds, when they were taken prisoners. As soon as general Baraguay d'Hilliers, who commanded in Upper Catalonia, was informed of this event, he collected all his disposable soldiers, to invest Figueras: but the Spaniards availed themselves of the time, which the French employed in assembling their troops. They introduced about four thousand men into the place, under the orders of general Martinez, with provisions for several months. On the third of May, the marquis de Campoverde attempted to throw fresh supplies into Figueras. He had prepared a very considerable convoy, but he found the French too superior in numbers to accomplish his purpose; and was obliged to renounce his object, after having fought a sanguinary battle, almost under the ramparts of the fort he wished to relieve. The English squadron, that was cruising before Rosas, desirous of seconding the Catalonians, landed a column, which was to advance to Figueras. But the disaster of Campoverde induced them to reembark; and the wreck of the Spanish army was marched towards Tarragona.

Encouraged by the success of the garrison of Almeida, in evacuating that place, general Martinez attempted to open himself a passage, sword in hand, through the French blockading troops. He had only provisions left for three days, and scarcely any ammunition. Marshal Macdonald was acquainted with the critical situation of the Spaniards. Expecting that they would make some desperate attempt to recover their liberty, he had carefully constructed lines of contravallation, covered by a double row of felled trees. For several days the French posts were doubled during the day; and at night, all the troops were kept on *bivouacs*, in the direction by which it was probable that the garrison

would try to escape. In the night of the sixteenth to the seventeenth of August, general Martinez, at the head of three thousand brave men, attacked the French lines: but he was forced to return to the fort, with the loss of four hundred men. This induced him to capitulate on the nineteenth. He wrote to the junta of Catalonia—"After more than four months of the most obstinate blockade, and being left without any succour from the army, I have seen myself under the necessity of surrendering fort San Fernando de Figueras, from the absolute want of provisions. I have exhausted every resource, having consumed every horse, and even the lowest insect, for food. In the night of the sixteenth, the whole garrison attempted a sortie with the bayonet; and, in spite of the obstacles opposed by the line of contravallation, I got as far as the felled trees, which obstructed the passage, and rendered it impossible to penetrate any farther. I have this day surrendered myself a prisoner of war, with the whole garrison, &c." If it was general Martinez, who planned the taking of Figueras by surprise, he displayed more zeal than foresight, and more valour than ability. Those indefatigable miquelets, who would have done so much injury to the French, by their almost continual attacks on the line from Perpignan to Barcelona, found themselves completely paralyzed by the brilliant but deceitful glory of taking a strong place. The conquest undoubtedly would have been beneficial, had there been any means of keeping it. Previously to this *coup de main*, the Spaniards should have collected sufficient forces to save Tarragona, which, next to Barcelona, is the strongest and most important place of Catalonia.

Marshal Macdonald made a pompous report of the operations of the blockade. He highly extolled the constancy of his army, in supporting pains, fatigues, the inconveniences of the climate, and above all, the hardship of passing twenty-five nights in *bivouacs*, from the twenty-fourth of July to the twenty-ninth of August. What then would he

have said, had it been in the month of January? The climate of Catalonia unquestionably is one of the finest in Europe. As for his observations on the works of the lines, on the sixty thousand cannon shots fired by the garrison, and on the redoubts bearing the names of the regiments, entrusted with their construction and defence, it may be supposed that he either wished to mock Buonaparte with such ridiculous stories; or, what is more likely, that the report, written by the chief of his staff, was sent to Paris without his having taken the trouble of perusing it attentively. For, like the late general Moreau, Macdonald is more active in the field than in the closet; and though he is uncommonly sagacious in the cabinet, he perhaps relies too much on those around him. The conclusion of this report is sufficient to give an idea of the whole—"I have just been hoisting the imperial flag on the walls of Figuierras; and our artillery is at this instant saluting it with one hundred and one discharges. This salute will be heard by the English vessels, which line the coast, and by the hordes of insurgents at Olot. It will announce to them the recapture of Figuierras, and the termination of the war in this part of Catalonia." To mention hordes of insurgents collecting at Olot, was a singular way of acquainting Buonaparte with the termination of the war. Macdonald does not bear the character of a courtier: but he thought that circumstances authorised him to flatter the idol of the day. His awkward attempt at adulation was, however, not relished by Buonaparte, who deprived him of his command, and supplied his place by general Decaen, the late governor of the Mauritius, or Isle de France.

To the important events in Estremadura and Catalonia, must be added the capture of Puycerda, by a corps of miquelets, on the fifteenth of April. After having levied contributions on the town and neighbourhood, they returned to their mountains. This incursion taught the French government that its unjust conduct towards the Spaniards

provoked reprisals, which a reverse of fortune might render extremely fatal to France. In the other provinces of Spain, the guerillas continued to harass the French with the greatest activity. The marquis de Porlier, so well known by the name of the *marquesito*, fought several determined battles in the Asturias. His knowledge of the country, and the confidence of the inhabitants, favoured his movements; so that he could either avail himself of his victories when he defeated the French, or avoid their pursuit, whenever he was obliged to retreat before superior numbers. Esposymina ought to be mentioned next to the marquis de Porlier. He was the terror of the French in Navarre, in Biscay, and on the road from Bayonne to Burgos.

A number of other equally zealous leaders might be named: but they were less intelligent, and also less fortunate. In general, however, the service of the guerillas, was so well performed, that the supplies, destined for Madrid, were captured at the very gates of that capital. But in the midst of this crowd of brave men, who are an everlasting honour to the Spanish nation, the Gallicians acted only an inferior part. On the twenty-fifth of August their general, Abadia, was attacked before Astorga, by the French general, Dorsenne. He opposed but a very feeble resistance; and his army retired almost in confusion. Balasteros, who was alternately a conqueror and vanquished, in the county of Niebla, retreated to the south of Andalusia; and, notwithstanding the repeated attacks of the French, succeeded in maintaining himself between Gibraltar and Ronda. He might, perhaps, have taken Seville, and destroyed the immense stores kept in that place, if, at the time of the battle of Albuera, he had acted with vigour, and in concert with the column that advanced on the right of the Guadalquivir. This general, who possessed the entire confidence of his troops, was deficient in activity and coolness. His bold, but almost always unfortunate attacks, would have been very useful, had the plans been combined, and

the means prepared, by a person fit to command in chief, like lord Wellington, whom the Spaniards at last appointed generalissimo of all the troops serving in the peninsula; justly considering him as the only commander who could insure their success. But much precious time had been lost, which might have been employed in the organization of armies, their discipline, and the proper plans of action. Such a loss generally proves irreparable.

"Pour sauver un empire, il suffit d'un grand homme!"

BOOK V.

ON the twenty-second of June, 1811, general Blake, with about six thousand Spaniards, quitted the allied army; and having crossed the Guadiana at Jerumenha, marched to the county of Niebla. He immediately made arrangements to scale the castle of Niebla, which was defended by three hundred men. On the thirtieth of June, two hours before day-light, the troops advanced with ladders under a very brisk fire of artillery and musketry; but here too, as at Badajoz, the ladders happened to be too short, and the fort was not taken. Blake embarked with his troops at the mouth of the Guadiana, on the sixth of July, and arrived at Cadiz on the twelfth of the same month. He soon left Cadiz again with a corps of choice troops, landed at Almeria, and formed his junction with the army of Murcia, near Baza. Marshal Soult, by means of his spies, had never lost sight of him; and leaving a corps of observation in the neighbourhood of Badajoz, returned to Andalusia, with the greatest part of the French army under his command. When he heard of general Blake's arrival at Almeria, he moved towards the army of Murcia. General Godinot was ordered to turn the right of the Spaniards, whilst marshal Soult refusing his right, made a vigorous attack with his centre. On the ninth of August, the Spaniards were driven from all their positions. Towards the close of day, their retreat became a complete rout, and they fled to the mountains near Caravaca. The Spanish cavalry behaved much better than the infantry; no impression could be made upon them during the day; and they protected the fugitives, who had taken the road to Murcia: but on the tenth, the same brave cavalry, relying too much on their courage,

were attacked by the whole of marshal Soult's dragons, and about five hundred were killed, wounded, or taken prisoners. The remainder of the column, amounting still to fifteen hundred men, retired precipitately to Murcia. Of the twenty thousand men, who composed general Blake's army, not more than six, or, at the utmost, seven thousand rallied, and established themselves at Lebrilla, covering both Murcia and Carthagena.

The dispersion of the Spaniards tranquillized marshal Soult, respecting the kingdom of Granada. This advantage had cost him only four hundred men, killed or wounded. He returned to Seville, that he might be enabled to assist the troops left in Estremadura, should they be attacked by a superior force. His anxiety in this respect was of short duration. Marshal Marmont had left Merida with the army of Portugal, on the seventeenth of July. He had crossed the Tagus at Almaraz, and quartered his troops in the vicinity of Placentia, where he still was on the first of August. Lord Wellington following this movement, manœuvred on his left, and marched with the main part of his army on the right banks of the Tagus, near Castello-Branco. A few days after, he continued his march to the left, and took a position on the Coa. But notwithstanding this manœuvre of the English, the army of Portugal maintained its position, and the army of the north, under the command of general Dorsenne, was quartered in cantonments, on the banks of the Douro. Ciudad-Rodrigo being thus abandoned to its own defence, lord Wellington made his arrangements to obtain possession of it. On the fifth of September, he completed the blockade of the place, and was busily employed in collecting the means of besieging it, when the French marched up to make him abandon the blockade, and drive him back to the mountains of Guarda.

Dorsenne and Marmont formed their junction, on the twenty-second of September, at Tamames, which is two

leagues distant from Ciudad-Rodrigo. The combined army amounted to sixty thousand men, of whom six thousand were cavalry. That of the allies consisted at most of fifty thousand, including the troops necessary to keep the garrison in check. Lord Wellington, under the supposition that he had wished to maintain the blockade, could have brought only forty thousand foot and four thousand horse into battle. The balance was too great in favour of the French; his lordship, therefore, raised the blockade on the twenty-fourth, and established his army in the position of Fonte Guinaldo, which had been strengthened by some field-works. A numerous advanced guard remained on the Azava, under the command of general Graham. On the twenty-fifth, the French, under the command of general Montbrun, attacked this advanced guard, near Elbodon. The English, owing to the superiority of the French in numbers, were obliged to fall back: but their retreat was effected in the same order as at a review. The squares formed by the infantry, were repeatedly attacked by the French cavalry, who were received at first with a very brisk fire, and afterwards at the point of the bayonet. This intrepidity of the English disheartened Montbrun. He gave up all further attempts, contented himself with cannonading the English, and continued the pursuit till very near Fonte-Guinaldo. The French generals employed the rest of that day, and the whole of the next (being the twenty-sixth) in reconnoitering the position of Fonte-Guinaldo, and making arrangements for its attack. Lord Wellington felt some apprehensions from the movement of a considerable corps, apparently destined to turn his left. He withdrew, in the night of the twenty-sixth, to the vicinity of Alfayates, and stationed his rear-guard at Aldea-de-Ponte. On the twenty-seventh, this village was attacked by the French advanced guard; but general Cole defended it till night. Though the French assailed him with the flower of their troops, their efforts were rendered useless for the whole day, by

the excellent dispositions of general Cole, and the intrepidity of his division.

This fine defence of Aldea-de-Ponte, must have made lord Wellington regret that he had not continued in his intrenched camp of Fonte-Guinaldo. He might have celebrated the anniversary of the battle of Busaco, by a still more signal victory than that which he had gained on the same day, in the preceding year. He might have taught Buonaparte that it is not prudent to confide the command of any army to inexperienced officers. Their inexperience, indeed, is sufficiently evident from their reports to prince Berthier. Marmont, in speaking of the engagement at Elbodon, says, "general Montbrun pursued the English for the space of two hours. His fire was so briskly kept up, that he exhausted his ammunition. The enemy's loss was considerable. He only stopped at the camp of Fonte-Guinaldo. But we had merely our advanced guard in action, our infantry being one march back, otherwise the English army would have been ruined. We had the mortification of seeing its divisions hastening from all sides to its intrenched camp. *Had fifteen thousand men been then at my disposal*, the English army would have been taken by surprise, and beaten in separate parties, without being able to assemble its troops," &c. An advanced guard in want of ammunition; a commander at the head of sixty thousand men, who has *not even fifteen thousand at his disposal*, prove better than the most learned discussion, that Marmont was not yet adequate to a command in chief; for Dorsenne, being neither a duke nor a marshal, was under his orders. This general, as little experienced as his commander, states in his report, "we soon reached Fonte-Guinaldo, where we learnt, with surprise, that the English commander had not yet collected his several corps. Could we have foreseen that this general would have been guilty of such a fault, we might have taken a part of the English by separate combats: but our infantry arrived only at night," &c.

Had Dorsenne and Marmont been present at Barrosa and at Albuera, they would have held a very different language. Soult and Victor could have informed them that the English were not so easily *taken* as they fancied. Be-silles, the retreat of Elbodon, and the engagement at Aldeade-Ponte, where, in their opinion, the English might have been so easily *taken*, redounded manifestly to the glory of the allies: for even their small rear-guard manœuvred on the twenty-fifth, and fought on the twenty-seventh, in spite of the combined talents and forces of two great French armies. The observation, with which the two generals conclude their reports, is a most glaring inconsistency. They say, "Were the moment fixed for the catastrophe of the English arrived, we should have followed the enemy up to the lines of Lisbon, where we might have formed a junction with the army of the south, which, though complete, has before it the single division of general Hill;" and Dorsenne adds, "whenever the emperor shall think the proper moment arrived for driving the English definitively from the peninsula, his majesty will not find in any other army more zeal and devotion." They would have greatly lowered their tone, had they been opposed to an enemy less circumspect than lord Wellington: but as they had but recently assumed their commands, the English general had not yet been able to acquire any precise notions respecting them. Had his lordship known them, particularly Marmont, he would at that time have given him a lesson in tactics, which the French marshal would have long remembered. But he lost nothing by waiting.

After the French had thrown fresh supplies into Ciudad-Rodrigo, they fell back to Salamanca, and returned to their old quarters. On the first of October, lord Wellington had resumed his camp of Fonte-Guinaldo. General Hill was detached to the left bank of the Tagus, covering the province of Alentejo, against the parties, that might have been sent from Badajoz. The fifth French corps, under the

command of general Girard, was stationed at Estremadura. General Dronet, with the ninth corps, protected the communications between the fifth corps, Badajoz, and Seville. The first corps continued the siege, or rather the semi-blockade of Cadiz. The fourth corps was quartered in Andalusia. Ballasteros remained under the cannon of Gibraltar. Suchet, who had entered the kingdom of Valentia, on the sixteenth of September, had laid siege to the castle of Saguntum, and cantoned the greatest part of his troops beyond Murviedro, to cover the works of the besiegers. Blake was in the neighbourhood of Valentia, with a corps of about twenty-five thousand men. Catalonia and Aragon were no longer the scene of great operations; but the warfare of the guerillas was carried on with the utmost activity, against the moveable columns of the French, their cantonments, and their convoys. The case was the same in the provinces of Biscay, the Asturias, and the kingdom of Leon. The surprise of Sant-Andero, on the fourteenth of August, is one of the numerous instances. The Spaniards penetrated into the town, without meeting the smallest obstacle. General Rouget, who commanded in the place, escaped by instant flight; but having learnt that the Spaniards were not numerous, he rallied his troops and retook the town. The same activity prevailed in the two Castiles. Joseph continued at Madrid, as he dared not pass the autumn in one of the royal palaces near his capital. He would have required a considerable corps of troops to defend him against the attacks of the Spanish partisans; and such a measure, weakening the garrison of Madrid, would have endangered the safety of the metropolis. General Castanos was busily employed in organizing a corps of troops between the Guadiana and the Tagus, under the protection of general Hill.

When marshal Soult was informed that Castanos had already embodied many recruits, he ordered general Girard to march to Caceres, and scour the neighbourhood, in

order to disperse these newly collected levies. Girard accordingly set out with his division from Merida, made a successful search in that part of Estremadura comprised between the Guadiana and the Tagus, and forced Castanos and his troops to take refuge in Portugal. General Hill was at Portalegre. Hearing how the French scoured the country, he resolved to punish them for the little impression which the neighbourhood of the English made upon their minds. He marched, on the twenty-third of October, to Albuquerque, where he learnt that Girard, after making his appearance at Alisada, was gone to Arroyo-del-Puereo. On the twenty-fifth, the Spaniards carried this village, and Girard retreated to Caceres. After several movements, which were carefully watched by general Hill, whom the French commander was far from supposing so near him, he established himself, on the twenty-seventh, at Arroyo-del-Molinos, a small town situated at the foot of the Sierra-de-Montanches. The French were perfectly at ease, and enjoying themselves, as if they had been in barracks at Versailles. On the same day, the allies arrived, towards evening, at Alcuéscar, in hopes of teaching general Girard's column, the next day, that distrust, in war as in policy, is the parent of safety.

At two o'clock in the morning of the twenty-eighth, general Hill began his march, which was favoured by a thick fog, attended with rain. At seven o'clock in the morning, the French were attacked by the English in three columns. At break of day, a brigade of general Girard's division had set out on its march to Medellin, and the remainder were on the point of marching to Merida, when the firing of the English riflemen brought them the first news of the visit, which general Hill was paying to the French. Girard wished at first to make some resistance; but the boldness, and, above all, the number of the allies, easily convinced him that the only resource he had left, to avoid being taken or killed, was to gain the mountains,

where the allied cavalry would be of no use; whilst his infantry would avail themselves of their superiority over the English in marching—a superiority, which the French unquestionably possess over all the troops of Europe, especially when they are on a retreat, or, to speak more clearly, when they are routed.

Scarcely had the English made their appearance in Arroyo, when they were joined by the inhabitants, who accompanied the firing of their muskets, with cries, a thousand times repeated, of—*viva los Ingleses!* They acted as guides in the pursuit of the fugitives. Of three thousand men, that were with Girard, when he commenced the attack, he lost about two thousand: fourteen hundred were taken prisoners. Among the latter were general Bron, and colonel the duke of Aremburg. Girard also lost a half battery of light artillery, consisting of one howitzer, two eight pounders, and eight powder wagons. The loss of the allies amounted only to seven killed, and sixty-five wounded. The importance of this affair is duly appreciated by marshal Soult himself, who, little habituated to reverses, and especially to surprises, was terribly vexed at Girard's disaster. In his letter to prince Berthier, dated Seville, the second of November, he observes:—"The event, of which I am informed by general count Erlon, commander of the fifth corps, in his reports of the twenty-eighth, twenty-ninth, and thirtieth of October, is so disgraceful, that I know not how to qualify it. . . . On the twenty-eighth of October, the first brigade, commanded by general Remond, was already on its march, at the distance of more than a league from Arroyo-del-Molinos, when general Hill arrived with his troops at general Girard's quarters, without a single musket having been fired. . . . General Girard had choice troops with him; yet shamefully suffered himself to be surprised, from excessive presumption and confidence. Whilst he was in the town, not a sentinel had been stationed there. The officers and soldiers were in the houses, as in

the midst of peace. I shall order an inquiry, and a severe example," &c.

It was a frequent observation of general Kleber, that "to be surprised was much more disgraceful than to be defeated;" and he constantly recommended vigilance to the officers under his command. He repeatedly told the army, in his daily orders, "that the bravest man may be beaten; but whoever suffers himself to be surprised, is unworthy of being an officer." Buonaparte also felt severely hurt at Girard's misfortune, not for the sake of the loss which his army experienced, but on account of the glory, which a manœuvre, as scientific as bold, shed upon the English army; and, above all, upon the general by whom it had been so seasonably performed. It likewise afforded a pledge of the important services, which may be expected from general Hill, when possessed of a supreme command. Nor ought a circumstance, highly glorious to the Spaniards, to be omitted, as it evinced their loyalty, and the sincerity of their zeal in the cause which they defended. For the whole six days that the allies were marching through the country in all directions, to take the French, as Buonaparte terms it, *en flagrant delit*, there was not one of the better class of inhabitants, who, either from the love of gain, or from a desire of pleasing the French, gave general Girard any information of the danger that threatened him. Can there be a stronger proof of their hatred to Joseph, their fidelity to their allies, and their attachment to Ferdinand VII?

The Spaniards of the army of Murcia were not so fortunate as those of Estremadura. A short time after their defeat at Baza, they attacked the post of Huescar, which covered the left of Soult's cantonments. The French, having timely information of their approach by patrols, forced the Spaniards to fall back on Lorca. The Spaniards had, however, accomplished their object, which was to make the French believe that the army of Murcia continued in the province, whilst the flower of its troops had been

marched to the river Guadalaviar, for the purpose of reinforcing Blake's army, which defended the kingdom of Valentia.

Fort Oropesa, situated on the road from Tortosa to Valentia, surrendered to the French on the tenth of October. Its occupation was of essential importance to general Suchet, as it secured to him the undisturbed arrival of convoys from his magazines on the Ebro. The castle of Saguntum had repulsed several attacks; but its garrison was in a critical situation, the breach having been found practicable. General Blake, who communicated with the governor by signals agreed upon, wished to try the fate of a battle, in order to furnish the castle with fresh supplies. He had an army of twenty-five thousand men, to which Suchet could only oppose twenty thousand, on account of the troops necessary to face the garrison. On the twenty-fourth of October, Blake appeared on the heights of Puche, with his right towards the sea, covered by the fire of the English vessels, and the left leaning on the village of Betera. On the twenty-fifth he attacked the French posts, and forced them to fall back. General Zayas, availing himself of this first advantage, occupied the village of Puzol, and, with the flower of his division, changing his front on the extremity of his left wing, marched his right forward to a height, which commanded the position of Suchet's left wing. This manœuvre was brilliant, but rather rash against experienced troops. Suchet's right was likewise turned by Blake's left. Thus the latter, who had a superiority of about five or six thousand men, found himself weaker than the French in his centre, from the too extended movements of his wings. Suchet hastened to avail himself of this fault, by an impetuous attack on the centre of the Spaniards, where prodigies of valour were performed. The Spaniards were at first overthrown; but afterwards the French were driven, at the point of the bayonet, from the intrenchments, of which they had possessed

themselves. The Spanish cavalry was defeated; but only after the most obstinate resistance. Suchet's experience and good fortune proved triumphant. The defeat of the centre rendered the advantages, gained on the right by Zayas, of no avail. A strong detachment of Walloon guards was taken prisoners at Puzol. Blake's left having been repulsed, this general retreated in good order, and would not have suffered materially, had he not wished to meet the French again behind the rivulet of Betera. His loss, which amounted to about six thousand men *hors de combat*, would not have exceeded half the number, had he continued his retrograde movement towards Valentia. With the best intentions, and superior numbers, Blake lost the battle through arrangements, as little adapted to the nature of the ground, as highly favourable to the enterprising character of the general, by whom he was opposed. Had he refused his two wings, and ranged the flower of his troops in several lines on the centre, with orders that those, who might be overthrown, were to form again in the rear, Suchet would have been defeated; the castle of Saguntum, which was in the utmost distress, would have received fresh supplies; and the French army would probably have been forced to return to Arragon.

The garrison of Saguntum had witnessed the efforts and reverses of the army, by which they were to be relieved. A longer resistance would have endangered the place, which could be attacked, and carried by storm. The breach having been judged perfectly practicable, the capitulation was signed on the twenty-sixth of October, 1811. Cendriani, the governor, has been blamed for having surrendered, when he might still have held out a long time. But the fact, that the troops marched out by the breach, completely refutes this calumny. How much are those fulminating denunciations to be distrusted, which are issued at random by numbers of writers! These men establish themselves supreme judges of generals, because governments,

anxious to guide public opinion, keep them in pay, and secure them against the punishment due to their impudent libels. But warriors are become philosophers: they treat the observations of ignorance with contempt, whilst they correct the faults pointed out by enlightened judges.

A good general ought to bear in his mind the fine answer of Marlborough to a French nobleman, who complimented him on his masterly manœuvres during the war in Flanders. "We committed a hundred blunders, and you a hundred and one," was the modest reply of the commander, who had made Louis XIV tremble on his throne. The great Conde, seeing his courtiers astonished at his perusing with pleasure a book, in which he was severely condemned, said, "I am delighted with this work, because it points out the faults of which no one dares to tell me." Whoever is duly impressed with the deep sense of the answers made by these two great commanders, can form a tolerable idea of the extensive information which a good general ought to possess, and will not be surprised at the reflections contained in this analysis of the military operations of the peninsula. "A mule," said marshal de Saxe, "that had made twenty campaigns under Cæsar, would still be but a mule." Experience alone does not make a general, if nature has not endowed him with a genius for war; but this genius, again, must have been improved by practice, and profound study. If it be said that the great Conde was born a general, the assertion may be contested. This prince, it is true, gained, at the age of twenty-two, a complete victory in the fields of Rocroy: but his father had been his instructor. He had, besides, served under marshal de Chatillon, the best general of Louis XIII, and he had under his orders, at Rocroy, marshal de l'Hopital and Gassion, the worthy pupil of the great Gustavus. Even he, who has been born with the most splendid talents, cannot become a good general, but by the practice of his profession, and by the study of military works. It was in the school of Turenne that

Marlborough readily improved his rare talents for the higher tactics; a science, in which, as in all others, an able master causes a rapid progress. This digression, it is hoped, will be forgiven for the sake of its object, which is to show the importance of the painful task imposed upon the historian, who is bold enough to speak the truth.

But to return to the Spanish war.—The partial successes, which the guerillas obtained in the month of October, may be considered as a kind of compensation for the progress of the French in the kingdom of Valencia. On the twelfth of October, baron d'Ayroles took the castle of Bellpuig, an important post, to keep up the communications of Catalonia with Arragon. On the twenty-sixth he defeated a French moveable column near Puycerda, and pursued them to the very territory of France, where he levied strong contributions, and afterwards returned to Catalonia, by the Val-de-Carol. On the fifteenth of the same month, Don Julian Sanches, who had waited the night before in ambush near Ciudad-Rodrigo, surprised general Raynaud, the governor of that place, when he was coming out for a ride, and took him prisoner. On the sixteenth, the cunning, brave, and enterprising Empecinado attacked the garrison of Calatayad, and took four hundred prisoners. On the seventeenth, Esposymina destroyed, in the neighbourhood of Ayorbe, a French detachment of eleven hundred men. The French troops, on their part, took Balaguer, and Mataro: but they completely failed in their attack on the small islands of Las-Medas, situated at the mouth of the Ter. Their occupation by the allies prevented the transport of supplies to Barcelona, by the coast; and facilitated the correspondence of the guerillas, in Catalonia, with the English vessels. General Dorsenne occupied the Asturias. He met with scarcely any resistance, though he had to encounter the Marquesito and Mendizabal, and had taken the precaution of not advancing without the whole of his army. In the south, marshal Soult sent three columns

against general Ballasteros, who, being obliged to give way to a force three times superior to his own, retreated once more under the cannon of Gibraltar. The French occupied the intrenched camp of Saint Roch. It was on his return from this expedition, that the French general, Godinot, blew his brains out. He was rather an active, than an excellent officer. This act of despair was attributed to his being apprehensive of the reproaches, with which marshal Soult would assail him, for having suffered Ballasteros to escape. Marshal Soult undoubtedly is a very able general, but he is perhaps a little too severe, especially towards officers who mortify his vanity, by not succeeding in his plans.

Thus ended a campaign, which offered so many favourable chances to the allies, though they did not avail themselves of the advantages. Badajoz would have been preserved, if it had been succoured in time; and this might have been effected by La Romana's corps, supported by an English reserve. The siege of Cadiz would have been raised, in consequence of the victory of Barrosa, if Graham had been the commander-in-chief. A well combined attack might have destroyed Massena's rear-guard, on the third of April near Sabugal; and by observing the usual precautions, the garrison of Almeida might have been taken, and its stores preserved. Badajoz would have been retaken in the month of May, and Soult completely beaten, if the army had been stationed within lines of circumvallation and contravallation; and the town would certainly have opened its gates to lord Wellington in the month of June, if the engineers had executed the approaches to the body of the place according to the rules of fortification. A corps of troops might have been detached from Cadiz to reinforce Campoverde, and enable him to succour, first Tarragona, and afterwards Figueras. Finally, had lord Wellington been less circumspect, and waited for the attack of the French in his intrenched camp, at Fonte-Guinaldo, his victory, which would have been complete, would have made

amends for his previous errors, and decided the campaign in favour of the allies. The French took Tortoso, Taragona, Badajoz, and Saguntum: they gained the battles of Gebora, Baza, and Murviedro; and they twice caused the siege of Badajoz, and the blockade of Ciudad-Rodrigo, to be raised. The allies gained the battles of Barrósa, Albuera, and Fuentes de-Onora: but the latter two were merely defensive. They took but one place, Olivenza, where the French had left only a weak garrison. Almeida cannot enter into the account, as Brennier had converted it into a heap of ruins. The combat of Arroyo-del-Molino, though very brilliant, can only be considered as of secondary importance, on account of the small number of French troops engaged, a thousand of which, that is to say, one-third, succeeded in escaping with their eagles. Massena's expulsion from Portugal is unquestionably a considerable advantage; though it may be objected, that it was as much the consequence of famine, as of the attacks of the allies; since, during a retreat of one month, the French were never actually forced from any position, but at Sabugal. Had lord Wellington, instead of marching to the Coa, manœuvred against Marmont, in the direction of Coria and Plasencia, he would not have been long without finding a favourable opportunity to avail himself of the marshal's presumption and inexperience. The distance of the army of the north would have prevented its co-operation with that of Portugal; whilst lord Wellington might have collected the flower of the allied troops on one and the same central point, to make an end of Marmont. This army of Portugal being once destroyed, marshal Soult could no longer have acted in Estremadura, and general Dorsenne dared not have advanced farther than Salamanca, or perhaps not beyond Valladolid. By continuing on the Tagus, lord Wellington would have insured to himself, the great superiority derived from a single line of operations against an enemy, whose forces, when they are at a distance of several

marches from each other, may be beaten successively by a concentrated army.

Every thing induces the belief that, by manœuvring on this principle, Marmont would have fallen into the snare, and would, of course, have been punished for his temerity. His defeat would have alarmed king Joseph; who, instead of sending Suchet with an army into the kingdom of Valentia, would have stationed the flower of it in the vicinity of Talavera, to cover Madrid, and collect the remains of the army of Portugal. The contrary, however, of all this took place, and the winter campaign of 1811 to 1812, opened on the second of November, 1811, with the capture of a Valentian suburb, called *Serrano*. Marshal Suchet caused it to be carried by one division. This general, who is as dexterous a courtier, as he is an intrepid soldier, proceeded very slowly in his operations to subdue Valentia. He wanted a dukedom from Buonaparte, in addition to the marshal's staff, which the conquest of Tarragona had obtained for him. He employed more than fifty days in his preparations for the passage of the Guadalaviar. General Blake had strongly intrenched himself on the right banks of that river. He had stationed all his infantry from the sea to Manisses, and his cavalry below that village, in the direction of Ribaroja; so that it covered the left of the whole line. In the night of the twenty-fifth to the twenty-sixth of December, three French divisions crossed the Guadalaviar in face of this cavalry, which opposed scarcely any resistance, and even fell back in confusion to Torrente. The infantry at Manisses, seeing the French columns marching on their left, became apprehensive of being surrounded, and, instead of joining the main body of the army, took the road of Murcia, by Cataroja. The Guadalaviar had been crossed in two places, one between the villages of Quarte and Mis-lata, and the other at the mouth of the river. The French suffered much in these two attacks: but the complete success, obtained by their right, decided the battle in their fa-

your. The Spaniards shut themselves up in Valentia. This town is surrounded by a strong wall, to which some works had been added, requiring a regular attack. There was, moreover, an intrenched camp, which covered the town, and the three suburbs, on the right of the river. Instead of carrying it by storm, which the great extent of the works, and their feebleness towards the sea rendered very practicable, the engineers were ordered to open the trenches on that point, and at San-Vincente, near the road to Murcia. Colonel Henry, an engineer of great merit, and the principal author of marshal Suchet's triumphs, was killed on the spot, at the moment he was beginning to draw the first parallel. The trenches had been opened in the night of the first to the second of January, 1812, and on the eighth the French miners were preparing to blow up the wall that encloses the town. But general Blake, *wishing to spare Valentia the horrors of a storm*, consented to capitulate. The loss of the allies amounted to about eighteen thousand good troops, three hundred and seventy-four pieces of ordnance, and stores of all kinds. The capitulation was signed on the ninth, and the garrison declared prisoners of war.

The Spanish general committed three faults; the first, in not having a choice corps of infantry on his left, to support his cavalry between Manisses and Ribaroja, and defend the passage of the Guadalaviar; the second, by shutting himself up in Valentia, instead of opening himself a passage, sword in hand, by the road to Murcia; and the third, in not surrendering before the place was bombarded. The population of Valentia, which had been considerably increased by refugees from the country, afforded no prospect for a protracted defence. The town might have raised a national guard of twenty thousand men. By adding to them five thousand troops of the line, the number of the defenders of Valentia would have been equal to that of Blake's army. The general would have had a corps of

twenty-five thousand men left, which he might have stationed on the heights, near Ribaroja. This arrangement gave him the double advantage of covering Valentia by threatening Suchet's right, if he marched against that place; and of having a safe retreat, in case of a reverse. The patriotism of general Blake, attested by more than a hundred honourable, though principally unsuccessful, combats, will not allow the supposition that he wished to betray his country. His enemies pretend that he had deprived himself of, all means of retreating, merely to obtain terms, which the tumult of a field of battle does not admit, and a rout does not authorize. But general Blake is a very loyal Spaniard. He is, however, justly blamed, for having, from silly vanity, exposed to a bombardment of four days, a population of about two hundred thousand persons, whom he could no longer guard against the yoke of the French. His cruel procrastination might deceive the multitude, always flattered with having sharers in their hopes: but the impartial historian sees nothing in it, but a proof of the Spanish general's weakness. The assertion of several journalists, that he had shamefully betrayed the sacred cause, which he had defended with so much zeal since the beginning of the war, can scarcely be credited. Yet his conduct, after the surrender of Saguntum, appears to confirm the severe opinion of his enemies. What a lustre he would have shed on his career, if, after having made the utmost efforts to relieve Valentia, he had moved towards Catalonia by forced marches! At all events, he is inexcusable for not having made such arrangements, that, in case of need, he might have marched with the flower of his troops to Alicant and Carthagenæ, for the purpose of rejoining lord Wellington's grand army by sea.

Whilst the events of Valentia covered with shame a commander, who, till then, had deserved general esteem, fortune, always fickle, afforded colonel Skerret a favourable opportunity of repairing, in the most brilliant manner, the

fault of not having landed at Tarragona the day before that town was stormed by the French, under Suchet. Sensible of the advantages, which he should derive from the occupation of Tariffa, by obtaining a free communication with Africa, marshal Soult had ordered marshal Victor, in the middle of December, to detach a corps of ten thousand men to take possession of that town. On the twentieth of December, general Leval, who was entrusted with this expedition, invested Tariffa on the land side, the other being the exclusive domain of the allies. The garrison consisted of one thousand English troops, and about the same number of Spaniards. On the twenty-fifth the trenches were opened at one hundred and twenty fathoms distance from the place. On the twenty-ninth the besiegers opened their batteries. The breach was judged practicable on the thirty-first, and at about eight o'clock in the morning, a strong column advanced towards it, in order to make the assault. It was composed of grenadiers and voltigeurs, the flower of the besieging army. In spite of a brisk fire by the besieged, the French boldly advanced to the foot of the breach. The firm appearance of the garrison, who fired almost close upon them, and a ditch that covered the breach, forced this column to retrograde with considerable loss. The allies, satisfied with having conquered, ceased their firing. To the honour of a glorious defence, colonel Skerret joined the generosity of granting an armistice, that the French might carry off the wounded left on the glacis. The besiegers continued the fire of their batteries till the fourth of January, 1812. Although they had succeeded in widening the breach of the thirty-first of December, they did not attempt to contend again with the garrison, who were awaiting them with intrepidity. In the night of the fourth to the fifth, the French retreated in silence, leaving behind them part of their artillery, with all the implements and tools for a siege.

This success must have caused colonel Skerret the most lively regret, at not having landed at Tarragona, there to

have given marshal Suchet a lesson of moderation, like that which he had just given to general Leval. It must, however, be acknowledged, that marshal Soult selected a very improper time, viz. the middle of the winter, for undertaking the siege of Tariffa. The engineers, besides, proceeded, as they had done at Saint Jean-d'Acre, against all the rules of art. They contented themselves with establishing one parallel, to cover the construction of the batteries. The column, destined to make the assault, was obliged to issue from this parallel; and thus to march, uncovered, and at noon day, under a very murderous fire, to arrive at the breach, where, independently of the English bayonets, a ditch, which they had neglected to reconnoitre, retarded their march, and rendered the attack very sanguinary. How could Buonaparte leave such gross faults unpunished? General Leval, little acquainted with fortification, relied on his engineer-in-chief, who, either to spare his labourers the dangers of regular approaches, or because he supposed the breach would be badly defended by the garrison, advised an absurd manœuvre; for the result of which (the loss of a number of brave men) he ought to have been made personally responsible. Soldiers are the children of the country. Whoever causes their useless destruction, either from ignorance or negligence, ought to be amenable to the "lex talionis." This grand principle is at once the sole guarantee of an honourable fate for the individuals of all ranks, and the first safeguard of the glory of empires.

The movement of the English general Hill towards Seville, afforded an additional motive for the raising of the siege of Tariffa. On the twenty-seventh of December, this general left the environs of Portalagre, in the expectation of surprising the French at Merida. His advanced-guard happened to fall in with a party of French marauders, who, having collected, formed a square, and, owing to the nature of the ground and to the rapidity of their march, succeeded in re-entering Merida, before they could be attacked by the En-

lish infantry. The French general did not deem it prudent to await the English in his position. He retreated by Almen-dralejo to Lerena, where general Drouet was stationed with the greatest part of the fifth corps. General Hill was at Al-mendralejo on the second of January, 1812. He sent a strong detachment to reconnoitre as far as Los Santos. Lieutenant-colonel Abercrombie, by whom this detachment was commanded, completely defeated a party of one hundred French horse. This slight advantage of the English on the third, made the French apprehensive of a serious attack. Marshal Soult, being resolved to concentrate his troops, with a view of protecting his principal positions, ordered marshal Victor to call general Leval back. Satisfied with having created an alarm in the French cantonments, general Hill returned to his former quarters, on the frontiers of Portugal.

This harassing system against the French to the south of Estremadura, had probably no other object than to make marshal Marmont believe that lord Wellington had many troops on the left of the Tagus, thereby inducing him not to harbour any apprehensions respecting Ciudad-Rodrigo, the possession of which was coveted by the English commander. Marmont's security was, besides, increased by the facility with which the blockade of that place had been raised three months before, through the bare junction of four of his divisions with general Dorsenne's army; a manœuvre, which he might repeat at any time, and with a probability of an equally favourable result. He not only quartered his army in very extensive cantonments, but also detached general Montbrun with three divisions, to second the operations of marshal Suchet in the kingdom of Valentia. Intimately acquainted with all these details, lord Wellington arrived on the eighth of January before Ciudad-Rodrigo; which place was completely invested on the same day. On the ninth general Crawford carried the redoubt of St. Francis, at the point of the bayonet. The possession

of this post facilitated the progress of the attacks. Though the works had not yet been pushed to the foot of the breach, the weakness of the garrison determined the English general to take the place by storming and scaling it at the same time. On the nineteenth, six columns marched against Ciudad-Rodrigo, and succeeded in obtaining possession of it in less than two hours. These different movements were executed by the aid of night. General Mackinnon, who commanded the column destined to storm, perished with many of his brave soldiers, through the explosion of a mine. The scaling proved less fatal, because the French, not expecting such an attempt, were taken unawares.— They employed almost all their means of defence to protect the breach. It is surprising that lord Wellington, who hitherto had directed this important operation so well, was not sensible that he ought only to have made a false attack on the best defended point, as the scaling alone promised the possession of the place without much loss. Every thing induces the belief that the inhabitants had informed the English how easily they might become masters of the town; they perhaps even did not remain idle in their houses, when the allies attacked the French on the ramparts. The chances were, therefore, all in favour of the English general; and he might have taken the garrison by surprise, had he made his arrangements accordingly, on the very night after his arrival before Ciudad-Rodrigo.

The garrison, amounting to seventeen hundred men, surrendered at discretion. Their loss was equal to that of the allies, which was rated at one thousand killed or wounded. The governor Barrie did his duty. Ciudad-Rodrigo, to be safe against a “ coup de main,” requires five thousand troops: and there were hardly half the number when lord Wellington made his appearance. To this capital fault must be added that of not having detached a division to harass the allies, and oblige them to divide their forces. Nothing was more easy than to send such troops from the

tenth to the fifteenth, to take post between Marilla and Tamames, and exchange every day some cannon shot with the besiegers, until the French army was collected. This manœuvre, by diminishing the means of attack on the part of the allies, would have given hopes to the besieged of being soon relieved, and, the attempt at scaling being thus rendered more difficult, would probably have failed, like similar attempts against Badajoz in the month of June, 1811. Marshal Marmont is a very good artillery officer; but he is not sufficiently skilled in the higher tactics. On the sixteenth of January he wrote to Berthier:—"I had collected five divisions, for the purpose of throwing supplies into Ciudad-Rodrigo: but this force is now inadequate to the object. I am, therefore, under the necessity of recalling two divisions from the army of the north. I shall then have above sixty thousand men, with whom I shall march against the enemy. You may expect events as fortunate as glorious for the French army." But in spite of these flattering promises, marshal Marmont was obliged to write to prince Berthier on the twentieth: "On the sixteenth the English batteries opened their fire at a great distance. On the nineteenth the place was taken by storm, and fell into the power of the enemy. There is something so incomprehensible in this event, that I allow myself no observation. I am not yet provided with the requisite information."

A town taken by storm is an argument easily understood by less sensible men than Marmont. But a tone of mystery was necessary to palliate gross faults, arising from the most fatal security. When Buonaparte heard this intelligence, he immediately perceived that his ancient aid-de-camp was incapable of successfully holding the important command entrusted to him.

Satisfied with having taught Marmont that he surpassed him in activity and boldness, the English commander resumed his position of Fonte-Guinaldo. He might easily

have carried off the French advanced guard, which, on the twenty-second, made its appearance near Tamames. The enterprise was favoured by the occupation of Ciudad-Rodrigo, as the detachment, entrusted with the operation, would have had a safe retreat under the cannon of that town. Fifteen thousand choice men ought to have been placed in ambush on the road to Salamanca. A corps of four or five thousand light troops should have marched against the French, with orders to fall back, at their approach. These light troops, when near the ambush, would have hastened their retreat in apparent confusion, which would have induced the French to be more eager in their pursuit. The concealed soldiers, then rushing from the ambush, would have fallen upon the rear of the French column, and infallibly destroyed it. General Souham's division, which appeared on the twenty-second in the vicinity of Tamames, amounted only to ten thousand men. It is by manœuvres like the one here described, that the forces of an enemy are ruined, without experiencing the enormous losses occasioned by sieges and battles.

Lord Wellington must also be blamed for having allowed generals to place themselves at the head of their columns, in the attack of Ciudad-Rodrigo. A general officer is extremely valuable, especially when he is skilled in his profession. General Crawford possessed the qualities requisite for a command in chief; whilst, at the head of a storming column, his thin person, and diminutive size, rendered him inferior to a grenadier. Captains, or lieutenant-colonels at most, ought to be charged with heading such attacks, which are always destructive, though often fruitless. Generals and colonels ought to be reserved for operations, requiring the talents which their situations demand, or suppose. General Crawford had been personally known in Ireland, in the year 1798, to the author of this history; who entirely agrees with lord Wellington in the sentiment, which his lordship has so well expressed in his letter to the earl of

Liverpool, dated Gallegos, the twenty-ninth of January, 1812, when he says, that major-general Crawford died on the twenty-fourth of the month, from the wounds which he received on the nineteenth, when leading the light division of the army at the storming of Ciudad-Rodrigo; that although the conduct of general Crawford, on the occasion wherein he was wounded, excited the admiration of the whole army, yet he cannot report the death of this officer, without expressing the profound grief which he feels on seeing his majesty lose the services, and himself the assistance, of an officer of tried talents and consummate experience, who was the ornament of his profession, and calculated to render the most important services to his country. It is the duty of a chief to preserve his soldiers; it is his interest to be sparing of the blood of his generals. Lord Wellington must, no doubt, have set the highest value upon Ciudad-Rodrigo, as its conquest cost the life of one of his ablest colleagues.

The French had been obliged to evacuate the Asturias, and part of the kingdom of Leon, in order to collect forces, sufficient to succour Ciudad-Rodrigo. Their retreat was rather precipitate; and yet the Spaniards did not avail themselves of it. That this part of Spain, formerly so active and so obstinate in opposing the French, acted, ever since La Romana's death, with a faint-heartedness, unworthy both of its numerous and warlike population, and of its constant hatred towards the French, is really surprising. This apathy cannot be accounted for, but as the result of intrigues on the part of Buonaparte's secret agents. The marquesito, and generals Mendizabal and Abadia, were men of equal merit with the baron d'Eroles, Lascey, and Revira, the leaders of the insurrection in Catalonia. Why had not the inhabitants of Galicia, where there was not a single Frenchman in arms, a body of fifty thousand well organized and disciplined troops on their frontiers, ready to avail themselves of the advantage gained by the grand allied army?

What a difference between this supineness of the Galicians, and the energy of the Catalonians! During the siege of Valentia, general Lasoy and the baron d'Eroles marched against Tarragona, at the head of ten thousand men. Their attack was favoured by an English squadron cruising in that quarter. On the twenty-fourth of January, ten thousand French attacked the Spaniards, who, at their approach, had raised the blockade of Tarragona, to give them battle. The conflict took place on the heights of Altafalla, to the north of Tarragona. Although the French were equal in numbers to the Spaniards, victory long remained doubtful; and was only due at last to the superiority of the French cavalry. The Catalonians effected their retreat through the mountains, towards Cervera, with little loss.

From the twentieth to the thirtieth of January, general Decaen manœuvred against Sarsfield's and Revira's columns, in the neighbourhood of Vique and Mapresa. This petty warfare was confined to some skirmishes, in which the inhabitants, from their agility, and knowledge of the country, had constantly the advantage. The Spanish leaders did not deem themselves strong enough for a general engagement; and kept their columns untouched. This situation of affairs in Catalonia rendered the arrival of general Blake, in that province, extremely seasonable. This general had shown, by supplying Gerona, in August, 1809, his great experience in the warfare of mountainous countries. He, moreover, enjoyed the confidence of the inhabitants. All these advantages leave no doubt but that he would have forced the French general to retreat, with the wreck of his army, under the ramparts of Perpignan; and had it not been for his influence, the magistrates of Valentia would have agreed to a capitulation, humiliating enough in itself, but to which the conqueror did not intend to adhere, when he signed it.

How could Buonaparte hope for the submission of Spain, when he suffered the most arbitrary measures to be adopted

by almost all his agents? By the second article of the capitulation of Valentia, marshal Suchet had solemnly promised "that no inquiries concerning the past should be made against those, who had taken an active part either in the war, or in the revolution;" and yet an official report, of the twenty-fourth of January, states that "fifteen hundred infuriated monks have been arrested, and sent to France. The leaders of the insurrection, who frequented the house of the English consul, as well as the satellites of that wretch, have been executed in the market-place, to the great satisfaction of the good inhabitants who had no share in the assassination of the French." But the transgressions, alluded to by marshal Suchet, had occurred during the revolution; and the guilty had been absolved by the capitulation.

The well-known loyalty of the French character ought to have prevented any recrimination for the past. But it was the practice of the lieutenants of Buonaparte, formed in his school, especially of those who shared his first campaigns in Italy, to be preceded by captivating proclamations, promising liberty, justice, and the respect of property. If well received, they immediately threw away the mask: all the services, which the inhabitants had been eager to render, were forgotten; and they drained the country with unparalleled address and severity, under the specious pretence of maintaining their armies, which, nevertheless, were in want of every thing. This observation, however, is not applicable to Suchet's conduct, for his army was constantly well supplied: but he must be blamed for not scrupulously observing the capitulation of Valentia. To reward his successes against general Blake, and his political measures against the inhabitants of Valentia, he was created duke of Albufera. He was, no doubt, afraid of not being thought the sole author of the conquest of Valentia, when he published that "general Montbrun had been very tardy in his march with the divisions of the army of Portugal. Had he

arrived at the appointed time, all that escaped of the army of Murcia would have been taken." Suchet's glory had no need of this attack upon the reputation of a brave man.

Montbrun is an excellent cavalry officer in the field of battle; but he was incapable of making any use of the three divisions of infantry, which he was to lead to Valencia, and he was delayed on his march by a counter order. He arrived at Alcañiz on the eleventh of January. Valencia had already capitulated; and anxious to display his abilities as a commander-in-chief, he marched against Alicante. He met with several hordes of Spanish peasants, whom his choice troops easily dispersed. On arriving before Alicante, he threw some shells into the town, in order to alarm the garrison and inhabitants. The governor, being summoned to surrender, replied with much firmness; although Montbrun was not ashamed of solemnly assuring him, "that he was followed by marshal Suchet, with his whole army and heavy artillery." But general Antonio de la Cruz was not the dupe of so clumsy a stratagem; since, far from inducing him to surrender to a cavalry officer, the assertion was better calculated to make him wait until the place should have had the honour of being besieged by a marshal of France "with his heavy artillery." Montbrun deserved this mortification, particularly as he had been warned by marshal Suchet that the time was not yet come to march against Alicante, a well fortified town, which required battering ordnance. At length, being sensible of the inconvenience of his absence from the army of Portugal, he resumed his march to the Tagus, which he should have done a few days sooner. He rejoined Marmont on the twenty-fifth of January, with the triple regret of not having contributed to the conquest of Valencia, of having failed before Alicante, and of not having arrived in time enough to save Ciudad- Rodrigo.

A short time after, marshal Suchet detached general Harispe, with one division, to obstruct the garrison of Ali-

cant, in their attempts to push parties far into the country. This general sent an officer under pretence of summoning the place, but, in fact, to reconnoitre the fortifications, and approaches of the town; for officers, entrusted with such errands, are frequently no better than honourable spies whom an able general often employs with success. The governor returned general Harispe the same answer as he had given to Montbrun. Another ostensible motive for sending a French officer into the town, concerned the exchange of the Spaniards, taken prisoners at Valencia, for about two thousand French that were at Alicant. This exchange had been agreed upon between Blake and Suchet. But the governor replied: "that he could not obey general Blake's orders, when he had lost his authority." Suchet, however, proved more fortunate at Peniscola. The governor surrendered that fortress on the fourth of February. He even claimed some merit for his cowardice, by saying: "that he had means to resist for two months, and that he had refused to admit the English, who offered to occupy the place." The object of this boasting was merely to please Suchet; for had this governor been so favourable towards the French, why did he not surrender the town, when the troops, sent to blockade it, had taken a position to keep the garrison in awe during the month of September, 1811? It is highly ridiculous and uncandid in any man to boast of being the warm friend of a cause that he opposed, when he might have espoused it without danger, and rendered it the greatest services.

Had the English offered to occupy Peniscola, before the conquest of Valencia, they would have been received with open arms, as at Tarifa; and the national enthusiasm renders it probable, that the governor would have paid for their non-admission with his head. The loss of the place must be attributed solely to the supineness of the higher powers, who were not sensible of the importance of this post for the correspondence with the guerrillas of Castile and

Arragon. Five hundred English, and a few gun-boats, would have been sufficient to preserve this little Gibraltar. From the moment that Spain was invaded by the French, the supreme junta ought to have requested the English government to take under its immediate protection, with its land and naval forces, all the fortified points on the coast, communicating with the ships of war; so as to be effectually defended by them. Nay, more, the English government ought to have required it as indispensable, towards the success of the general offensive and defensive system, to be adopted for the deliverance of the peninsula.

The advantages gained by the allies, over marshal Soult, made them forget the reverses suffered in the kingdom of Valentia. On the sixteenth of February, Ballasteros attacked the French general, Maransin, near Cartama. The conflict was extremely obstinate, and lasted three hours. The numbers were three thousand on each side. The nature of the ground having favoured the movements of the Spaniards, they sent the choicest troops of their column against the French on the left, who fell back, and hurried the remainder of the line away in their flight. The French were pursued as far as Malaga. This advantage was but the prelude to one of the most astonishing exploits mentioned in history, the storming of Badajoz. The allies left their position near Almeida in the early part of March. Lord Wellington set out from Frenada on the sixth, and arrived on the eleventh at Elvas. His lordship invested Badajoz on the sixteenth, and the trenches were opened in the night of the seventeenth to the eighteenth. General Graham was ordered to Santa-Martha, with a corps of observation, to cover the operations of the siege against the troops that might come from Andalusia. General Hill was detached with two divisions to Merida, in order to watch the movements of the French in that quarter. The French general Drouet, was stationed at Villa-Franca. Threatened on his front by general Graham, and on his right by general Hill, he might

easily have been carried off by forces so superior. The allies, however, made no attempt against him. But as he wished to keep up his communication with general Darian, who was posted at La Serena, and hearing that Merida had been occupied by general Hill, he thought his position dangerous, and fell back to Hornachos, by Puebla-del-Prior.

On the nineteenth, the garrison of Badajoz made a sortie, with two thousand men, on the right of the works. The besiegers were on their guard: they received the French at the point of the bayonet, and forced them back to the place. On the twenty-sixth, lord Wellington ordered fort La Picurina to be warmly cannonaded. The occupation of that fort was necessary to facilitate his approach towards the body of the place. As soon, therefore, as the artillery had damaged the palisadoes, this work was carried, sword in hand, by five hundred choice troops. General Philippon, the governor of Badajoz, being alarmed at an event, by which his means of resistance were considerably diminished, made immediately a strong sortie to recover La Picurina. But his movement had been foreseen. The French were repulsed and the English occupied the fort. This advantage caused the second parallel to be constructed, with scarcely any loss. The attack was confined to the front, formed by the bastions, La Trinidad and Santa-Maria.

Three breaches appeared practicable on the sixth of April; and general Picton was ordered to scale the castle, situated on the right of the attack, near the Guadiana. Two divisions were to give the assault by the three breaches. Several false attacks were ordered against fort Pardallay, fort San Christoval, and other works, on both banks of the Guadiana. All the columns began moving at ten o'clock at night. This bold enterprize was crowned with the most complete success, except on the breaches, where the most heroic intrepidity was paralysed by the resources of art. The English general committed here the same fault as at the capture of Ciudad-Rodrigo. As the approach of the re-

lieving army, under the command of marshal Soult, did not leave him time for a regular establishment at the foot of the breaches, he should have made only feints on those points, in order not to expose the flower of his troops to a certain and useless death. The success of general Pieten's attack was sufficient to take possession of Badajoz.

The inconveniences, attendant on the storming of a place in the night, have already been stated by the author, in his "Reflections on the siege of Badajoz in 1811." The opinion of the celebrated Vauban coincides with his own. When this great engineer was besieging Valenciennes, he proposed to Louis XIV, that the assault should be made at noon. The French marshals protested against the measure, pretending that night was more favourable. Vauban persisted. "You wish," observed he, "to spare the blood of the soldiers. You will spare it much better when they fight by day-light, without confusion, and without tumult. We want to surprise the enemy. They always expect to be attacked by night. We shall surprise them much more effectually, when, exhausted with the fatigues of their night watch, they will be under the necessity of encountering our troops refreshed, and proud to fight under the eyes of their king. Night favours the coward, and is attended with the danger of one part of our troops firing upon the other; which indeed happens but too frequently." Louis XIV adopted Vauban's opinion, in spite of the opposition made by marshals de Schomberg, de Luxembourg, de Lorge, d'Humieres, and de la Feuillade, and the minister Louvois, who were all present at the council of war. Valenciennes was taken by storm on the seventeenth of March; and its garrison, amounting to four thousand men, obliged to surrender at discretion. This conquest, one of the most brilliant exploits of Louis XIV cost him but forty men. The loss of the allies at Badajoz, on the sixth of April, amounted to about four thousand, killed or wounded; yet it may still be regarded as small, considering the nature and number of

the attacks. It would even have proved more considerable had the works of the siege been carried on to the body of the place. In 1695, the prince of Orange lost twenty thousand men at the siege of Namur, and marshal Boufflers, who commanded in the place, had ten thousand killed or wounded. Lord Wellington is far from meriting any blame, with respect to the loss which he suffered: but had he availed himself of every favourable circumstance, he would have obtained the same result at a much cheaper rate. It is not the wish of the author to indulge in any evil-minded censure: but the just severity of the historian does not share in the enthusiasm of periodical publications; and the splendour of a victory ought not to absorb the errors committed in gaining it. Wo to those that insult the writer, whom the love of truth prompts to tell ministers and warriors what sooner or later may be conducive to their individual glory, and to the prosperity of the state!

Marshal Soult was under no apprehensions for Badajoz. Philippon's fine defence of the preceding year, a garrison of five thousand men, and the construction of several out-works, seemed to justify his confidence. The place was supplied with provisions for two months. But he must have been acquainted with lord Wellington's designs upon Badajoz, on the seventeenth or eighteenth of March; and it required only six days to assemble the troops, necessary for the relief of the place. Instead of leaving Seville on the first of April, he ought to have begun his movement on the twenty-fifth of March; in which case, he would have reached Villa-Franca on the second of April, whereas he arrived there only on the eighth, two days after the English had triumphed over both the prodigious exertions of a choice garrison, and the scientific calculations of Buonaparte's ablest lieutenant. Marshal Soult's mortification must have been at its utmost height, when he learned the fate of general Philippon, whose conduct most certainly is above all well-founded reproach. This officer, on the contrary, might

have complained that Soult had not given him a garrison of eight thousand men, such as a place of the extent of Badajoz required.

General Lery, engineer-in-chief to the army of the south, wrote to general Kellerman respecting the loss of this place:—"The conquest of Badajoz costs me eight engineers. I am not yet acquainted with the details of that fatal event. Never was there a place in a better state, better supplied, and better provided with the requisite number of troops. . . . There is, in that event, a marked fatality. . . . I confess my inability to account for its bad defence. . . . Very extensive works have been constructed. All our calculations have been disappointed. The army of Portugal withdrew to a greater distance from us, when it ought to have drawn nearer; and thus lord Wellington, with his Anglo-Portuguese troops, has taken the place, as it were, in presence of two armies, amounting together to about eighty thousand men. This is the consequence of not having a supreme chief on the spot, to direct the movements. . . . In short, I think the capture of Badajoz a very extraordinary event, and I should be much at a loss to account for it in a clear and distinct manner."

This letter contains the highest eulogium on the operations of the allies, by an officer of very great merit. He is, however, mistaken respecting the garrison, which did not consist of the requisite number of troops, especially after very extensive works had been constructed; whilst before those additional works, when marshal Soult took the place from the Spaniards, the garrison amounted to above nine thousand men. The English general had ordered his two corps of observation to fall back, for the purpose of concentrating his troops, to be master of his movements, whatever might be the issue of the assault. The town being once taken, it would have been idle in lord Wellington to encounter Soult, and run the risk of affording him an opportunity to palliate the fault of not having relieved Bada-

joz, by the brilliant report of a sanguinary battle, which the superiority of his cavalry would have rendered as murderous and fruitless as that of Albuera. Sir Rowland Hill continued on the left of the Tagus, and the main part of the English army recrossed the river, to force Marmont's return into Spain.

Marshal Marmont's conduct, since lord Wellington's departure from the neighbourhood of Almeida, up to his return to that place, clearly shows that he was not sorry for Soult having in his turn been taught a lesson of vigilance. On the tenth of March, the English army was rapidly moving towards the south of Portugal. Marmont might have been on the Agueda on the fifteenth. He only reached that river towards the latter end of the month. On the third of April, he reconnoitred Almeida. On the seventh, he moved with several divisions towards Sabugal. His advanced guard entered Castello-Branco on the twelfth, and fell back on the fourteenth, having heard of lord Wellington's approach. Marmont recrossed the Agueda on the twenty-third. He had gained some trifling advantages over the militias, and foraged the country on the eastern boundaries of Portugal. He suffered a fine opportunity to escape for repairing the fault which he had committed, by not relieving Ciudad-Rodrigo. Had he attacked that place about the fifteenth of March, as he might easily have done, he would have obtained possession of it by the tenth or twelfth of April, and indemnified Bounaparte for the loss of Badajoz, which certainly gave great dissatisfaction to the cabinet of the Thuilleries. A masterly general, instead of carrying desolation into the hamlets and cottages of Portugal, would have left a corps of twenty thousand men on the Agueda. Half of these troops would have laid siege to Ciudad-Rodrigo; and the other half would have taken a position, to cover the operations of the besiegers. With the remainder of his army, amounting to about forty thousand men, a good general would have marched to Merida, or Almaraz. On

the first of April he would have effected his junction with marshal Soult, who was coming from Seville with about forty thousand men, and their joint marching to Badajoz would have forced the English to give up their designs upon that place, as it had done in 1811. It really is as mortifying to the French generals, as it is glorious to the English commander, that an army of fifty thousand men, should, by the ability and boldness of its manœuvres, have been enabled to take two strong places, the reputed keys of Spain on the side of Portugal, in spite of their being protected by two French armies, amounting together to at least eighty thousand men under arms. The conduct of marshal Marmont excites, indeed, little surprise; but it is difficult to conceive why marshal Soult, so distinguished for twenty years of services, as useful as brilliant, suffered Badajoz to be taken without opposition. If Marmont's jealousy operated so as to keep back assistance, and the inadequacy of his own troops made him afraid of being unable to oppose the fall of that place, he ought to have blown up its fortifications, after having evacuated it, and have kept only a flying camp in Estremadura.

During marshal Soult's absence, the count of Penne-Villemur, who had been detached from the fifth Spanish army, left the county of Niebla, and approached Seville on the fifth of April. For several days he had frequent skirmishes with the French garrison. Lord Wellington, in his letter, dated Nizza, the eighteenth of April, informs the earl of Liverpool, that the Spanish general Penne-Villemur had advanced to Seville by the right banks of the Guadalquivir; that on the fifth he had engaged the garrison of Seville, and the fortified convents on the banks of the river, and that he had forced them to withdraw within their works. He continues to state that the count of Penne-Villemur retreated on the tenth, upon the information which his lordship gave when Badajoz fell, and upon a conviction that marshal Soult would immediately return to Andalusia,

without risking a battle, to which it was not in the English commander's power to bring him. Lord Wellington expressed a hope that the count of Penne-Villemur had informed general Ballasteros of these circumstances, with which he was desirous that the latter should be acquainted. The French general had been under the necessity of leaving only the number of troops absolutely necessary for the defence of the immense magazines of Seville. General Ballasteros had completely defeated the garrison of Malaga on the sixteenth of February; and from the very beginning of the siege of Badajoz, he must have been requested to be doubly active, in order to diminish, as much as possible, the forces destined for the relief of that place; and yet he neglected such a capital opportunity of destroying the French establishments at Seville. His junction with count Penne-Villemur would have roused the energy of the numerous population of that city. Had he even occupied it only for twenty-four hours, that time would have been sufficient to deprive the French of their main resources.— Aware of the possibility of such an event, marshal Soult hastened back to Seville by forced marches. On the eleventh of April, the cavalry of his rear guard was attacked at Villa-Garcia by sir Stapleton Cotton, and pursued as far as Lerena. Their loss amounted only to about two hundred men *hors de combat*, because, on their reaching Lerena, they had the protection of a corps of ten thousand foot. The next day marshal Soult continued moving towards Andalusia: leaving general Drouet posted at Ovejuna, with his left at Guadalcanal, covering the road to Seville, and his right at Belalcazar, to protect Cordova, and the defiles of the Sierra-Morena.

Notwithstanding the numerous errors committed on both sides, the honour of the winter's campaign is due to the allies, although their faults surpassed those of the French. As they had seen lord Wellington always acting with the greatest circumspection at Busaco, at Torres-Vedras, at

Santarem, and at Fonte-Guinaldo, during the blockade of Ciudad-Rodrigo in 1811, Soult and Marmont were far from suspecting that the English commander, suddenly changing his method, would succeed in taking, nay, more, would even think of taking two well supplied and well defended places, in sight of those legions, so long the terror of the northern powers. With such soldiers as those, who, from their conquest of Badajoz, are all entitled to the appellation of heroes, the English commander might have obtained results, more conducive to the independance of the peninsula. Ciudad-Rodrigo and Badajoz would both have been retaken by the French, had marshal Soult, after having collected an army sufficiently strong to resist lord Wellington, thought it of importance for his designs to bring those two places back into his system of operations. A battle against Marmont offered a much more gratifying prospect. It would not have cost more than the two sieges. The absence of his cavalry, and of the three divisions, which had been marched to Alicant under Montbrun, secured a complete victory to the English. What immense benefits lord Wellington would have derived from a few campaigns under general Kleber! Had he possessed the advantage of improving the uncommon talents, with which nature has endowed him, in the school of a general of the first rank, as Marlborough did under Turenne, he would most certainly have equalled his master. He has acted occasionally, as if he were afraid of giving battle. When a commander has troops that are able to scale a fortress, he may dare any thing, with a certain prospect of victory. All the battles fought by his lordship were defensive. At Vimiera he was attacked by Junot; at Talavera, by Victor; at Busoca, and Fuente-de-Onora, by Massena. His engagements at Oporto against Soult; at Foz d'Aronce against Ney; and at Sabugal against Reynier, must have convinced him of the zeal, confidence, and attachment of the officers and soldiers of his army.

It would require a volume to give a detailed account of all the partial combats, fought at different points of Spain during the first four months of the year 1812, and especially during April. General Abadia marched a division of the army of Galicia into the kingdom of Leon. Don Julian Sanchez penetrated into Castile, and captured several convoys; Morillo advanced, for the purpose of reconnoitring, as far as the gates of Almagro in La Mancha; baron d'Eroles fought on the seventh of April against a division of the army of Catalonia, commanded by general Severoli, in the neighbourhood of Noguera; on the nineteenth Esposymina captured a considerable convoy destined for the sixtieth French regiment; on the twenty-first, general Lascey was blockading Tarragona, with six thousand Catalonians, and retired only because he was going to be attacked by a superior force, commanded by general Daccaen; and on the twenty-fifth the garrison of Alicant pursued general Harrispe, who, with his advanced-guard, had marched as far as the glaxis of that place. But the troops of Galicia, who had covered themselves with glory in many sanguinary battles, especially in that of Sanpayo, merely made their appearance in the kingdom of Leon, to parade and fall back without fighting, whilst the Empecinado, Mina, and Sanches, were performing prodigies of valour in the centre of the principal establishments of the French, with only a few hundred undisciplined peasants.

What, then, was general Abadia doing with an army that was asserted to amount to thirty thousand men, and that might have amounted to sixty thousand, had the plan, proposed for its formation, been adopted? In vain will it be said that he could not avail himself of lord Wellington's successes, because his resources were extremely limited; and nothing could be done without the pecuniary assistance of the English government. Such was not the language of the Catalonians; and had the soldiers of Castanos argued in that way, they would not have been crowned with the never-fa-

ding laurels of Andujar and Baylen, The inhabitants of the provinces of Spain never opposed the measures of their leaders, but the latter often did not act fairly towards the former, by neglecting to avail themselves of their disposition to engage the French. The great art of a good government is to make a proper choice of the public functionaries, entrusted with the execution of its orders. The errors of the junta, on so important a point, were soon corrected by the impartiality, discrimination, and energy of the new regency. It was the only way of reaping some fruit from the torrents of blood that had already been shed to insure the triumph of the sacred cause of the Spaniards, whose joy was still more heightened, when they heard of the emperor Alexander's noble resolution to force France back to her natural limits. As Spain had paralysed the efforts of Buonaparte ever since the year 1808, what was there not to be hoped for from the intrepid conquerors of Darius and of Charles XII? From this instant the deliverance of Europe, and the triumph of its legitimate sovereigns, were foreseen by every enlightened observer. We shall now investigate how far lord Wellington justified this prediction, by his manœuvres on the Tagus, and in the vicinity of Salamanca.

BOOK VI.

LORD WELLINGTON's arrangements tended to persuade Marmont that the English army, after some days of rest in the neighbourhood of Fonte-Guinaldo, would cross the Agueda to give him battle. The French general accordingly kept the main part of his troops in cantonments on both banks of the Tormes, in the vicinity of Salamanca. He was far from supposing that the allies had any design upon his magazines at Almaraz, where he left but a feeble garrison. General Hill left Almendralego on the twelfth of May, 1812: on the nineteenth his troops scaled the works, which covered the bridge constructed at Almaraz, to keep the communication open between Marmont and Soult. The attack was made in three columns. The French attempted some resistance: but the firm appearance of the English, and the terror inspired by the memorable storming of Badajoz, made them seek safety in flight. The castle of Miravete, situated at the distance of one league from the bridge, commands the only practicable passage for artillery. This post, which was strongly fortified, and secure against a *coup de main*, deprived general Hill of the use of his guns, as well as the co-operation of the troops, left to keep the garrison of the castle in check. But in spite of these difficulties, he completely succeeded in an enterprise, which must have been called rash, had not lord Wellington been opposed by a too confident general. Almaraz is at a distance of above one hundred miles from Badajoz; it required therefore, a very fatiguing march of seven days before he could reach it. General Hill's forces did not exceed ten thousand men. The French general Drouet, at the head

of twenty thousand men, might in four days have cut off the retreat of the English, by taking a position at Torremocha, with his right at Arroyo-del Molinos, and his left at Caceres. A corps of light troops might have been detached towards Truxillo, to watch general Hill's march. Had this measure been conducted with ability, not one Englishman could have escaped. General Hill was as able as any one to appreciate the danger of his expedition, if the French availed themselves of it. He saw that he had not a moment to lose. He destroyed the bridge of Almaraz, damaged the works, spiked the guns, and rendered unserviceable the magazines and stores, which he could not carry away. On the twenty-first of May he was at Truxillo, which is forty miles from Almaraz. He had taken two hundred and fifty-nine prisoners; the rest of the garrison, which before the action amounted to about five hundred, had either perished or escaped.

The capture of Almaraz determined Marmont to manœuvre on his left. He sent a strong division to the left bank of the Tagus, with a view, no doubt, of protecting the reconstruction of the bridge. Marshal Soult also ordered Drouet to advance in the direction of Medelin, but with forces too feeble to make general Hill repent his bold enterprise. The French general Dorsenne, detached a division to maraud, on the frontiers of Galicia; after which excursion, these troops returned to the Asturias, and on the seventeenth of May occupied Oviedo and Gijon. The Spanish general Mendizabal took possession of Burgos, and forced the French garrison to shut themselves up in the castle. At Cadiz, marshal Victor was endeavouring to intimidate the inhabitants by causing shells to be thrown into the city from the batteries of Matagorda. General Ballasteros, still proud of his victory over Meransin, fancied himself strong enough to carry the position near Bornos, on the right banks of the Guadalete. This post had been selected by marshal Soult to cover the high road from Seville

to Cadiz. He had given the command of it to general Conroux, an excellent infantry officer. Ballasteros attacked the French on the first of June. General Conroux, who expected this attack, kept his troops collected in the camp, which he had secured against *a coup de main* by some redoubts. The Spaniards looked upon this manœuvre as a proof of the fears, which their attack caused to the French; and scattered themselves round the position. General Conroux then charged them with impetuosity, and put them to the rout. Ballasteros lost fifteen hundred killed or wounded, eighty of whom were officers. The Spanish general in his despatch to the governor of Gibraltar asserts: "that this was one of the fiercest engagements that had taken place since the beginning of the war." The assertion is rather against him: it tends to confirm a well known fact, the bravery of the Spaniards; but it also shows that they were badly commanded on that day. The Spaniards, as has been repeatedly observed, should have cautiously avoided an attack upon the French in an open country, unless they acted in a line with the English. It was in the beginning of April, when Soult had stripped Andalusia of almost all its troops, for the purpose of hastening to the relief of Badajoz, that Ballasteros should have marched to the plains of Seville. Instead of this, he waited till the French were returned from Estremadura, nay, more, till they were intrenched, before he came down from the mountains. His defeat could easily have been foreseen; even his retreat might have been cut off by the French division, which occupied Medina-Sidonia. As soon as he heard the cannon of Bornos, the French commander at Medina-Sidonia should have moved by Alcala de los Gazules to Ximena de la Frontera. Ballasteros, being by this manœuvre cut off from Gibraltar and Algeiras, would have learnt to his cost, that the only species of warfare to be employed against the French, "is to harass them." It was in consequence of having ably pursued this system, that Ambiorix caused the

Roman legions, commanded by Sabinus and Cotta, the lieutenants of Cæsar, to be cut to pieces in the neighbourhood of Liege.

The capture of Almaraz, and the combat of Bornos, had opened the campaign of 1812, which, properly speaking, was but the continuation of the operations of the allies since the siege of Ciudad-Rodrigo. Lord Wellington had rested his army during the months of April and May. From the first of January to this time, it had undergone a diminution of twenty thousand men, viz. ten thousand killed, wounded, and sick, and ten thousand employed to garrison both Ciudad-Rodrigo and Badajoz. The latter, it is true, were Spaniards partly sent from Cadiz: but the former were almost all English, and the flower of his troops. Reinforcements from England replaced this loss of the active army during his stay at Fonte-Guinaldo. Lord Wellington, therefore, acted wisely in assigning a defensive position to his fatigued troops, which were besides deficient in cavalry. As soon as he thought himself enabled to attack the French with the certain prospect of victory, he lost no time in commencing his operations. On the thirteenth of June his army crossed the Aqueda, and on the sixteenth it encamped six miles off Salamanca, on the brook called the Valmuza. A few French horse made their appearance, but retreated at the approach of the cavalry of the allies. Salamanca was evacuated by the French in the night of the sixteenth to the seventeenth: they left only eight hundred men in three different convents, which had been converted into forts, to serve as *depots* for clothing and stores. Their fire commanded the bridge over the Tormes. The allies forded this river on the seventeenth, and took possession of Salamanca. The joy of the inhabitants was extreme, on seeing themselves, after three long years of suffering, delivered from a foreign yoke, which is always odious to good citizens.

The forts were instantly invested by general Clinton's division, and the trenches opened the same night. Marmont had gone to meet his reinforcements, by moving to the Douro. On the twentieth he retraced his steps, fancying himself strong enough to force the allies to evacuate Salamanca. He found lord Wellington near Morisco, on the road to Valladolid. The right wing of the army was at Morisco, the centre and the left wing occupied the heights in the direction of Vilarez. The whole day of the twenty-first passed in unimportant skirmishes. On the twenty-second, Marmont manœuvred to turn lord Wellington's right. General Graham, who commanded at that point, frustrated Marmont's designs by a well-combined attack, which forced him to fall back upon his army. The next morning the French occupied Cabeza Velloso with their right, and Aldea-Rubbia with their centre, while their left rested on the Tormes, near Huerta. As the Tormes is fordable, Marmont might rapidly have crossed it with the flower of his troops, and released the garrisons of the forts. To obviate this inconvenience, the commander of the allies changed his front, advancing his left wing; and part of the right was stationed on the left bank of the Tormes. This movement was executed just in time to oppose Marmont, who, at two o'clock in the morning of the twenty-fourth, crossed the river, as had been foreseen by lord Wellington. General Graham was again ordered to observe the French marshal, who, seeing the allies before hand with him at every point, despaired of saving the troops, which he had imprudently left in the forts of Salamanca. He recrossed the Tormes, continued in the neighbourhood of Huerta till the twenty-seventh, and retreated to the Douro.

The siege of the forts proceeded but slowly, because the allies wanted the necessary implements and ammunition. On the twenty-third, general Bowes was ordered to carry fort Sancayetano at the point of the sword: he was wounded in the very beginning of the action, but he had his wound

dressed, and returned immediately to head his brigade in a fresh attack, when he met with an honourable but unprofitable death. It is needless to repeat how essential it is to be sparing as to the life of soldiers, and especially of generals. The arrival of ammunition having enabled the besiegers to keep up a brisk fire against the forts, the breaches were found practicable on the twenty-seventh. La Merced and Saneayetano were carried by storm, and Sanvincente capitulated. These works had been constructed with the greatest care. No expense had been spared to render Salamanca a military post, safe against attacks from without, and capable of keeping the population in check, whenever a great part of the troops might be removed for warlike purposes. The allied army marched on the twenty-eighth in the direction of Valladolid. Whither, then, it may be justly asked, was Lord Wellington marching? Instead of going to seek Marmont, when the latter was in strong positions covered by the Douro, why did his lordship not attack him on the twenty-fourth of June, when the French general had so foolishly ventured to the left bank of the Tormes? To say that his lordship was besieging the forts of Salamanca, is an idle answer. Eight hundred men might have been kept in check by an equal number, nay, by the population of Salamanca alone, and the whole allied army might have been employed against the French, whose unpardonable fault of crossing and recrossing the Tormes, as it were, under the cannon of the allies, was left unpunished.

Lord Wellington soon perceived his error. The difficulty of crossing a river like the Douro, was increased by the works, which the French had constructed to intrench themselves in strong positions on the right of that river. They had, besides, received additional forces by the arrival of divisions from Navarra and the Asturias. His lordship, in a letter dated Rueda, the seventh of July, observed that he had moved his left forward as far as Pollos, near the ford

of the Douro, opposite which the enemy occupied a strong position on the heights commanding the plain, where he would have deployed the army, after having forded the river; and that being unable to establish the army on the right of the Douro, before he had the means of crossing that river, he had not thought it convenient to march his troops further in advance. The greatest generals have at all times committed faults, and it is their ability in repairing them, which has handed them down to posterity as men, who astonished the world by superior talents, the sole and immutable foundation of true glory. When Lord Wellington had well weighed the inconveniences and advantages of the passage of the Douro, he renounced it altogether; he even removed the cantonments of his reserve to some distance from his first line, that he might have more liberty for the movements which he intended to make, whenever Marmont should pass the Douro, and offer him battle. The allies had no means to cross the Douro; and if marshal Marmont had not passed it, the French would not have neglected to lampoon the general, who, having advanced first from Fonte-Guinaldo, and afterwards from Salamanca, continued on the Douro, or retreated, without any ostensible motive; he would have been compared to Massena, looking at, and flying from the lines of Torres-Vedras. Marmont's sanguine disposition rendered an essential service to lord Wellington. On the sixteenth of July, the French general concentrated his army near St. Roman, whilst his advanced-guard was passing the Douro, ~~and~~ the bridge at Toro. The commander of the allies was, however, not duped, though he feigned a movement of his main body in that direction. But instead of marching against the French advanced-guard, he took a strong position on the Guarena, a river which runs by Canizal, and falls into the Douro near Toro.

The French retreated from Toro on the night of the sixteenth, and on the seventeenth, they passed the Douro,

over the bridge at Tordesillas. After having performed a march of more than forty miles, they took a position at Nava-del-Rey, on the same day. On the eighteenth, Marmont attacked sir Stapleton Cotton, at Castrejohn. The English retreated in good order to the Guarena; and their retrograde movement was protected by a strong column of cavalry, which lord Wellington sent very seasonably. Had it not been for this timely succour, the infantry of sir Stapleton Cotton's detachment must have suffered very considerably, having to struggle against the whole French army. Lord Wellington may indeed be blamed for having kept sir Stapleton Cotton's corps at too great a distance from the main army. Opposed to an abler general than Marmont, that corps would have been roughly handled, in spite of the celerity and sagacity of lord Wellington's measures to repair his mistake. Encouraged by the retreat of the English advanced-guard, the French crossed the Guarena at Carteilo, to attack the left of the allies. General Clausel, who commanded the attacking column, was received at the point of the bayonet by general Cole's division, and obliged to fall back, with the loss of six hundred men, of whom two hundred and forty were taken prisoners. The allies lost nearly the same number, fifty-four of whom were prisoners. On the nineteenth, Marmont fell back on his right, and moved his left forward, making demonstrations against the right of the allies. Lord Wellington judged the moment favourable for giving battle. He moved his army to the right bank of the Guarena, on the morning of the twentieth, and stationed it in the plain of Valesa. Marmont was somewhat confounded at the commanding attitude of the allies. He refused battle; and manœuvred again on his left, along the heights which border the Guarena. He crossed that river near Cantalapiedra, and encamped with his right at Villamedia, and the left at Babila-Fuente. The allies followed this movement; and in order to be able to fight whenever a favourable opportunity should offer,

lord Wellington concentrated his whole army near Cabesa-Villosa: He placed a corps of observation at Aldea-Lingua, on the Tormes, to cover the right of his position. On the twenty-first, Marmont crossed the Tormes, and stationed himself on the heights of Calbarasa-de-Ariba, occupying the road from Salamanca to Ciudad-Rodrigo with his left. It was this highly presumptuous position, which caused the loss of the battle of Salamanca. How could Marmont be so inconsistent as to seize the line of operations of an army, that had offered him battle two days before in the plains of Valesa?

Lord Wellington had not for a single moment lost sight of his opponent: he had crossed the Tormes almost at the same time as Marmont. The advanced posts of the two armies began the action on the twenty-second, by the attack of two hills called Los-Arapiles, on the right of the position of the allies. The French remained masters of the most distant of these hills, their attack having been favoured by the nature of the ground, which concealed the march of the troops; and the great superiority of their numbers having rendered the resistance of the allies useless. Lord Wellington's situation became critical through the loss of that post; for had he been defeated, he would have been obliged to defile under the artillery and musketry of the troops stationed on that height, which fully commanded the high road to Ciudad-Rodrigo. Wishing to leave nothing dubious that could be guarded against, his lordship manœuvred with the greatest caution, as if a Conde or a Turenne had been before him. He extended the right of the army to the heights, in the rear of the village of Arapiles, where he stationed general Cole's division, and summoned some troops to the left of the Tormes, which had remained on the right, to observe a French corps posted at Babila-Fuente. It has even been asserted that his lordship had given orders to retreat to Ciudad-Rodrigo, and that the battle would not have taken place, had not Marmont possessed himself

of the high road. The assertion, however, appears fully contradicted by the manœuvres of the preceding days.

Towards two o'clock in the afternoon, Massmont opened a very brisk fire of artillery on the allies. He extended his left, and advanced a strong column to destroy that of the two Arapiles, occupied by the allies. General Packenham was ordered to turn the left wing of the French, whilst it was attacked in front by generals Bradford, Leith, Cole, and sir Stapleton Cotton, with generals Clinton, Hope, and don Carlos d'España acting as reserves. This attack had been so well combined, and was performed with so much ability on the part of the leaders, and so much bravery on the part of the troops, that the French were overthrown in all directions. General Pack was less fortunate. He could not obtain possession of the Arapiles, which were occupied by the French: but his attack had the good effect of keeping the French at that point, for, without this diversion, they might have taken general Cole's division in flank, while it was sustaining a dreadful conflict on the heights, which it had succeeded in carrying. It was then that sir Stapleton Cotton made a charge, as fortunate as brilliant, against a body of infantry, which was sent to pieces. The English lost in this attack general Le Merchant, who was killed on the spot. He was an excellent cavalry officer, who had always served with the most marked distinction, and his death was lamented by the whole army. General Cole was severely wounded, and obliged to quit the field of battle. His division, on being deprived of its worthy commander, was for a moment inclined to yield. Generals Beresford and Leith, who were to support it, were also wounded, and their troops deprived of their presence. The French redoubled their exertions to regain the ground which they had lost, and would perhaps have succeeded, had not general Clinton come up to the assistance of the fourth division, when the battle soon resumed the same aspect in favour of the allies. But the right of the French, which served as a

rallying point for the fugitives of the left and centre, still continued to resist.

Marshal Marmont had been wounded in the very beginning of the battle. A fragment of a shell broke his arm and one of his ribs, so that he was obliged to resign his command to general Clausel, a more experienced officer than himself. This change was very fortunate for the French army, as Marmont, had he not been wounded, would have persisted in retaining the position of his left, and the whole wing would have been forced to lay down their arms. Clausel could but partially repair the marshal's errors. He succeeded in rallying the left and the centre on his right. This manœuvre, performed in the presence of a victorious army, does great honour to general Clausel, who, by his coolness and presence of mind, saved the French from complete destruction. Though attacked on his right by the third and fourth division of the allies, and on his front by general Clinton, he did not quit the field of battle, but when he could do it under the cover of night. This rendered the pursuit difficult, and dangerous. General sir Stapleton Cotton was inadvertently wounded by one of his own soldiers. The advanced-guard of the allies crossed the Tormes on the twenty-third, and reached Clausel's rear-guard near the Serna, where the French cavalry abandoned the infantry. The latter, though attacked by victorious troops, opposed a vigorous resistance: but, forced to yield to numbers, they at length took to flight with great loss. The victory was chiefly the result of a charge of the German legion, commanded by general Boek, against the 69th French regiment, the squares of which were broken, and the men cut to pieces and dispersed. The loss of the allies on both days amounted to five thousand two hundred and twenty men *hors de combat*. That of the French was at least equally considerable in killed and wounded. They lost, moreover, from six to seven thousand prisoners, among whom there were one general, three colonels, three lieutenant-colonels, and

one hundred and thirty officers. The two armies were nearly equal in strength. They were rated at fifty thousand men each. Clausel had, therefore, thirty-six thousand men left, whom he led by forced marches towards Valladolid, through Penaranda, and Arevalo. He was joined in his retreat by some troops of the army of the north. The allies arrived at Olmedo on the twenty-eighth, and occupied Valladolid on the thirtieth. But they were unable to overtake the army of Portugal, which continued its retreat to Burgos.

Lord Wellington was, on the fourth of August, at Cuellar, cutting off the communications of the army of Portugal with that of the centre under the command of Joseph. Though this crowned general inspired no great terror, either by his troops, which did not amount to above twelve thousand, or by his talents, which had never yet been revealed, his lordship yet determined to pay him a visit in his capital, drive his new-fangled court towards Valentia, and afterwards march against the army of Portugal. King Joseph had left Madrid on the twenty-first of July, and marched by the Escorial to Alba-de-Tormes. He had already reached Blanco-Sancho, near Arevalo, when he learnt Marmont's defeat. On the twenty-sixth he retrograded as far as Espinar. Being ashamed to return to Madrid without having fought, he marched on his right to Segovia, where he arrived on the twenty-seventh. He wanted to make a diversion in favour of general Clausel, by drawing lord Wellington's attention upon himself. His lordship was, indeed, well convinced that the sad condition of Clausel's army, would not allow that general to resume the offensive for some time; he therefore left Cuellar on the sixth of August, took Segovia on the seventh, and arrived on the eighth at Saint Ildefonso, where he collected the troops destined for the attack of Madrid. The passage of the Guadarama, a lofty mountain, very easily defended, was not even disputed. The allies did not come in contact with

king Joseph's army, till they reached Majalahonda; where a wrong manœuvre of the Portuguese cavalry caused three pieces of artillery to fall into the hands of the French cavalry, which was about two thousand strong. The arrival of the English cavalry changed the face of affairs. The French evacuated Majalahonda, where the allies again found their three guns. On the twelfth day they entered Madrid. Joseph had left this city the day before, with his little army. He took a position on the left bank of the Tagus, with his right at Aranjuez, and his left in the direction of Toledo. He had committed the fault of leaving in the retiro a garrison of two thousand men, who capitulated on the twenty-fourth. What could have been his motive in abandoning these troops, at a time when soldiers were so invaluable to him? The retiro was commanded by a colonel, who begged to capitulate, without having opposed the slightest resistance. He was probably shown some ladders, and as his place was not so strong as Ciudad-Rodrigo and Badajoz, deemed it prudent not to expose himself to an assault. Lord Wellington granted him the honours of war, though he certainly was unworthy of them. That a commander should avail himself of the cowardice of an opponent is perfectly right; but it is painful to behold a brave man granting honourable treatment to a coward, whom he despises.

The allies found in Madrid, magazines of all kinds, about two hundred pieces of ordnance, nine hundred barrels of gunpowder, and twenty thousand muskets. As for the joy, which the occupation of Madrid by the allies occasioned in that capital, an eye-witness in a letter, dated the fourteenth of August, expresses himself thus on the subject: "At length we have reached the summit of our hopes and wishes. Lord Wellington entered this city on the twelfth instant. It is not in my power to give you an adequate idea of the enthusiasm, with which we have been received. . . . The whole population came to meet us with tears

of joy. Every individual, from the first to the last, embraced either the officer or the soldier, whom he could lay hold of, whilst we were marching. They invited us to their homes, and insisted upon our drinking wine with them almost at every corner of the streets. In the evening the ancient government, the cortes, and Ferdinand VII, were proclaimed anew in the midst of the acclamations of the whole town. : The soldiers of the Empecinado and del Medico appeared quite proud of parading in the streets of their capital. The illuminations were splendid, and consisted chiefly of torches placed on the balconies. All the palaces were hung on the outside with magnificent silk tapestry. It was indeed no small gratification for an Englishman to walk in the streets of Madrid, and to be saluted by the Spaniards as the deliverer of their country," &c.

The Madrid Gazette of the fourteenth of August, has the following article relative to the English: "Brave and generous allies, you have not met in Madrid with the pomp due to your triumphs: but the people have unbosomed their hearts to you; those hearts so constant in adversity, and as firm in their resolves, as tender and grateful." Political events are to the mass of the people, what winds are to the waves of the sea. The satisfaction of the Spaniards, which was unbounded, vanished, when lord Wellington solicited a loan of two millions of piastres. This request was rather in contradiction to the generous conduct of Great Britain, a country which always lent to its allies, and never required any subsidy. Was it becoming for the hero of Salamanca to raise contributions among those unfortunate Castilians, who, for nearly four years, had been reduced to the extremes of misery, and to the most frightful despair? This unreasonable demand cannot, after all, be attributed to lord Wellington. He probably yielded to the importunities of the Spanish leaders, who were in want of money.

The position, which Joseph occupied with his army on the Tagus, was about to be attacked by the allies, when his majesty, whose predominant virtue is prudence, evacuated Toledo on the sixteenth, and retreated by the road of Valentia, to join the reinforcements, which he had demanded of marshals Suchet and Soult. The latter, who possessed Buonaparte's entire confidence, refused to mangle his army. Marmont's reverse, and the conquest of Madrid, required the French troops to be concentrated, for the purpose of forcing the allies back to Portugal. Marshal Soult wrote to Joseph "that there was no way of preserving his kingdom, but by abandoning Andalusia for a time; and that accordingly he should march to Madrid by Granada, Murcia, and Sanelemente." The siege of Cadiz was raised on the twenty-fifth of August. The artillery had been rendered unserviceable, and the ammunition destroyed. Soult retreated in good order, under the protection of his whole cavalry. The Spaniards occupied Porto-Real, and Chiclana, on the same day. They displayed little energy in the pursuit of the French. In fact, they felt so happy in being delivered, that their joy absorbed all their faculties, and even paralyzed their desire of being revenged. Soult's rear-guard was left unmolested, except by colonel Skerret, who had so valiantly defended Tariffa. He consulted means with, or rather gave directions to general Cruz, to assist him in his intended attack of Seville. On the twenty-sixth the allies arrived from Castellajos, by the road of San-Lucar-La-Mayor near Triana, a suburb of Seville. The Spaniards suffered much in attacking a redoubt, which defended the approaches of the suburb. Colonel Skerret had it turned by the English foot guards. The French evacuated the suburb, and retreated to the town. They wished to defend the bridge; but they were again overthrown by the grenadiers of the English guards, and very closely pursued through the streets of Seville. They lost two hundred prisoners, and retreated by the road to Cordova. This expedition was so

well timed, that the rear-guard of the corps before Cadiz was obliged to march to Carmona by Utrera, in order to join the French army.

General Ballasteros pursued the column, which was retreating to Granada, by Antequera. He succeeded in obtaining possession of that town; and had another slight combat to sustain at Loya; but the delights of Granada appeared to impair that activity, of which he had given so many proofs. He ceased to harass the French army, when he might have done it most successfully, by marching his left flank to the east of the Sierra-Morena. As there could be no doubt of Soult's advancing to Madrid, Ballasteros, who had no enemy to encounter at Granada, ought to have rapidly moved to the left, during the march of the French towards Murcia, and taken a position on the Sierra de Alcazar. As the allies were advancing from Madrid, Joseph's army, which was at la Roda, would have been placed between two fires. It would have been forced to move towards Cuenca, and its march wished for junction with the army of the south would have become extremely difficult; whilst, by continuing to march on the Tagus, constantly fighting against Soult, Ballasteros would have formed his junction with general Hill, and the situation of the allies would have become uncommonly brilliant. Madrid also would have been preserved. The appointment of lord Wellington to the command-in-chief of the Spanish armies, had wounded Ballasteros's vanity; and, whatever his friends may assert to the contrary, it was this general's pride, which caused the failure of lord Wellington's plans. Ballasteros was even so little on his guard, as to write to his government—"that he should not fancy himself a native of the kingdom of Arragon, if he did not state that he could not submit to a determination degrading to the honour of the Spanish armies," &c. He was deprived of his command, and replaced by general Virues. But the mischief was done, and Soult was marching to Madrid without being opposed, either by troops

of the line, or by guerillas. It seemed as if his name spread terror far and wide. Enraged at having been stripped of the kingdom of Andalusia, by the skilful manœuvres of the English general, he longed for a favourable opportunity to be revenged, and he took the greatest precaution to arrive in good order on the ground occupied by the allies.

To these events must be added the attack of Almeria, by general Ross, on the fourteenth of May. The fort, which was near the sea, and a protection for privateers, was destroyed. On the eleventh of June, there had been a great skirmish in Estremadura, between the English cavalry of general Slade, and the French cavalry of general L'Allemand. The French, who had been conquerors at first, were obliged to fall back. On the twentieth of the same month, the Spaniards were seconded in the attack of Lequito near Bilboa, by sir Home Popham, who landed several times the following days to destroy the batteries on the coast near Bermeo. On the twenty-fourth, he landed at Argota, with a detachment of marines. Fort Galea, which was provided with eight heavy guns, was destroyed. The batteries of Argota and Bergona were also rendered totally unserviceable. When the French arrived, sir Home had accomplished his object and re-embarked. General O'Donel was defeated on the twenty-second of July, by general Harispe, at Castalla, between Xixona and Villena. The loss of the Spaniards amounted to three thousand men. The former observations concerning general Ballasteros, relative to his defeat at Bornos, apply with equal force to general O'Donel. The English general, Maitland, was expected at Alicant with choice troops, detached from the army of Sicily. O'Donel, therefore, must have been very covetous of glory not to postpone his attack for a few days. He was, no doubt, afraid of sharing it with the English general. He received, however, the chastisement which his presumption had incurred. The expedition from Sicily, amounting to six thousand men, landed at Alicant, on the

tenth of August. On the nineteenth, Astorga surrendered to general Santosildes. The garrison, amounting to twelve hundred men, were taken prisoners of war. Clausel had detached general Foy with two divisions to relieve Astorga; but his march was too slow, and he arrived only on the twentieth. The Spaniards, who were informed of his approach, had sent the garrison off as soon as the capitulation was signed. Bilboa was attacked by the French on the fourteenth of August. They were repulsed by general Renoules. On the twenty-seventh, the French general, Caffarelli, again attacked the place, and took possession of it, whilst general Soulier was engaged in a very sharp conflict with the marquesito, near Areta, where the Spaniards occupied a strong position. After having strenuously disputed the ground, they evacuated it; because the French were in sufficient numbers to cut off the retreat of the Spaniards, whilst they were attacking them in front.

General Clausel, having received reinforcements, had organized his army. On the nineteenth of August, he pushed a strong reconnoitering party as far as Tudela, and obliged general Anson to recross the Douro. The English corps of observation fell back to Arevalo. Lord Wellington left Madrid on the first of September: and on the sixth he crossed the Douro, without encountering any obstacle. The next day he entered Valladolid, which Clausel had evacuated in the night. The latter, in his retreat, destroyed the bridges on the Pisuerga, to retard the march of the advanced-guard of the allies. On the sixteenth, his lordship reached Pampliega, near Burgos. Three divisions of the army of Galicia joined the grand army, which entered Burgos on the nineteenth. The French had retreated to Briviesca, leaving in the castle a garrison of two thousand men, under the command of general Dubreton. General Pack, after having passed the Arlauson, forced the French to draw in their out-posts. They only kept the horn-work erected on Saint Michael's hill. Lord Wellington reconnoitered this

work. His lordship thought it might be carried by main force: and the following night general Pack established himself in it. The troops, by which it was defended, opposed a vigorous resistance, but were overthrown, and about five hundred were made prisoners.

His lordship also wished to take the castle by assault. In the night of the twenty-second, several columns attempted to scale it with ladders; but the besieged were on their guard, and the allies were repulsed. The assault probably would have been successful, had it, as at Badajoz, been made only after a breach had been effected in the body of the place, and when the garrison had been exhausted by the fatigues attending a vigilant defence of fifteen or twenty days. The besiegers were now obliged to proceed regularly, in order to approach the ramparts. On the twenty-ninth, they blew up a mine under the outer wall of the castle. The breach was practicable; for a detachment ascended the rampart, but could not establish themselves on it, because they were not supported in sufficient time. Another mine exploded on the fourth of October, and made a second breach. The besiegers, without losing a moment, made the assault, and established themselves in the outer works. The French, seeing themselves so closely pressed, redoubled their exertions. They made several sorties to destroy the works of the allies, and frequently proved successful; because there had been no parallels constructed with redoubts, sufficiently well placed to prevent a sally of the besieged from their works.

On the fifteenth, the French army moved forward, and endeavoured to make the allies raise the siege of the castle of Burgos. General Clausel manœuvred on the eighteenth and nineteenth, as if he wished to give battle. Lord Wellington did not decline the offer. He placed his army in array; his right resting against the Arlanzon, and his left stretching out in the direction of Ibeas and Robiena. On the twentieth the two armies observed each other: and towards evening general Paget, with two divisions, repulsed

a French party, which had moved to Quintana-Palla. On the twenty-first, Lord Wellington heard that Soult was approaching the Tagus, and threatened general Hill. The English commander-in-chief did not wish to endanger the success of the campaign, by obstinately persisting in the capture of the castle of Burgos; and thought his junction with general Hill indispensable, that the latter might not be drawn into a conflict with inadequate forces; for any decisive advantage, obtained by the French in the open country, would immediately have enabled them to return to Andalusia, and renew the siege of Cadiz. All the movements of the allies towards Madrid and Burgos must be considered as nicely calculated manœuvres to deliver the province of Andalusia from the presence of the French—a province which is as opulent, and almost as numerously inhabited, as the kingdom of Portugal.

The loss of the allies, before the castle of Burgos, was certainly very considerable; but it did not amount to a fourth of that which a battle against Soult, in the south, would have cost, to obtain the same advantages which lord Wellington now gained in the north. The siege of the castle of Burgos covered the French general Dubreton, and his brave garrison, with glory. It was raised in the night of the twenty-second: and the whole allied army fell back to the Douro. It is impossible to coincide with the English general in the praises which he bestows upon the engineers, entrusted with the construction of the works of the siege. Had the attack been properly conducted, the castle must have been in the possession of the allies on the fifth or sixth of October; and the beneficial consequences of this conquest may be easily enough appreciated. Caffarelli, defeated by lord Wellington's troops, and kept in check by the garrison with which the army of Galicia might have provided the castle, would not have been able to cross the Douro for the rest of the year. The flower of the English army being thus disposable, would have moved

by forced marches to the Tagus, and obliged Soult to fall back on Valentia; perhaps even to the left of the Ebro, in company with king Joseph and marshal Suchet. On this occasion, too, every zealous friend of the sacred cause which the allies were justly defending, asks—"What were the armies of Andalusia, of Murcia, of Valentia, and general Maitland himself, doing all this time?"

The allies recrossed the Douro on the nineteenth of October. The French occupied the opposite shore on the same day. This retreat from before Burgos was conducted with great ability, and performed in excellent order; though repeated attacks were made by the French advanced-guard, against the rear-guard of the allies. General Hill, having too great an inferiority of numbers to encounter marshal Soult, quitted the neighbourhood of Madrid on the first of November, crossed the Guadarama, and marched to Arevalo, where his troops formed their junction with the grand army. On the eighth, the two armies took a position on the left bank of the Tormes. General Hill occupied the castle of Alba, and stationed general Hamilton, with his Portuguese troops, on the right bank of the Tormes. On the ninth, the advanced posts of the allies were attacked by the French, and driven back to Albe de Tormes. On the tenth, general Hamilton was attacked. He had hastily constructed a few intrenchments, which proved of very great assistance in the defence and preservation of his post. After a brisk firing, which lasted till night, the French retired to the neighbouring heights. This conflict cost the allies nearly two hundred men, killed, wounded, or prisoners: and their whole loss, since they raised the siege of the castle of Burgos, including this, might amount to one thousand men.

Marshal Soult has already been censured for his excessive tardiness in taking possession of Andalusia during the year 1810; he committed the same fault in evacuating that province. Though he had left Seville on the twenty-sixth

of August, he only formed his junction with king Joseph's army, near Almanza, on the twenty-ninth of September. His advanced-guard occupied Alvacete on the third of October; and on the sixth it was at Minaya, near Sanelemente. The castle of Chinchilla surrendered on the ninth. It was but towards the latter end of the month, that he marched with numerous forces to the Tagus; which river, being every where fordable at that time of the year, might have been easily crossed, to the prejudice of the allies, if they had persisted in defending its right bank. General Hill preferred a movement to the Jaroma. His right, which occupied Puente-larga, was attacked on the thirtieth of October by Soult's advanced-guard. Colonel Skerret, who commanded on that point, made a good defence. The allies withdrew in the night, and on the fourth of November they reached Arevalo on the Adaja, without having been pursued. The Spanish divisions of don Carlos Espana and the count de Penne-Villemur, continually co-operated with the greatest zeal in the performance of general Hill's orders, from the time he left Estremadura, to his junction with lord Wellington.

From the tenth to the sixteenth of November, Soult was reconnoitering the positions in the vicinity of the Tormes; and instead of attacking the allies, who actually challenged him on the fourteenth and fifteenth, he entrenched himself on the heights of Mozorbes, and contented himself with sending detachments towards Ciudad-Rodrigo, to give lord Wellington some uneasiness respecting his communications with that place. On the sixteenth his lordship encamped his army on the Valmuza. Soult followed the allies with a strong advanced-guard, but never closely pressed upon them. On the seventeenth, he availed himself of a favourable position to attack the rear-guard under the orders of general Alten. A detachment of his light troops concealed themselves in a wood on the road to Ciudad-Rodrigo, and took general Paget prisoner, almost in the centre of the allied

army, at the moment that he was returning alone, to inquire into the cause of delay on the part of the division, which was to follow close upon his, and which the badness of the roads had obliged to slacken its pace. This accident was extremely painful to lord Wellington, who held general Paget's talents in high estimation. His lordship, in his official report to the earl of Bathurst, says that he is very sorry to announce the misfortune of losing lieutenant-general sir Edward Paget, who was taken a prisoner on the seventeenth, when commanding the column of the centre; that the heavy falls of rain having greatly ruined the roads, and swelled the brooks, an interval occurred between the fifth and seventh divisions of infantry; that sir Edward was returning alone on horseback to the rear-guard, for the purpose of inquiring into the cause of this delay; and as the road lay through a wood, a detachment of the enemy's cavalry must have passed that way, or sir Edward must have missed his road. His lordship added, that general Paget was not wounded, but that he could not sufficiently regret the loss of his services at such a moment.

In the same report, lord Wellington observes that the whole disposable force of the enemy in Spain was on the Tormes about the middle of the month, and that it certainly did not consist of less than eighty thousand men; nay, that it more probably amounted to ninety thousand, ten thousand of which were cavalry; and that as the army of Portugal alone had one hundred pieces of artillery, it was probable that there were not less than two hundred in the whole army. His lordship, however, appears to have been mistaken; for the whole French army did not amount to more than seventy thousand men under arms; but they were full of enthusiasm, and anxious to come to blows, whilst the reverse, experienced before Burgos, had cooled the ardour of the conquerors of Salamanca. Lord Wellington, therefore, acted wisely by assigning winter-quarters to his army, on the left banks of the Agueda. The French,

who were as much in need of repose as their opponents, were not long in following this example. They were quartered between the Douro and the Tagus. Joseph returned to Madrid; and marshal Soult fixed his head-quarters at Toledo.

The English ministers expected that fortune would continue to smile upon them, and that they should soon hear of the total expulsion of the French from the peninsula. The event was, however, procrastinated by a negligence on the part of lord Wellington. Had he sent an officer to summon the castle of Burgos to surrender, general Dubreton, its governor, had resolved, ever since the affair of the eighteenth, to accept an honourable capitulation, to which he was in every respect entitled. His fine defence had commanded the esteem of his opponents, and the admiration of all Europe. The loss of Burgos would have deprived the French of their principal *depot* of ammunitions; for the armies of Soult, Joseph, Clausel, and Caffarelli, all hastened to send thither for cartridges, as soon as the siege was raised. Thus the pride of a commander, the too faithful organ of the sentiments of his masters, retarded for a year the deliverance of the peninsula. He even ran the risk of withering the laurels, which he had gathered on the banks of the Tormes. Indeed, marshal Soult's circumspection from the twelfth to the sixteenth of November, can by no means be approved. The retreat from before Burgos had disorganized the allied army; and it would have been easily routed by a well-directed attack. The prudence of the French general must, no doubt, be attributed to his recollection of the sanguinary battle fought at Albuera; and it is to lord Wellington's good fortune in not being defeated, during his retreat of 1812, that his lordship is indebted for his victory at Vittoria.

BOOK VII.

THE complete overthrow of Napoleon's gigantic power, occasioned by the disastrous campaign of Russia, confirmed all enlightend observers in their conjectures respecting the approaching deliverance of the peninsula; and, judging of the future by the past, the period of that deliverance was also easily foreseen. In 1808, lord Wellington had forced Junot to evacuate the kingdom of Portugal. In 1809, he defeated marshal Soult in the neighbourhood of Oporto, and drove him back to Galicia. The sanguinary battle of Talavera, which obliged the French to concentrate their armies in order to save Madrid, freed Galicia, the Asturias, and the kingdom of Leon of their presence. Soult and Massena appeared, it is true, before Cadiz and Lisbon in 1810: but the magnitude of the peril awakened the energy of the English, Portuguese, and Castilians. They proved that they could be vanquished, but not subdued. Even the successes of marshal Soult in 1811, seem to have been destined merely to open a more extensive field of glory to the allied army, and to lord Wellington, in 1812. The conquest of Badajoz, and the victory at Salamanca, place the English commander by the side of the great captains, whose superior genius conferred upon the war of the French revolution a triple character of talents, heroism, and good fortune, obscuring, as it were, the most brilliant exploits recorded in the annals of anterior times.

The population of the peninsula is rated at thirteen millions of inhabitants. In the beginning of 1808, almost the whole was conquered by the French, whilst towards the latter end of 1812, half of that population had returned under their lawful authorities.

The population of the Asturias amounts to 360,000 souls,

That of Galicia	1,350,000
Andalusia	1,796,000
Murcia	360,000
Estremadura	400,000
Portugal	3,000,000

Total 7,266,000

And adding to this amount the fourth of the country, still occupied by the French, it became evident that within the space of four years, they had lost two-thirds of the peninsula, which circumstance justified the conjecture that the campaign of 1813, if it were well conducted, must force them to recross the Pyrenees. It was not a leader that was wanting to the allies: they had long since found an able one in lord Wellington. The obstacle, which was to be overcome, proceeded from the jealousy of the secondary chiefs, who, blinded by a false point of honour, paralysed alike the zeal of the inhabitants, the valour of their soldiers, and the talents of the commander, whom Providence appeared to have destined to humble the pride of Napoleon. But the firmness of the Spanish government opened a brighter prospect. They learnt that the triumph of the Russians would not have been so complete, had not all classes of that valiant nation, united round the throne of Peter the great, to chastise the rash imitator of Charles XII. An example so generous, excited in the allies of the south, the noble resolution of a frank and cordial union to save their country. Whilst Alexander expressed his satisfaction at the exertions made against the French in the peninsula, the prince regent of England applied to his parliament for the means of a vigorous prosecution of the war. His royal highness ordered lord Wellington's army to be reinforced, that his lordship might be enabled to heighten the glory of the preceding campaigns, by the total expulsion of the French from the territory of Spain. This event, which

had been so long wished for, by all the friends of justice, became still more probable, when Napoleon recalled fifty thousand choice troops from his army in Spain, together with marshal Soult.

The public, so frequently unjust, in spite of the proverb by which its flatterers attempt to establish its pretended infallibility, "*vox populi, vox dei*," inveighed loudly against lord Wellington, for not having set his army in motion before the first of May, 1813. According to the orators of the London coffee-houses, the conquerors of Busaco and Salamanca were no longer worthy of their splendid renown. In their delirious accusations, they even spoke of appointing a successor to the fortunate commander, who had first broken the spell of French invincibility. Fabius and Paulus Æmilius had, under similar circumstances, invited their Roman critics to give up the pleasures of the capital of the world, and assist them with their counsels. Those vain and ignorant censors proved their want of patriotism, by declining the invitation of the consuls. But the English general, foreseeing a similar denial, adopted a more decisive system of conduct. He despised his obscure slanderers, and justified the confidence of the enlightened part of the nation, by defeating king Joseph in the plains of Vittoria.

On the twenty-fourth of May, the advanced-guard of the allies moved to Salamanca. On the twenty-sixth, that city was occupied by General Fane, who pursued the rear-guard of the French, and took two hundred prisoners, near Huerta. On the twenty-seventh and twenty-eighth, his lordship assigned cantonments to general Hill's column between the Tormes and the Douro, and went in person to Miranda de Douro, where he arrived on the twenty-ninth, with the column under the orders of general Graham, who commanded the left wing of the army. On the thirty-first these troops took a position on the river Esla, their left resting on Tabara, communicating with the army of Galicia, and their right in front of Carvajales. On the first of June the English hus-

sars entered Zamora; the following day, they were at Toro. Colonel Grant, under whose orders they fought, took two hundred prisoners. Joseph was at the head of the French army, having under his orders marshal Jourdan, as his major-general. The French retreated rather in confusion. Valladolid was evacuated on the fourth. The allies found a great quantity of ammunition in that place. On the seventh their army crossed the Carrion, and on the following days it occupied both banks of the Pisuerga. On the twelfth general Hill attacked the position of Hormazas, which was defended by general Reille. General Ponsonby turned the right of the French with the greatest boldness, whilst general Hill was attacking the heights of Estepar.

The manœuvres of the allies were so ably performed, that the French became apprehensive for their line of operations; and crossed over to the left shore of the Arlanzon. In the night of the twelfth to the thirteenth, they retreated to Briviesca. They blew up the works of the castle of Burgos. On the fifteenth the allies passed the Ebro over the bridge of Saint Martin, and that of Fuente de Arenas. On the twenty-sixth, general Graham was attacked at Osma, by very superior numbers. He remained, however, master of the field of battle, because the French withdrew under the apprehension of being cut off from the main body of their army, which was collecting near Vittoria. Had lord Wellington rapidly moved his centre to Morillas, whilst his right was making demonstrations against Vittoria, he would indeed have succeeded in cutting them off. The French troops, that remained at Osma, would have been caught between two fires, and probably destroyed. They managed, however, to extricate themselves from this perilous situation, and to join their grand army, whose numbers, even after this junction, did not exceed sixty thousand men under arms.

On the twentieth, the two armies were in presence of each other. The French had their left wing stationed on

the heights between Arunéz and Puebla de Arlanzon, their centre on a height which commanded the valley of Zadorra, and their right wing resting against Vittoria. This position was covered on the whole of its front by the Zadorra, which at that time of the year, was not fordable any where. The English commander made his arrangements for the attack on the following day. Early on the twenty-first, the allies, fully confiding in the talents, and above all, in the good fortune of lord Wellington, marched to the battle with an enthusiasm that beggars description. His lordship had encouraged his troops with only these few words, that were eagerly circulated through the ranks: "Remember, my friends, that you are the brothers of the heroes of Trafalgar; and that you have before you those, whom you vanquished at Salamanca." The right of the allies under general Hill was first engaged. It drove the left of the French from the heights of Puebla, and took possession of Subijana-de-Alava. General Reille opposed at first but a feeble resistance. He thought it a false attack, intended to cause the centre to be weakened, and devoted his main attention to the left wing. When he perceived his error, he wished to stop the progress of the allies; but the favourable moment was past. It was on the heights of Puebla, that he should have been prepared to repulse the enemy. The French division, which had been beaten there, fell back in confusion, and lowered the spirits of that which came to its assistance; but if these two divisions had been enabled to support each other at the beginning of the attack, the exertions of the allies would have proved fruitless. Joseph and Jourdan came both in person to encourage the troops; considering it of material importance to regain the village of Subijana, the key of their position. Lord Wellington being also sensible on his part, that the occupation of this post gave him a decided superiority, sent orders to general Hill, that he must keep it at any rate. The French made several attempts to retake Subijana, but they were constantly repulsed.

Lord Wellington, freed from all fears respecting the fate of his left, now moved his centre, which had hitherto confined itself to mere demonstrations. His troops passed the Zadorra over the bridge of Villodas, and that of Transpupes. This manœuvre, which was boldly performed, frightened king Joseph, who did not await the attack, but ordered the troops of his centre to fall back on Vittoria. He wished, besides, to support his right wing, which was impetuously attacked by general Graham. The villages of Gamarra-Mayor and Abechuco, though obstinately defended, were carried by the English at the point of the bayonet. These two villages served as *tetes de pont* of the river Zadorra, to keep possession of the high road from Vittoria to Bayonne. The French, on being deprived of them, lost their line of operations; and whilst the allies were attacking Abechuco, Joseph despatched the choicest of his divisions to repossess themselves of the village of Gamarra-Mayor. But general Oswald repelled every attack, and remained master of that important point. Being defeated on their whole line, and unable to retreat by the high road to France, Jourdan and Joseph took the road to Pampeluna. The intrepidity and numbers of the allies, left them no time for recollection. All the artillery, consisting of one hundred and fifty pieces of ordnance, above four hundred wagons, the whole baggage, and even the army-chest, became the prey of the conquerors. Joseph owed his safety to the swiftness of his horse. Captain Wyndham, of the tenth English hussars, entered Vittoria, at full gallop, when Joseph's carriage had just left the place. He pursued it with one squadron, overtook the carriage and fired into it. The intruding fugitive had only time to leap out of the coach, and mount his horse. He escaped under the protection of about fifty dragoons, who encountered the English hussars sword in hand.

The loss of the allies amounted to four thousand men *hors de combat*, and that of the French to about six thousand.

Lord Wellington had eighty thousand men under arms. Joseph might have had more, had he concentrated his troops. General Clausel had been detached to the neighbourhood of Logrono, with two of the best divisions; and general Foy had recently been sent to the environs of Bilbao. The French might have collected one hundred thousand troops, with which they would have driven lord Wellington back to the mountains of Portugal. It was marshal Soult's absence from the army that occasioned all the mischief. There was not any superior officer, of sufficiently distinguished talents, to counteract Joseph's and his major-general's weakness. Jourdan is one of the best generals of division in the French army, but nature has not intended him for a commander of the first rank; and although the decrees of Saint-Just, and Barrere's reports, proclaim him the greatest captain of his time, it is well known that all his triumphs, and especially the battle of Fleurus, are due to Kleber and Moreau. When he was deprived of these two able assistants, the mask fell, and the hero vanished. The disaster of Vittoria was easily foreseen by those who remembered the unfortunate conflicts of Wurtzburgh and Leibtingen. Would marshal Soult ever have let the allies cross the Douro, and march to Vittoria, without giving them battle, with a well-concentrated army?

In the month of June, 1813, the French had still one hundred and sixty thousand men in Spain, partly present under arms, and partly in the different garrisons. Nothing was more easy than to form an army of chosen troops to counteract lord Wellington's plans. The victories of Lutzen and Bautzen justify the choice, which Buonaparte made of marshal Soult to be his lieutenant: but he ought to have given his brother Joseph the assistance of marshal Suchet, who, next to Soult, justly possessed the confidence of the army of Spain. Lord Wellington had been, for eight months, organizing a chosen army. The newspapers complained that he did nothing but read and hunt; whilst his

lordship was night and day inspecting his troops, visiting their cantonments, and putting the army necessaries in good condition. But in spite of his exertions, he opened the campaign, with only seventy-four thousand foot, and six thousand horse. Joseph might have encountered him with one hundred thousand, including ten thousand cavalry. The bad arrangements of his major-general afforded him, on the day of battle, but sixty against eighty thousand. This shows the justice of the observation of Louis XIV. On hearing of the victory gained by the duke of Vendome at Villaviciosa, that monarch said—"See what a great man can effect!" Of Joseph, beaten at Vittoria, it may be said, with equal justice—"See what a little man can effect!"

Lord Wellington's movements, at the beginning of this campaign, were a master piece. He did not covet the ephemeral triumph of entering Madrid; but took solid positions, which forced the French to evacuate that capital. He threatened their whole right flank from Santandero up to Valentia. He approached Burgos, which contained immense stores of ammunition. He had even the boldness to push the left of his army to the very line of operations on the part of the French; and he succeeded in taking possession of the high road, which leads from Madrid to Bayonne. But it must be confessed that the English commander is not equally able as a tactician. After he had reached a field of battle, by a series of scientific manœuvres, it is surprising to behold him at once acting, as it were, contrary to good sense. Why did he fight those combats of Subijana and Gamarra-Mayor? The instant his lordship knew to a certainty, that he had twenty thousand men more than Joseph in the field, his manœuvres ought to have been directed to the destruction of the left wing of the French. To accomplish this object, false attacks only were required on the two wings; whilst the flower of the army would have passed the Zadora, over the bridge of Villodas, and that of Transpupes; and would have taken a position be-

tween the left and the centre of the French army. Through this bold manœuvre, pointed out by the very nature of the ground, all the French troops stationed at Subijana would have been forced to lay down their arms. By crossing the Zadora, opposite to Youna, with fifty thousand men, lord Wellington would have revived the brilliant triumph of the duke of Marlborough, who, at the battle of Hochstett, in 1704, took twenty-seven battalions, and twelve squadrons, that had been left in the village of Blenheim.

The French themselves confess that they were badly attacked, and still more badly pursued. Three thousand horse (and lord Wellington had more than double that number) would have been sufficient to crush the French rear-guard of ten thousand men, so great was the terror in their army. At night, their retreat became an actual rout. The fugitives could not be rallied, even under the ramparts of Pampeluna. This fortress, however, intimidated the allies, who marched with precaution, that they might not fall into any ambush. Hence it may be inferred, that lord Wellington acted contrary to his interest, by cutting the French off from the high road to Bayonne. He would have worsted them much more in that direction, than in the mountainous country which leads to Pampeluna. He very likely might even have succeeded in bringing them to battle a second time; in which case the French would have been lost beyond recovery. Bayonne, which was not supplied, would have opened its gates; and Bordeaux would have sent deputies to hasten the march of its liberators. To praise the ability of his plans, in reaching a field of battle, is mere justice to lord Wellington: but the historian would be open to the censure of all military men, if he did not also remark, that his lordship shewed some uncertainty in his movements in the field of battle itself; that he trusted too much to his subordinate officers; and that he did not know how to avail himself of a victory. General Hill on the right, and general Graham on the left, defended Subijana

and Gamarra-Mayor with true bravery: but they performed no manœuvres that mark the eminent commander.—General Beresford, who commanded the centre, is proclaimed as his lordship's mentor, for his friendly advice and assistance during the operations. Lord Wellington's modesty in this respect, though conformable to the English character, cannot be applauded. The condescension of bestowing praises upon those, from whom we derive assistance, has limits, beyond which it becomes ridiculous. To hear the conqueror of Salamanca and Vittoria, declaring that he is indebted for his laurels to the general, who, in the battle of Albuera, was obliged to contend against a Polish lancer, is truly pitiful.

These observations may tend to diminish the general surprise, that the loss of the French did not correspond with the importance of the battle of Vittoria. The author has been credibly informed, that the whole French loss, in killed, wounded, and prisoners, did not exceed three thousand, and that the loss of the English amounted to nearly double that number. Lord Wellington is silent respecting the total amount of his prisoners; and this certainly is rather uncommon in the narrative of a battle by a conqueror, whenever he is able to give a satisfactory account on so important a subject. The sick that could not be removed from the hospitals of Vittoria, must have increased the number of French prisoners to about three thousand; and it is from this circumstance, that the total loss of the French, on the twenty-first of June, has been stated at six thousand. No individual of note perished on either side in the battle of Vittoria. Lord Wellington mentions the death of a lieutenant-colonel, on whom his lordship would not have lavished the following high praises, if he could have bestowed them on any officer of higher rank. He expresses his regret in announcing, that the honourable lieutenant-colonel Cadogan died of the wounds he received; that his majesty had lost in him an officer of

great zeal and tried valour, who had already acquired the respect and esteem of the troops; and from whom, had he lived, his country might have expected the most important services. Such garlands, hung over the tomb of a hero, highly endear a general to his army and to the nation. Buonaparte had most successfully followed this system in his first campaigns of Italy. By relinquishing it, to praise merely his flatterers, he disgusted the French; and his fall became the general object of their wishes. This reproach, however, does not apply to the just encomiums of marshal Bessieres, who gloriously fell in the plains of Lutzen; but it is impossible to recollect, without a smile of pity, the tragi-comical scene impudently inserted in an official bulletin, respecting the death of general Duroc. History ought severely to censure the juggler, who, in his writings, affects a sublime morality, whilst all his actions offer a monstrous assemblage of perfidy and cruelty. Lord Wellington, too, may be reproached for having spilt much blood unnecessarily: but he did it from inexperience; whilst Buonaparte would have caused a million of men to be slaughtered for a million pounds of sugar and coffee. The latter has frequently been heard to say—"That his conscription, or *continental* produce, would, in the end, render him absolute master of the *colonial* produce."

The allies of the south frustrated, however, his calculations, and humbled the proud conqueror of Bautzen. The defeat of Vittoria forced him to send marshal Soult back to Spain. But the decisive blow had been struck. It was like sending a physician when the patient is past recovery. Ferdinand had re-ascended the throne of his forefathers on the twenty-first of June. On the twenty-sixth, the Spaniards invested the fortress of Pampeluna. General Hill pursued Joseph's army, which returned to France by the road of Roncevalles. The defeat of Charlemagne in 778, in the valley of this name, has rendered it famous in history! The celebrated Orlando, his nephew, perished

in it, with a great number of valiant knights, the heroes of so many old romances. The left of the allies had followed the high road to Bayonne, by Tolesa. General Foy, who was in this direction, with a corps of fifteen thousand men, was overthrown near Tolesa, and driven from that town, which was carried by storm. On the first of July, general Graham established his troops on the ancient boundaries of Spain and France. The centre of the allies manœuvred against general Clausel, who, being unacquainted with Joseph's retreat, had dared to show himself at Vittoria the day after the battle, with about twenty thousand men. Had lord Wellington been less circumspect, this corps must have been inevitably destroyed. In his report, dated Ostiz, the third of July, his lordship states that Clausel was still at Logrono on the twenty-fifth of June; and that he reached Tudela only on the twenty-seventh, in the evening, six days after the battle. The English commander would have required only four days to take a position, with thirty thousand choice troops, at Villa-Franca on the Arragon. He might have occupied Alfaro with a numerous advanced-guard, to defend the bridge on the Ebro, and act on either shore of that river, according to Clausel's movements. This manœuvre would have obliged the French to lay down their arms, as their retreat to Sarragossa would have been cut off by superior numbers. General Clausel's ability, and the ardour of his troops, contributed as much as lord Wellington's tardiness, to extricate them from their perilous situation. They safely reached Sarragossa, whence they marched to Jacca and Oleron, without being once engaged on their return to France. One of general Clausel's divisions was still at Jacca on the fourteenth of July. General Paris, who commanded this division, lost no time in joining his corps, which formed the left of the French army, leaving a garrison of eight hundred men in the fort of Jacca.

The castle of Pancerbo had surrendered by capitulation to count d'Abisbal, on the first of July. Though the garrison amounted only to seven hundred men, they obstructed the communication between Vittoria and Burgos. The occupation of this post was as gratifying to lord Wellington as honourable to count d'Abisbal. But his lordship's satisfaction was troubled by unfavourable accounts of the expedition in Catalonia. The opening of sir John Murray's operations against marshal Suchet had been rather splendid. On the thirteenth of April, the French attacked the allies in their fine positions at Castalla. They were aware that they had to encounter troops more inured to war than the Spaniards. The English infantry used their bayonets with the intrepid coolness of old warriors. All the charges of the French cavalry proved ineffectual. The English general, wishing to improve his first success, was going to act on the offensive: but Suchet, sensible that his troops, already fatigued with fighting, would be overthrown at the first onset, did not want to risk a second conflict, and withdrew to Biar in the greatest order. During the night, he continued his retreat to Villena, and the allies resumed their position at Castalla. This advantage, gained over an army that fancied itself invincible, gave rise to the most flattering hopes. The conqueror of Saguntum, and of Valentia, was, for the first time, flying before the allies. The English government had long been told that such would be the case, whenever a reserve of experienced English troops should be sent to support the efforts of the brave Spaniards. But troops, to render the services expected from them, must be well conducted. The victory of the thirteenth was due to the intrepidity of the soldiers. The inferiority of sir John Murray's talents was soon manifested, not by any reverses, but by his inability to organize victory in the east of Spain.

The cabinet of London, more fortunate in selecting advisers, than generous in rewarding their services, had been provided with a plan for the campaign of the peninsula, which recommended that the French should be attacked on

their two lines of operations, drawing as near as possible to the extremities of both lines towards France. Whilst lord Wellington, therefore, was threatening Bayonne, sir John Murray was to make demonstrations on the Lower Ebro. It was in consequence of these arrangements, that twenty thousand men were embarked at Alicant. They sailed from that harbour on the thirty-first of May, and came in sight of Tarragona on the second of June. The celerity of this passage disconcerted the defensive plans of the French. Two divisions left Valentia to oppose the English expedition. On the tenth, marshal Suchet himself was at Tortosa. Sir John Murray had not lost a moment in landing his troops, and investing Tarragona. Being little skilled in fortification, he was alarmed by the intrenchments, which surrounded the place. Had he attacked them on the very day of his landing, he would have obtained possession of them with inconsiderable loss; the garrison would have retired to the upper town, and would have thought themselves extremely well used on being granted the usual terms. Sir John Murray is highly blameable for not having attacked Tarragona instantly, but he certainly is excusable for not having awaited a serious engagement with marshal Suchet. The assertion may indeed be proved.

The surrender of fort Balaguer, on the seventh, deprived the French of the only road, by which any artillery could reach Tarragona, with the troops coming from Valentia. It was Suchet's interest to make his arrival known to the garrison, who defended themselves with the greatest bravery. On the twelfth, he lighted several fires on the mountains, which could be seen at Tarragona. The flower of the army of Catalonia, under the orders of general Maurice Mathieu, also arrived on the same day at Arbos, a village about a day's march from Tarragona. By an able direction of their joint movements, marshal Suchet would have been enabled to attack the besieging army with twenty-two thousand men; whilst sir John Murray had only fifteen

to oppose, two-thirds of which were Spaniards. There were but five thousand English. If sir John could have prevented Suchet's junction with Maurice Mathieu, and could have beaten them separately, he is to be blamed for not having ~~made~~ the attempt. But the instant the junction of the French general was effected, nothing short of a ~~prompt~~ retreat could save the allies from total destruction. The whole plan, however, had been mangled in its execution. A corps of twenty-five thousand English troops of the line should have landed at Barcelona: that place should have been invested, and its blockade intrusted to the brave Catalonians: the English, after defeating the French, should have caused them to be pursued by the *miquelets* into the defiles of the Pyrenees, up to the ramparts of Perpignan, and should then have marched to the Ebre to meet Suchet. Had this plan been punctually performed, the duke of Albufera would probably have been reduced to superintend in person, the agricultural labours of his new vassals.

The author was in London when the account of sir John Murray's retreat arrived. He loudly approved of it, and showed that sir John had not the means necessary to accomplish his intended object. But the English public was of a different opinion, on account of the artillery and stores left behind. They could not forgive sir John's returning to the French that ordnance, which it had cost so much blood to obtain on the memorable occasion of storming Badajoz. Seventeen pieces of cannon are no doubt to be regretted; but if their preservation was to have cost the loss of a battle, the general could not hesitate. The honour of the army was in no respect committed either by the retreat, or by a loss of artillery, imperiously commanded by circumstances. A defeat would have proved a serious misfortune; and to the unavailable destruction of a great number of brave men, must in all probability have been added the loss of that very same artillery, or at least of the field pieces used in the line. Sir John Murray is to be

blamed for too much circumspection in his first operations against Tarragona, and for neglecting to prevent the junction of the armies of Valentia and Catalonia. With more foresight and activity, he might have re-embarked his heavy guns and other ammunition: but he must be praised for having had sufficient firmness of character and true patriotism to prefer the safety of his army, and the national honour, to his own glory. It must have been painful, indeed, to re-embark without fighting. If this general has had the misfortune of being abused by some writers in the pay of closet commanders, he may comfort himself with the assurance, that men of judgment and experience sincerely pitied him for having been exposed to retrograde, in a career where he had the most brilliant laurels to gather, had the means been adequate to the importance of the task with which he was entrusted.

Marshal Suchet was amply revenged for his defeat at Castalla. He manœuvred with great ability. He momentarily paralysed an extensive plan, the precise and complete execution of which would have placed him in a most critical situation. Whilst he directed the military operations in Catalonia, general Harispe was fighting on the Xucar. On the thirteenth, general Elio attacked general Habart's division, near Carcagente. The conflict was sharp. The Spaniards lost fifteen hundred men, seven hundred of whom were taken prisoners. This success of the French damped the ardour of the allies, and probably induced lord Bentick, who had superseded sir John Murray, to return with his expedition to its former position. Satisfied with having relieved Tarragona, marshal Suchet set out in great haste for Valentia, to oppose the attempts which the allies might make against the coast, on those points that had been stripped of troops to carry off the French stores. His army entered Valentia on the twenty-fourth. Lord Bentick, having been delayed by contrary winds, Suchet determined to avail himself of the non-arrival of the expedition, to de-

foot the allies, who remained on the Xucar. But they were apprised of his intentions by their spies, and returned to their intrenched camp at Castalla. A rear-guard, which had been left at the Col de la Olleria, was attacked at the point of the bayonet, and the troops were all killed, taken, or dispersed. The expedition sailed back to Alicant on the twenty-fourth. The troops were immediately landed, and took positions in the neighbourhood of Xixona to act as a reserve to the camp at Castalla. This measure of lord Bentinck manifests his sagacity.

It was before he sailed from Alicant, on the thirty-first of May, that sir John Murray, his lordship's predecessor, might have shown himself worthy of his situation, by refusing the command in chief of the expedition, until he should have been furnished with the requisite means of conducting it to a happy issue. The number of French troops in that part of Spain was not problematical: the emissaries of the allies must have given accurate information on that subject; and sir John Murray, as commander-in-chief, ought to have known, on the thirty-first of May, what number of troops he might have to engage on the twelfth of June following.

Ever since the beginning of July, general Graham had been besieging Saint Sebastian: on the seventeenth, he took possession of the convent of Saint Bartholomew. The occupation of this post enabled him to establish batteries against the rampart of the place, and these were so well served, that the breach was judged practicable. On the twenty-second, an English officer was sent to summon the governor to surrender, but he was not admitted. On the twenty-fifth, the besiegers made a general attack on three points, at the time when the ebbing tide left the foot of the rampart dry. The French expected this attack; and for the purpose of turning it to advantage, they had constructed inner intrenchments behind the breaches. Never had the English displayed so much intrepidity: their zeal de-

served a better fate: they were killed at the musket's end. Major Frazer perished on the breach, with the flower of the Scotch grenadiers. This assault cost the allies two thousand men *hors de combat*. The French lost only forty. On the twenty-seventh, they made a sortie, and their joy was at its utmost height, when they saw that the allies had discontinued the operations of the siege. General Rey estimates the loss which he caused the allies in this conflict, with their rear-guard, at twelve hundred men. Lord Wellington, seeing himself attacked by marshal Soult, made arrangements to concentrate his troops on the spot, whither he foresaw that the French would direct their efforts. To supply Pampeluna appeared the object of marshal Soult's movements; the English commander, therefore, manœuvred to oppose it. On the twenty-fifth, he ordered general Graham to suspend the siege of Saint Sebastian, and station himself near Renteria. By this arrangement, general Graham formed the reserve for the troops posted on the Lower Bidassoa, whilst a corps of observation kept the garrison of Saint Sebastian in check.

General Cole fought the whole day of the twenty-fifth, with the French advanced-guard at Roncevalles; at night he retreated to the neighbourhood of Zubiry. On the same day, general Hill was attacked in the Puerta de Maya, at the entrance of the valley of Bastan. The spirit of the French overcame every obstacle, and the allies were overthrown. The arrival of general Barnes covered the retreat to Iturita. The eighty-second regiment made several charges with the bayonet, under the direction of general Stewart, who was wounded. Lord Wellington arrived only on the twenty-seventh. General Cole had left his position of Zubiry, as being too much exposed, and had manœuvred to cover the blockade of Pampeluna. His right rested at Huarte, and his left was established on the heights near Villada. Sir Stapleton Cotton's cavalry was on the right near Huarte, and two Spanish divisions formed the reserve.

Marshal Soult attacked this position almost at the very moment that lord Wellington arrived; but was repulsed on the whole line, except the left. He took the village of Sorauren, on the road from Ostiz to Pampeluna, and all exertions to drive the French from it proved unavailing. Soult remained master of that part of the field, and the two armies passed the night on the ground upon which they had fought.

Lord Wellington, being convinced that battles are gained by determination and numbers, lost no time in reinforcing himself with all his disposeable troops. On the morning of the twenty-eighth, he was joined by a corps of infantry, which he stationed on the heights near Sorauren. This movement gave some uneasiness to the French, who marched a large body of infantry out of the village: but they were soon forced to retreat with great loss. To repair this reverse, they attacked the whole line between Villaba and Huarte, and succeeded in breaking it on two points; but their successes were only momentary. The English generals Campbell and Ross, having been reinforced, resumed their respective positions: the rest of the day was employed in cannonading. General Hill, though briskly attacked, kept his position near Lezassa, during the twenty-eighth. Lord Wellington, having ordered this column to fall back, and enter into the line with the troops near Pampeluna, the French followed this movement. When they reached Ostiz, they attempted to turn general Hill's left. Lord Wellington availed himself of this too extended manœuvre, and assumed the offensive.

On the thirtieth, the French were attacked on the whole of their line. A lofty mountain, against which their right was resting, was carried at the point of the bayonet, by general the earl of Dalhousie. General Packenham took Sorauren. One only cry was heard along the whole line of the allies:—"Let us preserve, unsullied, the laurels won at Salamanca and Vittoria!" Marshal Soult, astonished

at such an obstinate resistance, was forced to yield to imperious necessity.

He ordered the retreat, mortified at not having been able to throw into Pampeluna the convoy, escorted by his army. It was a bold enterprise, and probably would have been successful, had the French generals displayed greater activity. They ought to have attacked the post of Altabiska, near Roncevalles, on the twenty-fifth, and to have pursued the enemy closely, without giving him time to recollect himself. Marshal Soult must also be censured for not having composed his column, so as to enable it to arrive under the ramparts of Pampeluna, without being exposed. The corps of general Reille, and that of count d'Erlon, ought to have amused general Hill, and manœuvred to join marshal Soult's main body, cutting off from the allied army the fifteen thousand troops which defended Roncevalles; particularly, as general Cole, under whose command they were, committed the imprudence of fighting in that position, though he had superior numbers before him. It is evident that these troops would have been lost, if, instead of obstinately persisting in carrying the Col de Maya, count d'Erlon had marched on his left to Erro, by the Aldrides and Hierpele. The national guards, and the mountain chasseurs, whose ardour is so highly extolled by marshal Soult, might have been sent to cover this movement, and to deceive the enemy. This operation was worthy of marshal Soult's great renown; he would have avenged the defeat of Vittoria: he would have maintained in the opinion of the public that superiority over lord Wellington, which he had acquired by his victories in the north and south of Europe; and the theatre of war would have been fixed on the banks of the Ebro. Marshal Suchet had evacuated the kingdom of Valentia, to draw nearer his magazines on that river. The loss of "the battle of the Pyrenees," however, hastened the surrender of Pampeluna, and drove the French back to their territory. Spain became free, excepting

Catalonia, and some strong places, in which Suchet had placed garrisons.

As the French government did not publish the reports of the battles of the twenty-eighth and thirtieth of July, Marshal Soult's loss can be stated only by surmise. Lord Wellington rates it at fifteen thousand men *hors de combat*, and that of the allies at six thousand. The circumstances, in which the two armies found themselves acting alternately on the offensive and defensive, induce the belief that this bloody conflict was equally fatal to both, and that each lost about eight thousand, killed, wounded, or prisoners. It is also but an act of justice to observe, that the generals and soldiers of both armies covered themselves with glory. If marshal Soult's star was for a moment eclipsed by that of lord Wellington, it was effected by prodigies of activity, courage, and devotion. The French commander had formed a plan worthy of his great talents, and would have executed it, had it not been for the double disadvantage of commanding an army, recently beaten, against soldiers rendered invincible through their late triumphs. The heights of Maya, of Ronsevalles, and of Sorrauren, prove that the valour of troops is subordinate to the ability of their general. Marshal Soult, though defeated, deserves high praise for the regularity of his marches, the precision of his attacks, and, above all, for his able retreat. As early as the twenty-eighth, he had sent back to France the cannon and baggage, which might have encumbered the roads. This foresight is a severe reflection upon the loss of artillery, experienced by marshal Jourdan on the twenty-first of June.

An additional misfortune increased marshal Soult's regret. Ever since the beginning of August, the siege of St. Sebastian had been resumed and carried on with renovated vigour. On the twenty-sixth, the post of Santa Clara was carried by the allies. The breach having been acknowledged practicable, the assault was made on the thirty-

first, at eleven o'clock in the morning. General Graham, who is as loyal with his pen, as brave with his sword, says in his report, that whatever the most determined bravery could attempt, was repeatedly done, by the troops which advanced from the trenches: but that every effort was fruitless, and that no one, who tried to make his way upon the breach, survived; and that in this almost desperate state of the attack, he was bold enough "to order the guns to be pointed against the curtain;" that a very brisk artillery fire was directed only a few feet above our soldiers; that seeing "the admirable effect of the firing of the batteries upon the curtain," he ordered the troops to make a grand effort, and establish themselves on the breach, while an attempt was made to scale the horn-work; that it fell to the lot of the second half brigade of the fifth division, commanded by colonel the honourable Charles Greville, to leave the trenches for this purpose; and that the third battalion of the royal Scotch, under lieutenant-colonel Barnes, supported by the eighty-eighth regiment, under lieutenant-colonel Miles, fortunately arrived so as to ascend the breach of the curtain, almost at the instant that an explosion in the rampart of the curtain, occasioned by the fire of the English artillery, created some confusion among the enemy; that the narrow pass was carried and kept, and a lodgment thus obtained, after a storm, that had lasted two hours; that to stop the impetuosity of the troops was impossible, and that within an hour at utmost, the enemy was driven from all the complicated defensive works, which he had constructed in the streets; that the enemy suffered severely in his retreat to the castle, and left the whole town in the power of the English. This extract from general Graham's report to lord Wellington is sufficient to give an idea both of the bravery of English soldiers, and the inexperience of their engineers.

After lord Wellington had caused two assaults to be made in the month of June, 1811, to carry Badajoz, the author published very circumstantial remarks on the faults

committed by the conductors of the siege. All the English periodical publications, except the *Times*, inveighed against these observations; and yet, in the following year, Badajoz was taken by a strict conformity with the author's principles. Colonel Fletcher of the engineers was an excellent officer, as brave as well informed; he wanted only experience in the conduct of a siege. He perished as a hero on the breach; but it was his own fault. Had he followed the rules of the art, and crowned the covered way, made the descent and passage of the ditch, rendered the breach practicable, and established a lodgment on it, he would, perhaps, have been still alive, and enjoying a less sanguinary species of renown. The storming of St. Sebastian cost three thousand men, because it was performed, or rather prepared, in the Turkish manner. The operation, if well directed, ought not to have cost above one thousand *hors de combat*. The consideration, besides, ought to have had some weight, that the garrison had a safe retreat to the castle, and that the possession of some ruined mansions did not deserve the sacrifice of a vast number of intrepid soldiers. That so liberal an idea should have escaped general Graham's generous mind, is astonishing. Indeed, when the town was taken, the English were obliged to besiege the castle, the position of which induced them to blockade, and bombard it.

Marshal Soult honours courage. He ardently wished to relieve the garrison of St. Sebastian, whose fine defence commanded general admiration. On the very day when the assault was made, he crossed the Bidassoa with the greatest part of his troops, and made an impetuous attack upon the Spaniards, stationed on the heights of San-Mercial. Lord Wellington states that the Spanish troops repulsed the French, and that he had no need to move the English divisions, which formed reserves on the flanks of the Spaniards. Several partial engagements occurred on the front of the two armies. The English commander was obliged

to leave the heights, between Lezaea and the Bidassoa. He retreated to those which are before the convent of San-Antonio, where he maintained himself. Marshal Soult must have had early information, that the town of St. Sebastian was taken. He still wished to try the fate of arms; but a mighty change had taken place in a very short space of time. A year before, the Spaniards were the auxiliaries of Soult in Andalusia; they escorted his convoys; and even mounted his guard. How great must have been his astonishment, when he saw his troops repulsed by the very men, to whom they had hitherto denied the appellation of soldiers! He must have inferred that fortune was forsaking Buonaparte's arms, and that a speedy peace was the only way to preserve the sad wrecks of that colossal power, which in August, 1812, alarmed Europe, from Cadiz to Naples, and from London to Moscow. The French resumed their positions upon the Bidassoa on the first of September, leaving the castle of St. Sebastian at the mercy of the allies.

General Rey proposed an armistice of a fortnight, promising, that unless he obtained some succour within this time, he would at the expiration of it surrender to general Graham, on condition that he should return to France with the garrison. His proposal was rejected. A numerous artillery played upon the castle from the sea and land side, and caused much injury to the besieged. The governor, at length, hoisted the white flag, and sent an officer to obtain a capitulation. The garrison, amounting to seventeen hundred men, were sent to England as prisoners of war. Although these brave men had caused the allies a loss amounting to twice their own number, they were most kindly treated by the English, who are always ready to honour valour and true merit.

Lord Wellington, it has been observed, carried his gratitude to his colleagues too far; but the delicacy, with which he commended the rivals of the land force, deserves the greatest praise, for in England, whatever belongs to the

navy, enjoys a decided preference over the army. In speaking of the officers of the royal navy, whose co-operation was so active, and so effectual during the siege of St. Sebastian, his lordship, in his letter to the earl of Bathurst, dated Lezaca, the second of September, 1813, says that he entirely concurs with general Graham's report concerning the cordial assistance which he received from captain sir George Collier, and the officers, sailors, and marines, under his orders; that they did every thing in their power to facilitate and insure success; that the sailors served the guns in the batteries; and that on every occasion they displayed the energy, which characterises the British navy.

Buonaparte, being alarmed respecting Spain, as marshal Soult had not been successful against the allies, demanded of the senate a levy of thirty thousand men, to be taken from the last conscription in the departments adjacent to the Pyrenees. "This force," said count Regnault de Saint-Jean-d'Angely, "will be sufficient to arrest the career of victory, of which the enemy has boasted too soon; to resume against him the attitude which befits France; to await and prepare the moment when England shall no longer dispose of the treasures of Mexico, which she snatches from Spain, and with which she feeds her commerce in both Indies, prolongs her monopoly in Europe, supports at home her exhausted credit, pensions those she has bribed, and pays her fatal subsidies to the cabinet, which she misleads." The orators, who sent a million of men to the French armies at the beginning of the war of the revolution, did not use such ridiculous cant, such a true lamentation of Jeremiah. The conscripts, who succeeded in escaping, laughed at the decree. A few were arrested by the gendarmerie; they were taken partly to Soult's and partly to Suchet's army. Marshal Suchet, since his departure from Valentia, had not had any serious engagement. He committed a great fault in leaving garrisons, wherever there was a rampart with a ditch; which measure weakened his army to

the amount of more than twenty thousand men. A good general cares little for strong places. A victory opens their gates at a much cheaper rate than the most regular siege. Engineers are not of this opinion, because it infringes upon both their glory and their purse, but it is that of all enlightened officers; and the French government might annually spare immense sums spent for no purpose, as has been incontestibly proved by the battle of Marengo, in 1800, and by the invasion of France in 1814.

Lord Bontick had followed marshal Suchet since his departure from Valencia. As his lordship did not place much confidence in the composition of his troops, he did not wish to risk a battle. He passed the Ebro on the twenty-first of July, between Tortosa and the sea. The flotilla, which followed the movements of the land forces, facilitated that operation. On the twenty-ninth, the allies invested Tarragona, both on the land and sea side. The works of the siege were begun on the third of August. The garrison, being too weak to attempt any sorties, kept up a heavy fire of artillery and musketry. General Decaen formed his junction with marshal Suchet on the fourteenth, in the neighbourhood of Villa-Franca. They determined to march on the following day, to give battle to lord Bontick; and force him to raise the siege. On the fifteenth, the French advanced-guard met an English party in front of Nules, and put them to flight. This skirmish apparently alarmed lord Bontick; and he availed himself of the darkness of the night to retreat to Cambrils. His lordship, though personally a most brave man, wanted firmness of mind. In vain does lord Wellington approve his retreat. It is more justly entitled to blame than that of sir John Murray. In his report of the nineteenth of August, lord Bontick states to the marquis Wellington, that he heard, on the tenth, of marshal Suchet having moved from Barcelona to Villa-Franca, with *five thousand men*, and on the fourteenth, was informed by baron d'Eroles and colonel Manzo, that, inde-

pendent of the troops he had taken from different garrisons, he had been joined by general Decaen, with six thousand men; that in consequence of this information, his lordship suspended all the operations of the siege of Tarragona, except the formation of fascines; and landed neither ordnance nor ammunition; that he had intended to push as far as the Llobregat: that marshal Suchet's army was, at one time, divided between Barcelona and Villa-Franca: that a rapid movement might have enabled his lordship to fall separately upon its advanced-guard; and occupy the chain of mountains on his side of the Llobregat, before he could be joined by his troops from Barcelona; but that his lordship could not execute this movement without being joined by Saarsfield; and that, previously to this junction, marshal Suchet had concentrated his forces in Villa-Franca and the neighbourhood; that the numbers of Suchet's troops had been variously stated at from twenty to twenty-five thousand men; that the environs of Tarragona afforded a position very good in itself; but capable of being completely turned by an enemy, who, crossing the mountains, should approach Tarragona by Valls and Reuse; that on the fourteenth, marshal Suchet moved a considerable corps of troops to Altafalia; but the road being along the beach, the gun-boats prevented his advance, if such had been his intention; that on the fifteenth, he drove back the posts, which were on the cols of Santa-Christina and Llebra; and that he afterwards forced the corps, which was at Brasia, to retreat; his whole army following by the same road, &c.

It is but fair to ask lord Bentinck the details of the combat, which forced the corps that was at Brasia to retreat: for this corps, by its flight, placed at Suchet's disposal those cols, or heights, which, had they been properly guarded, and courageously defended, would have served to stop the progress of the French army. The best position may be turned, if its flanks are not covered by natural advantages, or by the combinations of art. How can his lordship state

that Suchet had twenty or twenty-five thousand men, when, a few lines before, he had mentioned in the same report that he had but eleven thousand? Thirty thousand allies continue eighteen days before an almost dismantled town, garrisoned with two thousand men; and, in spite of their superiority, they retreat without fighting, before an army of eleven or twelve thousand. Sir John Murray, on the contrary, who had but half of lord Bentick's force, would have had to encounter the flower of the French armies of Valentia and Catalonia; while, to give a just idea of the exploits of the viceroy of Sicily, it will be sufficient to state, that he had, in his expedition, *thirteen men hors de combat*.

Marshal Suchet, who was afraid that the allies were too well acquainted with his real force; and that they would advance to give him battle near Tarragona, hastened to blow up the fortifications, which had not yet been destroyed, and fell back to Barcelona. He supplied the want of numbers by much boldness; and it is to the intrepid determination of his manœuvres, that lord Bentick's pusillanimity must be attributed. Thus the unfortunate town of Tarragona, after having been occupied by the French for the space of two years, was left a heap of ruins. Besieged, bombarded, and taken by storm, it became the prey of the flames; and whatever escaped the first conflagration, disappeared through the explosion of the mines and the powder magazines, which were blown up, because they could not be carried away. Tarragona is a small town, situated on a hill, near the sea, between two rivers, the Jaya and the Francoli. Its harbour is not good, being choaked by rocks, which impede the entrance of large vessels. Its population does not exceed ten thousand souls; whilst, in the time of the Romans, it was the best peopled town in Spain. It gave its name to the largest part of the peninsula, which was called Hispania Tarragonensis. Augustus, and Antonius Pius, protected Tarragona by the example of the Scipios, who, in the Punie wars, had made it the principal strong hold against

the Carthaginians. Like Alexandria, it has fallen from its ancient splendour; and, in spite of the fertility of its soil, and the beauty of its situation, Tarragona will not recover from its present humbled state, on account of the vicinity of Barcelona and Valentia: but the most remote posterity will praise the noble devotedness of its inhabitants during the siege of 1812.

After the destruction of Tarragona as a strong town, nothing remarkable occurred in Catalonia, except that lord Bentick's advanced-guard was surprised by marshal Suchet, on the thirteenth of September, in the pass of Ordal. His lordship fell back to Tarragona; and the French, satisfied with having taught the allies a lesson of vigilance, returned to their positions near Barcelona. What can be inferred from this constant superiority of marshal Suchet? The armies in Catalonia, being of the same composition as those on the Bidassoa, it may be taken for granted, that the indolence of the allies, in the east of Spain, proceeded from the inferiority of lord Bentick's talents. His lordship, at length, did himself justice, and sailed for Sicily in a man-of-war, towards the latter part of September. He was succeeded by general Clinton, who so effectually seconded lord Wellington at the battle of Salamanca. But Suchet, who was immediately acquainted with this change, did not wish to endanger the renown acquired by his former successes. He continued on the Llobregat; and general Clinton took a position in the neighbourhood of Tarragona. His troops were superior in number to those of Suchet. He, too, probably was afraid of exposing, as commander-in-chief, the glory which he had acquired under lord Wellington.

His lordship continued to set a glorious example, by attacking the French, whenever they afforded him the least opportunity for doing so, with some prospect of success. The passage of the Bidassoa was effected by general Graham on the seventh of October. He met with a very obsti-

mate resistance, particularly at the hermitage of the Rhune, situated on a very steep rock. The French succeeded in keeping this post the whole night of the seventh, but on the eighth, towards ten o'clock in the morning, it was carried by the English in the most brilliant style. The French, overwhelmed by numbers, were obliged to retreat; and they had the mortification of seeing the enemy take a position on the territory of old France. The passage of the Bidassea cost the allies one thousand men *hors de combat*, and the French lost nearly the same number. This success of lord Wellington was again a consequence of the faulty arrangements, made by the French generals at the battle of Vittoria, where they lost all their artillery. Pampeluna surrendered to the allies on the thirteenth of October, after having been blockaded four months and ten days. The garrison were taken prisoners of war, but they were treated with the greatest regard, because the civil authorities declared that "the conduct of the French towards the Spaniards had been conformable to strict discipline, and that the measures adopted by the governor, during the scarcity, occasioned by the blockade, had been so excellent; that not one single inhabitant died." Pampeluna is the *Pomperopolis* of the Romans, and the *Pampelon* of other nations. It was founded by the great Pompey. Its modern fortifications are the work of the celebrated Vanban, who, for his virtues, talents, services, and misfortunes, well deserves to be handed down to posterity, as equal in glory with the illustrious conqueror of Mithridates.

The author concludes his analysis of the principal exploits of the war in Spain and Portugal with the capture of Pampeluna, and without mentioning the military operations that took place on the French territory, from the passage of the Nivelle to the battle of Toulouse; because he intends soon to publish a work on the restoration, or the triumph of legitimate sovereigns. The allies of the south performed so glorious a part in that great event, that to state their

exploits singly, would be altogether to diminish the importance of their brilliant services, and mangle the most interesting description, which either ancient or modern history can afford.

Lord Wellington braved every danger, overcame every obstacle, and displayed all the resources of his genius, to insure the triumph of the sacred cause of the Bourbons. The allies of the north appeared afraid of entering upon the territory of ancient France. They stopped on the banks of the Rhine. The English commander gave them the signal of battle, which, under his guidance, constantly proved the signal of victory. Proud of having in his camp a worthy descendant of Saint Louis, his royal highness the duke of Angouleme, lord Wellington crossed the Adour, that he might present this prince to the enraptured eyes of the loyal inhabitants of Bordeaux, who received, with true French enthusiasm, the nephew of Louis le Desire, the husband of the august daughter of Louis XVI, and presumptive heir to the throne of France. The allies of the north, encouraged by the successes of their friends of the south, crossed the Rhine, overthrew the armies of Buonaparte, and entered Paris, where they were received like liberators. How greatly must they have rejoiced in the generous efforts they had made, when they witnessed the rapturous exultation of all ranks, at the sight of his royal highness monsieur, brother to the king, and at the entrance of Louis le Desire into his good city!

The restoration of Ferdinand VII, also forms part of the glory appertaining to the English. The noble blood of the Bourbons ought to be avenged for the humiliations which it received from madmen, the disgrace of society, and the most terrible scourge of nations. Where is the individual born to be a subject, that dared to pretend to a more distinguished treatment than such men as Crillon, Turenne, Marlborough, Kleber, Soult, and Wellington? How much would the illustrious crusaders for the happiness of Europe

have to upbraid themselves, if the servile clamours of a few intriguers rendered them deaf to the energetic wishes of all nations, in behalf of their legitimate sovereigns! To have destroyed the cause of the evil is not sufficient; its fatal effects ought to be extirpated as an example to the guilty, and for the honour of the victims, the glory of the restorers, and the security of all. Generosity and clemency ought, it is true, to be the distinctive qualities of sovereigns: but posterity, that severe and incorruptible judge, is sure to devote to the most profound contempt the princes, to whom Providence had intrusted the means of insuring the triumph of their own cause, if they should abuse their trust, to confirm the most unjust usurpation. The reign of quackery has lasted but too long, to the disgrace of those august families, destined by Providence to be the representatives of the Divinity on earth, by a happy combination of benevolence, dignity, and grandeur; and above all, by the mutual confidence and attachment, which subsist between a good prince and his subjects. No, it is neither prudent, nor allowable, nor possible, for the congress of Vienna to clothe with those eminent prerogatives, the usurper of the throne of Naples, to the prejudice of the illustrious descendants of Louis the great. Let the author be allowed to submit to the meditation of the magnanimous authors of the restoration of Louis XVIII, that sublime thought of Tully, pleading for Ligarius, and addressing Cæsar: "The greatest favour you have received from fortune, is the power of preserving life, the glory of legitimate monarchs; and the most flattering advantage you have received from nature, is the will to do so."

BIOGRAPHIC MEMOIR
OF
THE FRENCH MARSHAL SOULT,
DUKE OF DALMATIA.*

Seldom he smiles, and smiles in such a sort,
As if he mock'd himself, and scorn'd his spirit,
That could be mov'd to smile at any thing.

SHAKESPEARE'S *Julius Caesar*, Act I.

GENERAL SOULT was one of the four generals of the imperial guard, and had the chief command of the French troops in Andalusia. He is but forty-two years of age, though he appears much older. His height is five feet ten inches; his constitution vigorous; his features ordinary, except his eyes, which are rather scrutinizing. He has altogether a look expressive of a genius above the common cast. An attentive observer soon discovers in his countenance that strength of mind, to which he is indebted for most of his victories. His figure is soldier-like, and his manners unaffected: but his address is cold. He speaks little: he is uncommonly strict as to enforcing discipline: his activity and his sagacity have often deservedly obtained the encomiums of Kleber and Buonaparte.

* This Biographic Memoir was published at London, during November, 1811, in the first volume of *The Philosopher*. On my arrival at Paris, in May, 1814, an officer of the staff requested me to lend him the translation of this account. He returned it to me with some marginal observations, which impartiality induces me to publish, with my remarks in reply.—S.

As he was born of parents in but middling circumstances, Soult must be considered the only founder of his military fortune. He was only sixteen years of age, when he enlisted as a common soldier. His good conduct attracted the attention of his superiors, who successively appointed him a corporal and a serjeant. His strong attachment to the career of arms, led him to study, with success, the manœuvres of infantry. His improvement was rapid; and even in those subaltern stations, he already manifested that firmness of character, which has since so greatly contributed to his advancement. In 1792, his reputation of being an excellent instructor, gained him the appointment of adjutant-major in a battalion of national guards. In 1793, he was appointed an officer on the staff, and some little time after an adjutant-general. It was in this capacity that he was employed in the army of the Moselle, under the command of Jourdan. When forty thousand men of that army marched to the Sambre, for the purpose of relieving Charleroi, Soult was chief of the staff in the division of general Lefevre, which formed the advanced-guard.

On the twenty-sixth day of June, 1794, the day of the battle of Fleurus, the right wing of the French army, under the orders of general Marceau, was attacked by the Austrian general, Beaulieu, at three o'clock in the morning, and at noon all the troops of Marceau had been defeated. They were flying in the greatest confusion; and their general himself, surrounded by the dragoons of the Austrian regiment of Latour, owed his safety only to the bravery of the officers attached to his staff, who protected his retreat to Lefevre's division. "Give me," said Marceau to this general, "four of your battalions, that I may drive the enemy from the position which he has just carried." Observing that Lefevre hesitated, he added in a tone of despair, with a view to effect his object: "If you refuse me, I'll blow my brains out." Lefevre, turning round to Soult, who was present, asked his opinion; the latter answered,

that "to detach even the smallest number of troops, would expose the safety of the division." Marceau, casting an angry look at him, asked who he was, that he should take upon himself to speak in such a peremptory tone?—"I am calm," answered Soult coldly, "and you are not so." This observation only tended to inflame the anger of Marceau, who challenged Soult to fight him the next day; "To-day, or to-morrow," replied Soult. "You will always find me ready to tell you the truth, and to pay you the respect due to your rank. Do not blow your brains out, but fight with us, and when our danger is over, we will give you the battalions you wish for." At that very moment, the prince of Cobourg assailed Lefevre with the flower of his troops. Seven times did the Hungarian grenadiers renew their attacks. Soult rapidly flew to wherever the peril was greatest; Marceau, too, fought like a lion. Lefevre remained with the reserve. The battle raged for several hours with an obstinacy bordering on fury. The brave regiment, called the Royal Allemand, repeatedly charged the columns headed by Soult and Marceau, which were pursuing the Austrian grenadiers. About three hundred of these intrepid warriors met with death, close to Lefevre's intrenched camp. At six o'clock in the evening, all the divisions of the army of the Moselle were retreating, except that of general Lefevre. Fearing for his two flanks, this commander was about to follow the movement of the rest, when Soult intreated him to wait; assuring him, that as far he could judge from the uncertainty of their manoeuvres, the enemy was already beginning to retreat. This opinion of Soult was soon confirmed by orders to make an attack sent by Jourdan, who, by means of observers stationed in a balloon, had learnt the movements of the Austrian army. Marceau and Soult attacked the village of Lambussart, and succeeded in taking it. Prince Cobourg effected his retreat in good order, after a sanguinary battle, which lasted nearly eighteen hours without interruption.

Marceau, who had witnessed Soult's ability and coolness, said to Lefevre: "The chief of your staff is a man of merit: he will soon obtain great renown."—"Yes," answered Lefevre, carelessly, "he is not a bad officer. I am satisfied with him, for he conducts the business of my staff tolerably well." Marceau then held out his hand to Soult, and in a friendly tone said, "general, I beg you will forget the warmth with which I spoke this morning. Although my rank entitles me to give you instructions, you have this day taught me a lesson, which I never shall forget while I live. It is you who have gained the battle of Fleurus." With these words, he embraced him, and from that moment there subsisted between them the most solid friendship, until the death of Marceau took place, which event Soult most feelingly deplored.

During the campaigns of 1794, 95, 96, and 97, Soult continued at the head of general Lefevre's staff. Whenever any one praised the former, in the presence of the latter, Lefevre immediately answered, that Soult was better calculated for the desk than the field, though he knew very well that he was highly qualified for either. But it was policy which induced him to lessen Soult's merit as a tactician, lest some commander-in-chief, or the directory, might deprive him of that officer, for the purpose of placing him in a situation more congenial with his talents. This is the true reason that Soult remained so long in a subordinate station. Whoever had seen Lefevre, and heard him argue on military matters, was amazed that a man of such scanty information could have acquired the great reputation he enjoyed. His division consisted of fifteen thousand men. Whenever the army was moving forward, it formed the advanced-guard, and in every retreat it acted as the rear-guard. In the camp, as on the march, and in the field of battle, this division always preserved the greatest order, was never broken, and almost constantly gained the victory of the day. The troops of Marceau, Championet, Berna-

dette, and other generals, were far from enjoying the same reputation, though their commanders were known to possess talents much superior to those of Lefevre. Soult was, therefore, universally acknowledged as the author of his general's glory. The cavalry deployed on the field of battle with as much precision as on a parade; and the infantry manœuvred, under a most destructive fire, like Swiss soldiers. Soult superintended every thing; he even carried his attention so far, as to be regularly on the spot when provisions were distributed, that he might be sure of their being good; which attention gained him the esteem of the soldiers. He was equally fearless in reprimanding officers guilty of neglect, as he was ready to express his satisfaction at the conduct of those who manifested their zeal for the service. He himself set them the best example; and on a day of battle, he was sure to be found in the foremost ranks.

Lefevre, by his bombastic reports to government, succeeded in gathering for himself the fruits of so much zeal: but he never could deceive the soldiers. Whenever they experienced any reverse, the cry throughout the division was: "It happened because the general interfered; why does he not blindly rely on the chief of his staff?" These details are by no means exaggerated, but simple truth. I, myself, served with Soult in Lefevre's division, as adjutant-general, and I was fully enabled to appreciate the merit of either.

Soult was at length appointed a general of brigade: but Lefevre being unwilling to part with him, caused him to be entrusted with the command of the advanced-guard of his division; and Lefevre having been wounded, Jourdan gave his division to Soult, who commanded it in chief at the battle of Leibtengen, on the twenty-sixth of March, 1799. Soult, after his promotion to the rank of a general of division, was employed in Switzerland under Massena, whose right hand he was supposed to be. He followed that general into Italy, and effectually assisted him at the siege of Genoa, where Soult

was wounded by a ball, that shattered his right leg. He was taken prisoner with his brother, who was then his aide-de-camp, and chief of a squadron, and who has since been raised to the rank of a general, in which capacity he commanded the cavalry of the fourth corps, in the kingdom of Granada. ●

The Austrians having lost the battle of Marengo, Soult returned to his native country. As soon as he recovered from illness, produced by his wounds, he was appointed commander-in-chief of a corps of observation in the kingdom of Naples. Officers who then served under his orders, have assured me that his love of justice and probity, gained him the affection and respect of both the troops and the inhabitants. General Lefevre having recommended Soult to Buonaparte, as being equally skilled in manœuvres, and strict with regard to discipline, he was sent for to Paris, and appointed colonel-general of the *chasseurs a pied* of the consular guard. He constantly showed himself worthy of Buonaparte's confidence; and the effects of Soult's influence were soon visible in the great improvements of whatever related to the service. Delighted with the rapid advances of his guard in discipline, appearance, and instruction, Buonaparte thought he could not appoint any officer better qualified than general Soult, to be commander-in-chief of the camp of Boulogne.

Being possessed of more sincerity than the other courtiers, Soult loudly blamed the immense works which were constructing on the coast near Boulogne, and on both banks of the Liane. He was suffered to rail; and his freedom of speech was forgiven on account of his having the good sense to show himself one of the most zealous advocates for the erection of Buonaparte's triumphal pillar, with this inscription: "The army and navy to Napoleon the Great." Soult would have acted more wisely, had he advised his master to construct good barraeks for the soldiers, to establish a healthy hospital with a spacious garden, and to build pow-

der magazines of free-stone, instead of wood; which, like so many volcanoes, threatened complete destruction to Boulogne. This was the more to be dreaded, as it might have been caused by the imprudence of a sentry, or the malice of a villain. But unfortunately splendour is preferred to utility; and in conformity to this fatal principle, that which might be really advantageous to society, is neglected.

During his stay at Boulogne, Soult displayed uncommon activity. Almost continually on horseback, he visited the coast, the camps, and the cantonments; and employed himself in teaching his troops those great evolutions, which proved of so much service to him at the battle of Austerlitz. When the army of Boulogne was ordered to Germany, Soult crossed the Rhine at Spire, on the twenty-sixth of September, 1805, and marched to Nördlingen, by Heilbron. On the sixth of October, he took possession of the *tête du pont* at Donauworth, passed the Danube, and advanced to Augsburg, which he entered without fighting. Memmingen also opened its gates to him after a slight resistance. During the whole campaign, Buonaparte entrusted Soult with the most important posts. At the battle of Austerlitz he commanded the right wing of the army. Buonaparte having sent him orders to attack the heights of Pratzen instantly, Soult answered to the aid-de-camp who was the bearer of those orders, "that he would begin the attack, as soon as he could do it with any prospect of success, but that it was not yet the proper time." This answer was reported to Buonaparte, and excited his anger; he immediately sent another aid-de-camp, to repeat his orders. This officer arrived at the very moment when Soult had already commenced his movement, which he had delayed with the sole view to allow the Russians time for moving towards their left, and thus weakening their centre. ~~He~~ who opposed the advance of Soult's corps, were either killed or taken, and he established himself on the fine elevated plain near Pratzen. Buonaparte, who was on a height, from which he

could observe all the movements of the army, was delighted with his lieutenant's fine manœuvres, and their brilliant results. He rode up to him full speed, and in the presence of all the officers of his staff, who but a few moments before had heard him bitterly inveighing against Soult, embraced the latter, saying, "My dear marshal, I hold you to be the first tactician of my empire."—"Sire, I believe it," replied Soult; "since it is your majesty that has the goodness to tell me so." This well-timed compliment gave as much pleasure to Buonaparte, as it created surprise among the spectators. Nothing was wanting to complete the effect of this extraordinary scene, but the presence of the colonel, who commanded the regiment of foot, in which Soult had served as a common soldier in 1786. Had he beheld his inexperienced recruit, changed into an adroit courtier, and a clever general, capable of beating those Russian and Austrian commanders who had acquired so much glory by their splendid exploits against the Turks, the colonel, no doubt, would have thought it a miracle.

On the fourteenth of October, 1806, at the battle of Jena, Soult decided the victory by his movement against the centre of the Prussian army, after having gained possession of a wood on his right. On the sixteenth of the same month, being in the village of Greussen, he would not give credit to the statement of an armistice being concluded, which general Kalkreuth pretended to be the case, in order to favour the retreat of the column that covered the king of Prussia's flight. Buonaparte, in his tenth bulletin, dated Naumburg, the eighteenth of October, 1806, has manufactured a conference between the Prussian general and marshal Soult, for the purpose of giving a lesson, in his way, to those generals of the grand army, who having good-naturedly believed in the pretended armistice, suffered several Prussian columns to escape. Soult rendered eminent services in Prussia and in Poland. At the battle of Eylau, though his troops were inferior as to number, he kept general Beningsen's

army in check. Marshal Augereau had been overthrown, and had left marshal Soult's left wing uncovered. Marshal Davoust had been delayed in his march by bad roads. Marshal Ney was fighting against the Prussians; and Bernadotte was too far distant for his co-operation to have been hoped for. But Soult made so excellent a use of his troops, that he seemed to multiply them. If after having forced Augereau's corps to quit the field of battle, the whole Russian army had rushed headlong (their favourite manoeuvre) upon marshal Soult's line, Buonaparte would have been completely defeated; and Davoust's troops, whom this movement would have cut off from the rest of the army, would have been taken, killed or dispersed. On the approach of the night which succeeded that bloody day (the eighth of February, 1807,) Buonaparte, alarmed at the enormous loss which he had suffered, wished to retreat. "Let us stay where we are, sire," said Soult; "for although we have been cruel sufferers, we shall pass for conquerors, if we remain the last on the field of battle. I have observed movements in the Russian army, which induce me to think that Beningsen will avail himself of night to retreat." Though Buonaparte dared not hope for such good fortune, he adopted the opinion of Soult, with whose uncommon penetration he was well acquainted. He was so delighted with the turn which his affairs had taken, that he was seen the whole next day examining, with a smiling countenance, the environs of Eylau, that dreadful scene of devastation and slaughter, where twenty thousand dead, dying, and wounded, lay helpless on the snow, the army being in want of every thing!

Soon after the peace of Tilsit, Soult was appointed to a command in the army of Spain. On the tenth of November, 1808, he attacked the troops of Estremadura with the second corps, put them to the rout, and took possession of Burgos. He then marched to Reynosa, occupied Saint Andero, and sent detachments into the kingdom of the Asturias, whilst the other corps of the French army were

manœuvring on the two banks of the Ebro, and defeating Castanos at Tudela.

Buonaparte having determined to march to Madrid, he ordered Soult to observe general Moore, and manœuvré so as to draw the English army towards Burgos;* whilst a corps of choice troops endeavoured to seize their line of operations, for the purpose of cutting off their retreat to Corunna, where the ships, destined to take them to England, were waiting. General Moore's sagacity made him avoid a snare so artfully laid for him. He retreated to Benevente, where his cavalry had a successful engagement with the *chasseurs* of the imperial guard. Soult's march was slow, and his attacks were far from vigorous. Whatever Buonaparte may assert, Soult was most certainly repulsed at the battle of Corunna; and the English gained a defensive victory, though dearly purchased with the loss of their brave general, Moore, who was alike distinguished for his private virtues, and his military talents.

The invasion of Portugal cannot be ranked among the exploits, which redound to marshal Soult's honour. It is

* *Note by the officer of Soult's staff.*—This is not correct. Marshal Soult received no orders nor injunctions of that kind. He returned, of his own accord, from the mountains of the Asturias, where he was manœuvring on the Carion, where he learnt that the English were marching to the Douro; and he arrived just in time to keep them in check. Buonaparte had not foreseen this movement. Soult advanced with great vigour against the English; and, on his march, carried off two Spanish divisions of La Romana's corps. At Corunna he defeated the English, and forced them to reembark with precipitation, leaving behind, their horses, magazines, and equipage.

Answer of the author to the above note.—My remarks are founded on the official reports of general Moore, and the French bulletins. If Buonaparte had not foreseen the movement of the English, nor ordered that of marshal Soult to resist them, it confirms the opinion I have often expressed, respecting Soult's superiority of talents. As for the remainder of the note, the facts, mentioned in the body of the work, afford a satisfactory answer on a well known subject. When a commander takes neither a cannon nor a man from an army he attacks, and cannot force that army from its position, whilst the assailants are obliged to return to the position which they occupied before the attack, nothing is more easy than to point out the conqueror.

true, that after having overthrown the Portuguese regiments of militia, he took the town of Oporto by storm. But how did he defend this important post? What measures did he take to prevent lord Wellington's effecting the passage of the Douro? I have been credibly informed, that Soult was very near being made a prisoner at Oporto. He was at table, with all the officers of his staff, when he heard that the enemy was already in the town. He had only just time enough to mount his horse,† and was obliged to

* *Note by the officer of Soult's staff.*—The author is not correctly informed. The expedition to Portugal was a consequence of the secret treaty of Tilsit, with which he is unacquainted. The battle of Oporto is one of the finest exploits that can be quoted. Marshal Soult was forced to retreat, because, first, the population in his rear was in open insurrection; secondly, the English army, by which he was attacked, was superior in numbers; and, thirdly, marshal Victor, who was to advance with three divisions by Ciudad-Rodrigo and the Alentejo, did not make his appearance. Soult's determination to leave his artillery behind, does him much honour, as it was the means of saving his army. He brought nineteen thousand five hundred men back; and lost, in this expedition, but three thousand five hundred, including the two thousand who remained in the hospitals at Oporto.

Answer of the author.—I certainly did not know that there had been any mention of the expedition to Portugal in the treaty of Tilsit, with which, like all Europe, I was only acquainted by seeing the articles in the public papers. I am also of opinion, that the conquest of Oporto was a *fine coup de main*: but it cannot be ranked with the battles of Austerlitz and Jena; nor even with the storming of Badajoz, on the sixth of April, 1812. Oporto was defended by peasants, and attacked by French soldiers; whilst Badajoz was defended by French soldiers! I concur with the officer of the staff in the praises, which he bestows upon the retreat from Portugal; and I am glad to hear that the number of men lost was much less than stated in the English reports.

† *Note by the officer of Soult's staff.*—This is not exact. Marshal Soult was prepared, and in motion: he had no occasion to open himself a passage.

Answer of the author.—The colonel, of whom I had the fact, was not at Oporto when it occurred. He may have magnified the report of some eyewitness. It is, however, incontestibly true, and not denied, that the English riflemen fired upon marshal Soult in the streets of Oporto; and that, in spite of his strenuous exertions, he could not succeed in driving general Hill's column from the town. I therefore admit that Soult was in motion, but not prepared. On this occasion it may be said of him—

“*Et quandoque bonus dormitat Homerus.*”

open himself a passage through the English riflemen, sword in hand. I had this fact from colonel d'Auture, who was in marshal Soult's staff; and has since been employed in mine, while I commanded at the camp of Boulogne.—When the second corps entered Portugal on the tenth of February, 1809, it was twenty-three thousand strong. When the same corps quitted that kingdom, on the eighteenth of May following, it had suffered a diminution of eight thousand men; and all its artillery and baggage were left behind. The loss of the men was almost entirely occasioned by the vindictive spirit of the peasants, who took no prisoners, but slaughtered all that fell in their way. It happened, by one of those caprices of inconstant fortune, that Soult arrived very opportunely to raise the blockade of Lugo, which was invested by twenty thousand Spaniards, under general Mahi. The garrison, consisting of the sixty-ninth regiment, under the orders of general Fournier, were absolutely without provisions, and unable to protract their defence. The Spaniards retreated on Soult's approach; and this fortunate occurrence threw the veil of oblivion over his miscarriage in Portugal.

Soult's march to Placentia, with his own corps, and that of marshal Mortier, obliged lord Wellington to evacuate his position at Talavera-de-la-Reyna. Buonaparte rated Soult's force at seventy thousand men; whilst, in fact, he had not above thirty thousand.* The marshal seemed to

* *Note by the officer of Soult's staff.*—The truth is, that Soult had fifty-six thousand men, comprising the corps of marshals Ney and Mortier. He executed some bold manœuvres, in spite of the orders of king Joseph, who was generalissimo, and who had just lost the battle of Talavera. Joseph and his army would have been ruined, had not Soult arrived three days afterwards to save them. At the marshal's approach, lord Wellington precipitately retreated to the Guadiana, and abandoned Cuesta's Spanish army. Had Joseph listened to Soult's advice, the English army would have been lost, or at least very much exposed.

Answer of the author.—Soult may have had fifty-six thousand men at Salamanca: but, deducting the garrison of that place, the corps necessary

be taking his revenge for having been driven from the north of Portugal. The conquest of Oporto, and the victory at Talavera, are certainly very brilliant exploits; but it is equally certain, that both lord Wellington and marshal Soult suffered themselves to be influenced by exaggerated reports, and did not make the best of two successes, purchased at the expense of so much blood. King Joseph, having been obliged to fly with all speed after the loss of the battle of Talavera, justly concluded that marshal Jourdan, the chief of his staff, had not attainments sufficient to direct the military operations in the peninsula, and entrusted marshal Soult with those important functions.* King Joseph soon had reason to congratulate himself on the choice he had made. An

to observe the garrison of Ciudad-Rodrigo, and the troops requisite to keep up the communications as far as Placentia, in a country that was in open insurrection; and, adding to this, the slowness, not to say the refusal of a certain marshal to co-operate—all these circumstances induce the belief that Soult could not have attacked the allies with more than thirty thousand foot, and from four to five thousand horse. I differ, too, in another respect, from the officer of the staff; for I think that Soult's march to Talavera, by Placentia, partakes more of rashness than of skill. He would have been very careful not to take such a license, when lord Wellington was acting on the Adour upon *fixed plans* of operation, and after he had acquired five years more experience in the higher tactics. This part of my work is, therefore, perfectly correct; except that there ought to be a few thousands added to Soult's force; which circumstance, however, does not destroy the accuracy of my argument, as the allies would still have had about twice as many troops as the French.

* *Note by the officer of Soult's staff.*—It was Buonaparte, who, by one of his decrees, appointed marshal Soult major-general of the French armies in Spain, and gave him the right to assume an immediate command, wherever he might be. Soult never would take the title of major-general to king Joseph.

Answer of the author.—I applaud marshal Soult, for having refused the title of major-general to king Joseph. He was so, however, by a decree; since it is said, in the fourth note, that Joseph was *generalissimo* of the armies in Spain. I know, from a good quarter, that Soult also had unlimited powers from Joseph, when his majesty's head was not intoxicated with champaign, or influenced by some favourite. But whether Soult was Joseph's major-general, or commander-in-chief, is perfectly immaterial. Buonaparte only is highly to be blamed for not having ordered his brother impli-

army of fifty thousand Spaniards, under the orders of general Arrizaga, was completely defeated in the plains of Ocana, on the nineteenth of November, 1809. King Joseph commanded the French in person, under the direction of marshal Soult. It is impossible not to lament the disasters of those brave Castilians. Why encounter an army inured to war by several campaigns, with raw troops and in an open country? Why not await the French in the fine positions of the Sierra-Morena? * Why, in short, if the Spaniards were so madly anxious to come to blows, did they not act in concert with the English, whose discipline and experience afforded reasonable hopes of success, or would at least have saved them from the disasters of a rout?

On the twentieth of January, 1810, Soult made a general attack on the enemy, who defended the passes of the Sierra-Morena. His victory at Ocana had dismayed the Spaniards. On the twenty-second, all obstacles were overcome; and he had his head-quarters at Baylen, a place forever memorable from the victory of the Spaniards over the French under general Dupont. Marshal Soult did not avail himself of the terror, spread among all classes of inhabitants, by his passage of the Sierra. If, instead of scattering his troops, he had rapidly proceeded with all his forces to Seville, and thence to Cadiz; he probably would have obtained undisputed possession of those two cities: but he seemed to hesitate,† and advanced with the slowness of a

citly to adopt the marshal's advice; and marshal Soult is not less blameable for having consented to act, without that express condition in every thing relative to the army.

* *Note by the officer of Soult's staff.*—They were also defeated in the Sierra.

Answer by the author.—That is true; but merely because they had committed the fault of fighting in the plains of Ocana. If Arrizaga's army of fifty thousand men had been stationed, by a general like Soult, to defend the passes of the Sierra-Morena, I appeal to the marshal himself, whether their position would not have been impregnable.

† *Note by the officer of Soult's staff.*—The whole army marched to Seville, which opened its gates without hesitation: three divisions, which had

Tortoise. If instead of sending Sebastiani to Grenada, and Mortier towards Badajoz, he had marched them towards Cadiz, with a bridge equipage to cross the river of Santi Petri, the despatch, which acquainted prince Berthier with the conquest of Andalusia, would have been dated from Soult's head-quarters at Cadiz. It is thus that Buonaparte would have manœuvred, had he commanded this expedition in person. The influence of the French party at Cadiz insured the surrender of the place.* In vain will Soult attempt to excuse himself, by asserting that his plans were paralysed through the irresolution of king Joseph: he ought plainly to have told the latter "that his kingdom was not of this world." The king ought to have been reckoned as nothing whenever circumstances demanded the abilities of a general. The French owed their victory at Fontenoy to the

not six thousand Spaniards before them, went by forced marches to Cadiz. They were under command of Victor, who might, perhaps, have made a more rapid advance, though the army was without any bridge equipage. For the rest, there were no troops detached before the capture of Seville; and those, which were sent afterwards, did not in the least counteract the expedition to Cadiz.

Answer by the author.—I have shown that the march to Seville was too slow; a first fault. Why keep the whole army two days before Seville, when the submission of Cadiz depended on arriving there first? a second fault. As for the third, which the staff officer admits, when he says, that *Victor might have made a more rapid advance*, it is so glaring, that it is justly considered as the first cause of the disasters experienced by the French in the peninsula.

* *Note by the officer of Soult's staff.*—The influence of the English and the cortes, backed by the whole armed population, and eight thousand regular troops, covered by intrenchments, was much stronger.

Answer by the author.—At this period the whole population was in favour of the French. To talk of the influence of the cortes is ridiculous. They were then considered as a company of stage-players. The English were distrusted, and their good faith suspected. Had Victor arrived before the duke of Albuquerque, he would have been received with the greatest enthusiasm. I need only refer to the duke of Albuquerque's letter, and to the galling vexations, with which the partisans of the French overwhelmed that unfortunate nobleman, who afterwards died broken-hearted at London, from having met with so much ingratitude on the part of his fellow-citizens.

good sense* of Louis XV, who, on a day of battle, considered himself merely as first aid-de-camp to the marshal de Saxe.

The defeat of La Romana's corps, on the nineteenth of February, 1811, and the capture of Badajoz, which surrendered to the French on the eleventh of March, are events, so much the more vexatious to the allies, as all chances were in their favour to avoid these disasters. Instead of pursuing Massena, who vanished like a shadow, lord Wellington should have detached the Portuguese, with some light troops, to harass the rear-guard of the French, and marched to the relief of Badajoz, with the flower of his troops. This place, the key of the Guadiana, surrendered only on the eleventh, and it might have been relieved on the ninth. Buonaparte is rather ridiculous when he finds fault with marshal Soult, for not having delegated the command of Andalusia to marshal Victor, when he himself proceeded to Estremadura. Every lieutenant in the French army knows that the governorship of a province belongs, by the military regulations, to the oldest officer, in point of rank, next to the commander-in-chief.† Victor

* *Note by the officer of Soult's army.*—All this is true; but it is singular that the author attributes the fault to marshal Soult. He appears to have no idea of the difficulties which the marshal encountered, to do good and prevent harm.

Answer by the author.—A historian knows neither friends nor enemies. He ought even to forget that he exposes himself to be persecuted by the present generation. Two ideas only are to be incessantly in his mind: justice and posterity. Marshal Soult has, perhaps, to reproach himself with having rendered Joseph refractory by exaggerated compliments, always dangerous when addressed to a fool. What occasion, for instance, had the marshal, after the battle of Ocaña, to say to the former war-commissary, Joseph d'Ajaccio: "Sire, I congratulate you on the signal victory, which your majesty has just gained." We cease to be surprised that this scribe should fancy he was become a general, when we find the conqueror of Austerlitz weak enough to proclaim his pretended talents, and to give him the merit of a brilliant triumph.

† *Note by the officer of Soult's staff.*—General Sebastiani had been purposely placed under marshal Victor's orders.

was a marshal, and Sebastiani a general of division. It is not probable that the latter would have refused to execute Victor's orders, if this marshal had taken care to send him any in time. Buonaparte was much to be pitied, if, for the sake of lessening the disgrace of a reverse to the eyes of the French, he was reduced to a foolish quarrel with his best officers. Had he wished for a just motive to blame marshal Soult, the battle of Albuera, which the latter fought on the sixteenth of May,* afforded him a fine opportunity for venting his anger. It was in the night of the fifteenth to the sixteenth, that Soult was informed by his spies that the siege of Badajoz had been raised. Instead, therefore, of wantonly causing the slaughter of many thousand brave warriors, he ought to have manœuvred on the morning of the sixteenth, just as he did on the following day. This was clearly pointed out, by his superiority in cavalry, which would completely have covered all the movements of his infantry. Such a threatening attitude

Answer by the author.—Knowing marshal Soult's regularity in whatever concerns the service, I had no hesitation in assuring the English ministers that this assertion of Buonaparte was false, and that he had advanced it merely with the view to throw some discredit upon Soult, of whose talents and successes he was childishy jealous.

* *Note by the officer of Soult's staff.*—The marshal could not be informed of the siege of Badajoz having been raised, as there still remained a corps of English and Spanish troops before that place. A battle, besides, was indispensable, to prevent the enemy resuming his operation before Badajoz, and give marshal Marmont time to reach the Guadiana, with the army of Portugal; which object was accomplished. The marshal glories in the battle of Albuera: under existing circumstances, it saved Badajoz.

Answer by the author.—The corps, which remained before Badajoz, could not save the works of the besiegers from destruction. It is, therefore, matter of surprise that the governor should not have informed the marshal of what was passing. My observations on the battle of Albuera are so circumstantial; that they do not require any further comments. The manœuvres, performed during the battle, do certainly great credit to the marshal, though victory remained doubtful. Such is my opinion as a tactician; but as a historian, I must blame both Soult and Beresford for having forgotten that they were also the fathers, and not merely the commanders of their soldiers.

would have overawed general Beresford, who could not have resumed the siege of Badajoz for several days. It is even probable that, had it not been for the wanton slaughter of the sixteenth of May, the allies would not have refused battle after the junction of Soult's and Marmont's armies; and every thing tends to strengthen the belief that the fate of the peninsula would have been decided on the twentieth of June, in the plains of Albuera. Lord Wellington may also be reproached for having permitted general Beresford to fight a regular battle with marshal Soult, who more than a year before, had been pointed out to the English government, as the most able of the French generals in Spain; and it might have been naturally supposed that this information would have rendered his lordship anxious to be present, at the first important engagement, which occurred with marshal Soult.

The conduct of the French generals, after having relieved Badajoz, and subsequent to lord Wellington's retreat from Portalegre, afforded matter of surprise to all military men; who asked why two French armies, that had found their junction so difficult, separated again without giving battle to the enemy, who was only at one day's distance? The lines of Portalegre could not, in twenty-four hours, have been converted into the second edition of the lines of Torres Vedras; and this position offered no obstacles, sufficient to stop the double torrent, which, a few months before, had

** Note by the officer of Soult's staff.*—Buonaparte imperiously commanded it. Marshal Soult even experienced his displeasure, for having been of a contrary opinion; and from that instant the marshal foretold the misfortunes which it afterwards was not in his power to prevent.

Answer by the author.—This was one of the greatest faults committed by the French generals during the war. A complete victory, gained over the allies at that time, would have rendered their situation so much the more critical, as Suchet had just then subdued the kingdom of Valencia. Had I been in the post of Soult and Marmont, I think I should have obeyed the laws of tactics, for my own glory and the honour of the French arms, under the conviction that Buonaparte would not have withheld his approbation, for the sake of the success, which was infallible.

broken through the Sierra Morena, and overflowed Portugal. Time, the great teacher, will perhaps one day reveal the cause of those singular movements. I for my part am tempted to believe, that Massena in 1810, and Soult in 1811, reluctantly obeyed superior orders. But whatever may be the case, Soult has exposed himself to the censure of history, by inserting in his report of the siege of Badajoz, facts contradicted by the English reports, and highly improbable in themselves. The events of war are uncertain; but the reputation of the chief commanders is to the world a guarantee of the truth, on which public opinion ought to rest. The English army did more than its duty at the siege of Badajoz, as it attempted two assaults before the breach was practicable.

On the ninth of August the army of Murcia was attacked by marshal Soult, and its dispersion appears to have been effected by the French troops of the fourth corps, with as much ease as a simple march. Blake's arrival in Murcia, with reinforcements from Cadiz, ought, however, to have awakened the energy of the Spaniards, and increased their spirit of resistance. Lord Wellington also may be asked why he did not make a diversion on the Guadiana, to prevent Soult's march against the army of Murcia. This shows how wrong it was in the English not to have immediately adopted a fixed plan of military operations, and a good system of organization. In consequence of this double neglect, the provinces of Spain were attacked, ravaged, and subdued, in succession, like other kingdoms of the European continent.

Though I have been more than once under the necessity of censuring the operations of marshal Soult, he was nevertheless, the general of the French armies who should rank next to Buonaparte and Moreau. He had not a genius for the higher tactics, equal to those two commanders; but he is their superior in the practical application, or execution of manœuvres on the spot. As Buonaparte regretted, in

1809, that he had not Soult with him on the banks of the Danube; so did Soult, more than once, in Spain and Portugal, regret that he was not under the immediate directions of Buonaparte. For some time, Soult was strongly suspected of being a warm republican; it has even been asserted that he espoused the other party, merely from policy. Some say that he caused himself to be treated like a king at Oporto.* These rumours, however, never were confirmed, in spite of the pains that prince Berthier took to verify them. Buonaparte, besides, ever since his elevation to the imperial throne, had cast off the mask, and it was perfectly immaterial to him whether he was beloved, provided he was obeyed and feared, as he was by Soult.

My opinion is that this marshal, who is one of the men most amply rewarded for their services, seeks only to keep in favour with his sovereign, by honourably performing his duty. He, no doubt, like many others, raised his voice

* *Note by the officer of Soult's staff*—These reports were all equally absurd, and the public was silly enough not to perceive that Buonaparte caused them to be circulated, designedly with the view to lower Soult in public opinion, just as he had done with regard to general Moreau.

Answer by the author.—Buonaparte never believed these reports, although he abused general Ricard, under the pretence that this officer had written proclamations to forward the success of the project. Though better calculated to fill a throne than Murat, marshal Soult had no such foolish ambition. He never had any wish but for the glory and happiness of his country. That he used all the means proper to extricate his troops from a bad situation, but always in concert with his colleagues, and informing government of his proceedings, was a duty imposed upon him by the laws of war. Who is the Frenchman that feels not grateful to marshal Soult, for having dared to adopt such a stratagem, in order to spare the French armies the grief and disgrace, which constantly attend the most honourable capitulation? When I published my Biographic Memoir of Marshal Soult, in November, 1811, Buonaparte was in the plenitude of his power; and I had no object but to merit the esteem of Europe, by an impartial narrative. I am, therefore, forced to blame the indiscreet zeal of the officer of the staff, who wishes to represent marshal Soult, as the conqueror on the sixteenth of January, 1809, at Corunna, and on the sixteenth of May, 1811, at Albuera. Soult has gained so many brilliant victories, that no one needs to be at the pains of ascribing to him any which he is not entitled to.

against the imperial elevation of Buonaparte; but when afterwards acting one of the principal parts in the war, it would have been nothing short of madness to think of the re-establishment of the republic. On the contrary, marshal Soult's solid and enlightened understanding induces the belief that, in proper time, he will prove one of the firmest supports of the throne, a zealous advocate for religion, and a strict observer of military discipline. Men, possessed of these highly important qualities under legitimate governments, insure alike the happiness of citizens, the glory of monarchs, and the splendour of empires.

NOTE ON THE SIEGE OF BURGOS.

On the nineteenth of September, the English obtained possession of fort St. Michael by a *coup de main*. Between the twentieth and twenty-third, the trenches were opened, the batteries established, and the besieged made a warm resistance. On the twenty-fourth, the besiegers left the suburb of St. Peter, to attack the intrenched camp. Nothing remarkable occurred between the twenty-fifth and the twenty-ninth; but in the night of the twenty-ninth to the thirtieth, the English blew up a mine, without any beneficial consequence to themselves. From the thirtieth of September to the third of October, the usual attacks and defences proceeded. On the fourth a mine exploded, an assault was made, and the English established themselves on the breach of the intrenched camp. From the fifth to the eighteenth, the briskness of the attack was paralysed by the ability of the defence. On the eighteenth, a general assault was made by three English columns, but victory remained with the besieged. The French chief of a battalion, Laidé, distinguished himself by his bravery and sagacity. The general of brigade, Dubreton, was promoted to the rank of a general of division, for his fine defence of a paltry town against the flower of the English army. The loss of the French, during the siege, which lasted thirty-four days, amounted to eight hundred men *hors de combat*; that of the besiegers exceeded three thousand.


NOTE ON THE DEFEAT OF THE FRENCH AT BAYLEN, IN 1808.


Since this work was printed, the author has been assured, by officers of distinction in the French army, that general Castanos remained at Andujar with the Spanish corps de reserve, and that it was general Reding, who directed the operations of the Spaniards, and signed the capitulation.

THE END.

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